{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-61652", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-07-10T18:25:21.466Z", "datePublished": "2026-09-21T21:13:26.969Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T21:13:26.969Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "Zapros: Streaming decoders ignored the requested chunk size, allowing a single compressed response chunk to allocate unbounded memory (decompression bomb)", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-770", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV4_0": {"attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.7, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "version": "4.0"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/kap-sh/zapros/security/advisories/GHSA-6cp7-3m3c-5x5c", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/kap-sh/zapros/security/advisories/GHSA-6cp7-3m3c-5x5c"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "kap-sh", "product": "zapros", "versions": [{"version": "< 0.14.0", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T21:13:26.969Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Zapros, a Python HTTP client, prior to version 0.14.0 is vulnerable to denial of service via memory exhaustion. The issue affects all callers who streamed compressed responses relying on the chunk size \u2014 explicit (`iter_bytes(chunk_size=...)`) or the default \u2014 to bound memory. The decoder ignored that bound, so a chunk could be far larger than requested and a single compressed response could overflow memory. Version 0.14.0 contains a patch. Some workarounds are available. Read the still-compressed body with `Response.iter_raw()` / `Response.async_iter_raw()`, which bypass the built-in decoders, and decompress it yourself with an explicit output-size bound (e.g. `zlib`'s `max_length`), aborting once a configured limit is exceeded. Where feasible, send `Accept-Encoding: identity` to disable response compression so bodies are not decompressed client-side. Avoid decoding response bodies from untrusted servers."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-6cp7-3m3c-5x5c", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

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