Description
GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name() to constrain the `name` field, and GitPython's own containment guard Submodule._to_relative_path() is applied in add() and move(), Submodule.update() derives the absolute checkout location from the raw `path` value without that guard. A .gitmodules entry containing directory traversal components (e.g., path = ../../../tmp/escaped) can therefore cause directories to be created via os.makedirs() outside the repository working tree, populated from the submodule URL on the clone path, and removed via shutil.rmtree() when force_remove is used. Exploitation requires an application flow that updates submodules at a non-HEAD commit (such as a historical-commit API); the common clone-then-update flow re-derives the path from a canonical tree lookup and is not affected. The issue is fixed in GitPython 3.1.62.
Published: 2026-09-26
Score: 8.7 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
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Remediation

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History

Sat, 26 Sep 2026 13:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name() to constrain the `name` field, and GitPython's own containment guard Submodule._to_relative_path() is applied in add() and move(), Submodule.update() derives the absolute checkout location from the raw `path` value without that guard. A .gitmodules entry containing directory traversal components (e.g., path = ../../../tmp/escaped) can therefore cause directories to be created via os.makedirs() outside the repository working tree, populated from the submodule URL on the clone path, and removed via shutil.rmtree() when force_remove is used. Exploitation requires an application flow that updates submodules at a non-HEAD commit (such as a historical-commit API); the common clone-then-update flow re-derives the path from a canonical tree lookup and is not affected. The issue is fixed in GitPython 3.1.62.
Title GitPython before 3.1.62 Path Traversal via gitmodules path
First Time appeared Gitpython Project
Gitpython Project gitpython
Weaknesses CWE-22
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:gitpython_project:gitpython:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Gitpython Project
Gitpython Project gitpython
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Subscriptions

Gitpython Project Gitpython
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: VulnCheck

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-26T13:23:48.759Z

Reserved: 2026-09-26T02:37:41.037Z

Link: CVE-2026-100689

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-26T14:16:53.420

Modified: 2026-09-26T14:16:53.420

Link: CVE-2026-100689

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses