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Search Results (28227 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89849 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Reject non-SCSI SRB on status IOCB fast path qla2x00_status_entry() filters out non-TYPE_SRB entries and the SRB_NVME_CMD, SRB_BIDI_CMD and SRB_TM_CMD types, then falls through to a SCSI fast path that assumes the command is an SRB_SCSI_CMD. The first thing on that path, qla_chk_edif_rx_sa_delete_pending(), and the subsequent handling both evaluate GET_CMD_SP(sp), i.e. sp->u.scmd.cmd. The srb u union overlays the SCSI command pointer with other command layouts (bsg_job, iocb_cmd). If firmware delivers an unexpected STATUS_TYPE IOCB for a non-SCSI handle, sp->u.scmd.cmd can read as a non-NULL garbage pointer, bypassing the NULL checks in qla_chk_edif_rx_sa_delete_pending() and at the cp == NULL test, and leading to a wild pointer dereference. Reject any SRB whose type is not SRB_SCSI_CMD before entering the fast path. The outstanding_cmds slot is left untouched so a genuinely non-SCSI command still completes through its proper handler. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89873 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: v4l2-ctrls: validate HEVC EXT SPS RPS counts The HEVC SPS control carries the short-term and long-term RPS counts that decoder drivers use to walk the matching EXT SPS dynamic arrays. Reject SPS values that exceed the HEVC limits of 64 short-term sets and 32 long-term references so drivers cannot later index beyond those controls. Also reject EXT SPS ST RPS entries whose negative or positive picture counts exceed the 16-entry arrays, or whose combined delta-POC count exceeds the HEVC DPB maximum. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89819 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: validate plane degamma LUT size for private color prop Unlike the CRTC degamma path, which is guarded by amdgpu_dm_verify_lut_sizes(), the per-plane degamma LUT size was never validated before use. __set_dm_plane_degamma() passed the user-supplied size straight into __is_lut_linear() and, for a non-linear LUT, into __set_input_tf() -> __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(), the latter always iterating MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES entries regardless of the actual LUT size. A malformed AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT blob (e.g. a single entry) could thus trigger a divide-by-zero in __is_lut_linear() or an out-of-bounds read in __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(). Reject any plane degamma LUT whose size does not match MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES, mirroring the invariant the code already asserts a few lines below (and which the CRTC path enforces). The AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT property is only exposed on builds with AMD_PRIVATE_COLOR defined. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89825 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: fix firmware control interface bounds checks panthor_init_cs_iface() and panthor_init_csg_iface() validate firmware control interface offsets with 32-bit arithmetic and the size of the host wrapper structures. The offsets are derived from firmware-provided strides, so the arithmetic can wrap before the bounds check, and the host wrapper size is not the size of the firmware control interface being mapped. Use 64-bit arithmetic for the computed offsets and validate against the actual firmware control interface structure sizes with subtraction-based bounds checks. Also validate that the shared section is large enough for the global control interface before using it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89838 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: limit recovery filename logging to stored length F2FS stores recovery filenames as a length plus a fixed-size i_name buffer. The buffer is not NUL-terminated, but recover_inode() and recover_dentry() print it with %s. For a 255-byte filename, recovery logging can read past i_name into the following raw inode fields. Print the name with a precision bounded by i_namelen and F2FS_NAME_LEN. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89929 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nVM: Ensure INVVPID is emulated on the correct physical CPU When emulating INVVPID, KVM executes INVVPID on the physical CPU using vpid02 (instead of the L1 assigned VPID), after doing some validations on the operands. However, it is possible that the physical CPU KVM executes INVVPID on is different from the CPU L2 is running on. For example, in the following scenario: - L2 runs on CPU #1 and exits to L1 (vmx->nested.vmcs02.cpu=1) - L1 migrates to CPU #2 and executes INVVPID - KVM executes INVVPID on CPU #2 - L1 migrates back to CPU #1 and runs L2 (vmx->nested.vmcs02.cpu=1) The TLB entries on CPU #1 are never invalidated, because INVVPID was executed on CPU #2, and vmcs02 never ran on a different pCPU (i.e. vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs() will *not* request KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH). Ensure that INVVPID is being executed on the same pCPU that L2 last ran on, and if not, fallback to clearing last_vpid=0 to trigger a full VPID flush on the next nested VM-Enter (as KVM will detect L1 using a different VPID for L2). If L2 ends up running on a different pCPU, KVM will flush the TLB anyway through vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89859 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Zero dport diagnostics buffer to avoid info leak qla2x00_do_dport_diagnostics() allocates the qla_dport_diag response buffer with kmalloc_obj() (non-zeroing) and, on success, copies the full sizeof(*dd) back to user space via sg_copy_from_buffer(). The inbound sg_copy_to_buffer() only fills as many bytes as the user request payload provides, and qla26xx_dport_diagnostics() zeroes only dd->buf. The options and unused[] fields are therefore copied out uninitialized, leaking kernel heap contents to user space. Allocate with kzalloc_obj(), matching qla2x00_do_dport_diagnostics_v2(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89952 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: validate ONFI extended parameter page sections nand_flash_detect_ext_param_page() allocates the length declared by the ONFI parameter page, then treats the data as a fixed header followed by variable-length sections. It reads that header and advances over sections without first proving that the fixed page and each current section fit in the allocation. Reject pages shorter than the fixed header, track the remaining variable area while walking sections, and require the ECC section to contain every field read from struct onfi_ext_ecc_info. Use device-scoped diagnostics that identify the malformed ONFI section. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89984 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/intel: Fix kernel address leakages in LBR stack Before Arch LBR gained CPL filtering support, a user-only branch stack could still contain kernel addresses. As a result, kernel branch records may be exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. For example, on Intel Tiger Lake, the following command can still report SYSRET/ERET entries with kernel-space from addresses: $ ./perf record -e cycles:p -o - --branch-filter any,save_type,u -- \ ./perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \ ./perf script -i - --fields brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \ grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}' Total time: 0.000 [sec] 0.219000 usecs/op 4,566,210 ops/sec [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.551 MB - ] 0xffffffff93c001c8/0x7f12a2b1d647/P/-/-/16959/SYSRET/- 0xffffffff93c001c8/0x7f12a2b1d5c2/P/-/-/17535/SYSRET/- 0xffffffff93c01928/0x7f12a2861000/P/-/-/6719/ERET/- 0xffffffff93c01928/0x7f12a297a000/P/-/-/8575/ERET/- The problem is that intel_pmu_lbr_filter() does not fully validate the privilege level of sampled entries. It filters some mismatches based on the branch type and the to address, but it does not reject entries whose from address violates the requested branch privilege filter. Fix this by extending software filtering to validate both from and to addresses against br_sel. Any LBR entry contains kernel address does not match the requested user filter is dropped. This prevents kernel addresses from appearing in user-only branch stacks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-40533 | 2026-09-18 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| An exposure of sensitive information through data queries vulnerability in Desktop API in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 7.2.1-69057-10, 7.2.2-72806-7 and 7.3.2-86009-2 allows remote attackers to obtain non-sensitive information. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56597 | 2026-09-18 | 3.1 Low | ||
| HCL BigFix Service Management is affected by a Sensitive Information Leakage vulnerability, which could allow an unauthenticated attacker to extract internal IP addresses from the application's responses, enabling them to map the underlying network topology and identify potential internal targets. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90015 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB. xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers, copies the data back into the URB's buffer. The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg, under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments. That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them. Only the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped. The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce. Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash block. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them into a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each. At 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every segment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to wMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and dm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted: device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted A reproducer running this under qemu is available at https://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity The bounce state (bounce_buf, bounce_dma, bounce_len, bounce_offs) already lives on the ring segment, so there is nothing extra to track. Keep recording the last bounced segment in td->bounce_seg and, on completion, walk the segments from td->start_seg up to it, unmapping every segment that still has a pending bounce. Stopping at td->bounce_seg rather than td->end_seg matters: a bounce implies the TD continues past that segment's link TRB, so bounce_seg is always strictly before end_seg, and a later TD may already have started in end_seg and been bounced there. Walking that far would copy a foreign bounce buffer into this URB and unmap it twice. It also keeps the walk correct if a TD ever wraps the whole ring so that end_seg == start_seg. [mn: Add ring->num_segs check to prevent unlikely infinite for loop.] | ||||
| CVE-2026-89907 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: KVM: Validate MSI data before routing it to EIOINTC pch_msi_set_irq() passes e->msi.data straight into eiointc_set_irq() as the irq number. The MSI data comes from userspace, that either via a KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI entry set with KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING (used by irqfd and KVM_IRQ_LINE) or directly via KVM_SIGNAL_MSI, and is never checked against EIOINTC_IRQS. eiointc_set_irq() uses the value with __set_bit()/__clear_bit() on the 256-bit isr bitmap, eiointc_update_irq() then indexes sw_coremap[] and the per-cpu coreisr/sw_coreisr bitmaps with it. Therefore a data value >= 256 reads and writes memory past the end of those arrays, i.e. any process holding a VM fd can corrupt kernel memory beyond the allocation of loongarch_eiointc. Reject MSI data that doesn't fit in the EIOINTC irq space. The DMSINTC path is unaffected as it decodes the vector from the address and masks it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-67100 | 2026-09-18 | 9.8 Critical | ||
| HCL BigFix Service Management is affected by SQL Injection flaw and a Cross-Tenant Data Exposure flaw vulnerabilities. which could allow an authenticated attacker to inject database commands to extract sensitive system details, as well as manipulate request values to gain unauthorized access to full personal profile data and PII across different organizations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90011 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is '>' and login->req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding bytes, where padding = ((-payload_length) & 3); any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL terminator. The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL to ';', so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and the CHAP path is never entered. Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS bytes, so the buffer is always terminated. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12954 | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High | ||
| The Mapster WP Maps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary User Meta Write in all versions up to, and including, 1.23.0 via the `my_profile_update()` function. This is due to the function performing no nonce verification, no capability check, and no allowlist validation on the meta key supplied via the `acf-photo-gallery-groups` POST parameter before passing both the meta key and its corresponding value directly to `update_user_meta()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to update arbitrary user meta values, though privilege escalation is not possible. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89981 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: Don't read GMID_EL1 when MTE is disabled __cpuinfo_store_cpu() gates the GMID_EL1 read on the raw ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, so it reads the register even when the kernel has disabled MTE (CONFIG_ARM64_MTE=n or arm64.nomte). KVM sets HCR_EL2.TID5 in that case, and pKVM injects an UNDEF the host cannot handle: Internal error: Oops - Undefined instruction: 0000000002000000 [#1] SMP pc : __cpuinfo_store_cpu+0xf4/0x264 Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! Only pKVM reaches it, and only after a CPU is offlined and brought back online: its CPU_ON relay sets the host HCR before the CPU enters EL1, while plain nVHE sets it at CPUHP_AP_KVM_ONLINE. Gate the read on the CPU's own ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 with the command-line override applied, and on CONFIG_ARM64_MTE, which no register reflects. The boot CPU stores its registers before init_cpu_features() strips an unsafe override, so clamp against the hardware value here too. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92770 | 2 Goharbor, Linuxfoundation | 2 Harbor, Harbor | 2026-09-18 | 6.5 Medium |
| Harbor through 2.15.2 fails to properly restrict the q query parameter filtering on scanner registration access credentials. Project administrators can exploit fuzzy filtering on the AccessCredential column to recover the scanner adapter secret one character at a time through response row counts. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90042 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers The fscrypt subsystem uses the scatterlist crypto API, inheriting its requirement that any buffers are in the linear mapping region. However, the messenger client uses kvmalloc() to create buffers for messages, which will occasionally place those buffers in the vmalloc() region when physical memory fragmentation doesn't permit a large enough kmalloc(). The various callers of ceph_fname_to_usr() directly pass (slices of) raw messages from the MDS without considering that the messages may be in vmalloc() buffers, resulting in oopses especially on non-x86 platforms (see 'Closes:' for more details and a reproducer). Make ceph_fname_to_usr() explicitly tolerant of vmalloc()-allocated fname->ctext, fname->name, and/or oname->name buffers, using `tname` (which, when non-null, must be a linear address; when null, is briefly allocated as necessary) as a bounce buffer to avoid passing any inappropriate addresses to fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(). Additionally change parse_reply_info_readdir() -- the only function to supply its own `tname` -- to follow the new "tname must never come from vmalloc()" rule by passing NULL when the message is not in the linear region. Though this causes a per-dentry kmalloc()+kfree(), this overhead exists only when processing the minority of messages that spill into vmalloc(). My (crude) testing puts this at only about 1 in 8,000 readdir messages. Still, if the overhead proves unreasonable in the future, it is easy enough to mitigate: a future change could allocate a bounce buffer in parse_reply_info_readdir() and use that as `tname` instead. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89278 | 2026-09-18 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| The GPTranslate – Multilingual AI Translation Agent for WordPress: Translate Your Site with AI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 2.34.6 via the enqueue_frontend_scripts. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract the plaintext third-party AI provider API key (OpenAI, DeepL, xAI/Grok, Gemini, Claude, or Google Cloud Translation) — a credential granting billed account access — by fetching any public page and applying the inverse transformation bundled in the plugin's own public JavaScript asset. This exposure affects the default configuration (gpt-3.5-turbo in client mode) and all supported non-DeepSeek providers; only deepseek-* models and gpt-* models configured in server-proxy mode correctly suppress key emission. | ||||