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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89613 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: reject invalid empty mapping pairs Reject an attribute with empty mapping pairs if it has inconsistent highest VCN and size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89588 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: APEI: GHES: fix ARM section length accounting after header In ghes_handle_arm_hw_error(), after skipping the cper_sec_proc_arm header with (err + 1), the remaining length was reduced by sizeof(err) (pointer size) instead of sizeof(*err) (structure size). That overestimates the bytes left for cper_arm_err_info records and can let the parser read past the CPER section when err_info_num is large enough relative to error_data_length. Use sizeof(*err) so the length accounting matches the pointer advance and the earlier sizeof(*err) size check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89584 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: validate user space vectors during extraction The bio-based drivers don't necessarily check the alignment split, and stacking block drivers don't always handle a misalignment detected after submitting the bio. Validate user vectors against the device's dma_alignment as the bio is built from the iov_iter, rejecting misaligned early with -EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89574 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm array: validate array block headers on read array_block_check() validates blocknr and csum and nothing else, while node_check(), next to it, has bounded the structural fields since both were written. dm_array_cursor_next() takes its loop bound from the on-disk nr_entries and element_at() is unguarded pointer arithmetic, so a count larger than the block holds keeps the cursor in one block while the index grows past it and the read walks off the dm-bufio buffer -- dm_cache_load_mappings() drives it once per cache block at activation. Check the header against itself: reject a zero value_size, require max_entries to equal calc_max_entries() for that value_size and block size, and require nr_entries to fit. Equality rather than an upper bound, since a count below the real capacity trips BUG_ON() in fill_ablock() and trim_ablock(). Metadata dm-array writes satisfies all three. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89571 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/features: bound fwctl command payload to the input buffer fwctl_cmd_rpc() copies cmd->in_len bytes into inbuf = kvzalloc(cmd->in_len) and passes inbuf and in_len to ->fw_rpc(). The CXL callback cxlctl_fw_rpc() ignores in_len and never checks the user-controlled op_size against it. cxlctl_set_feature() bounds op_size only from below (op_size <= sizeof(feat_in->hdr)) and then reads op_size - sizeof(hdr) bytes from feat_in->feat_data via cxl_set_feature(). With a small in_len and a large op_size the first memcpy() already reads past the kvzalloc(in_len) buffer; the out-of-bounds bytes are placed in the mailbox payload and sent to the device, and a large enough op_size can walk into unmapped memory and oops the kernel. The Get paths pin op_size to a fixed size but likewise read the input struct without checking in_len. Reject, at the single dispatch point, any request whose fixed header plus op_size does not fit in the copied-in buffer. The lower-bound test guards the subtraction and ensures op_size was copied in before it is read. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89537 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject short RFC 4121 MIC tokens in gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2 gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() reads the token ID at ptr[0..1], the flags byte at ptr[2], and padding at ptr[3..7], then passes ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN and cksum_len to gss_krb5_mic_build_sg(). None of these accesses check read_token->len first. The minimum safe token size is GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) plus ctx->krb5e->cksum_len (12-24, depending on the enctype). All callers accept shorter tokens from the wire: - gss_unwrap_resp_integ() enforces only an upper bound (offset + len <= rcv_buf->len) before allocating mic.data = kmalloc(len) and passing it to gss_verify_mic(). A malicious NFS server can therefore supply a short checksum opaque, producing a small slab allocation that the Kerberos MIC verifier reads past. - gss_validate() enforces only len <= RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE (400) before passing the wire-supplied length to gss_validate_seqno_mic(), which constructs a mic xdr_netobj and calls gss_verify_mic(). - svcauth_gss_verify_header() enforces only checksum.len >= XDR_UNIT (4 bytes) before dispatching to gss_verify_mic(). - svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ() checks only that the checksum fits in gsd->gsd_scratch. Add a length guard at the top of gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(), before any ptr[] access or scatterlist construction. Well-formed MIC tokens from gss_krb5_get_mic_v2() already have exactly GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cksum_len bytes, so valid traffic is unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89526 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Validate Read chunk positions before reconstruction The RPC/RDMA Read chunk position field is supplied by the remote client and stored verbatim in the parsed chunk list. xdr_count_read_segments() checks only 4-byte alignment; it never compares the position against the received inline body length. In the single-chunk path, svc_rdma_read_complete_one() splits the head and tail kvecs at ch_position. A position past the inline body underflows the tail length, exposing adjacent slab memory to the upper XDR decoder. In the multi-chunk path, svc_rdma_read_multiple_chunks() computes gap lengths between chunks as unsigned subtractions from ch_position. Overlapping Read chunks cause these subtractions to underflow. A final position past the inline body likewise underflows the trailing gap length. svc_rdma_copy_inline_range() then copies past the receive buffer into request pages that are returned to the client through the Reply channel. Bound inline-range copies in svc_rdma_copy_inline_range() against the decoded inline RPC body saved in rc_saved_arg. Reject a single Read chunk positioned beyond that body, and reject multi-chunk lists where accumulated read bytes exceed the next chunk's position. Apply the same position and overlap checks in the call-chunk interleaving path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80985 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: carry oversized SMC-Rv2 LLC messages in the queue entry smc_llc_rmt_delete_rkey() and smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys() read the part of a v2 message that does not fit into the 44-byte union smc_llc_msg, and both bound themselves by the size of the buffer it landed in, not by what arrived. On a link with a shared v2 receive buffer a 44-byte DELETE_RKEY_V2 declaring 255 rkeys reaches rkey[9..254] in whatever an earlier message left in lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2, and passes each of them to smc_rtoken_delete(). One of those 255 matched a registered rtoken and deleted it. An ADD_LINK on such a link installs up to 255 rtokens from the same bytes. Copy the tail into the queue entry, so its length is the length of the message that arrived, and declare the rkeys that fit inline as a member of the union instead of reaching them through a cast. The same DELETE_RKEY_V2 now processes the 9 rkeys it carries. The copy is limited to the longest tail the two functions can read, so the peer does not pick the size of the entry. The bound the previous patch placed on links without a shared v2 receive buffer is no longer needed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80962 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate geometry fields from on-disk cache_info cache_segs_init() iterates cache_info->n_segs times indexing cache->segments[], which is sized to the cache device geometry, and get_seg_id() takes each segment id from the on-media cache_info and the per-segment next_seg link. Both come from cache device metadata that is only CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls them: an oversized n_segs or an out-of-range id drives an out-of-bounds access of cache->segments[] and a wild CACHE_DEV_SEGMENT() pointer into the device mapping -- an out-of-bounds read and write from on-disk data. Reject an n_segs that exceeds the device segment count and a segment id that is out of range before either is used. Valid metadata is unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80961 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key's intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller's bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public. Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80959 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: bound the persisted tail-position offset cache_pos_decode() takes the persisted key_tail and dirty_tail seg_off from the cache device and addresses within the segment with it. A seg_off at or past the segment data_size, controllable by whoever supplies the device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN), reads past the segment data. Reject a decoded seg_off that is not below the segment data_size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80958 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: clamp the tail kset read to the segment data region The tail-kset read in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker bounds its length by PCACHE_SEG_SIZE - seg_off, the raw segment size rather than the data region. A tail near the segment end reads past the segment data into the following control area. Clamp the read to cache_seg_remain(), the data region. | ||||
| CVE-2026-78511 | 1 Microsoft | 12 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft Office Ltsc For Mac 2021 and 9 more | 2026-09-13 | 8.8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-9800 | 1 Redhat | 4 Build Keycloak, Build Of Keycloak, Jbosseapxp and 1 more | 2026-09-13 | 8.1 High |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak Policy Enforcer. This vulnerability allows any authenticated user to bypass all authorization policies, including role, scope, and User-Managed Access (UMA) permission checks. By including the configured access-denied page path within a request URL, either as a path segment or a query parameter, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to protected resources. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89629 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-12 | 5.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: corsair-void: Check size of status and firmware events before reading them Malformed status and firmware events could cause an out-of-bounds read since the size wasn't being checked. Check the size and warn on unexpected values to avoid this. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89666 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-12 | 6.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: reject out-of-range nseconds in NFSv3 SETATTR and create ops A client can send an NFSv3 SETATTR, CREATE, MKDIR, SYMLINK or MKNOD carrying an atime or mtime whose nseconds field is out of range. The value is well-formed on the wire and decodes cleanly into a valid uint32, but it is not a valid timespec64: tv_nsec must be less than NSEC_PER_SEC. Nothing in the setattr path clamps it. notify_change() runs the time through timestamp_truncate(), which does not reduce tv_nsec below NSEC_PER_SEC when the filesystem supports nanosecond granularity (s_time_gran == 1), and the inode atime/mtime setters store it verbatim (only ctime is normalized, via inode_set_ctime_to_ts()). The un-normalized value then corrupts on-disk metadata: ext4's ext4_encode_extra_time() shifts tv_nsec left by EXT4_EPOCH_BITS, which overflows the 32-bit extra field and clobbers the seconds-epoch bits, so the stored seconds (and thus the year) are wrong on read-back. XFS with bigtime mis-stores the timestamp for the same reason. Validate the client-supplied atime/mtime in the proc handlers and return NFS3ERR_INVAL before anything is changed. RFC 1813 lists NFS3ERR_INVAL for SETATTR and describes it as the error for a value the server 'can not store ... in its own representation'; the client maps it to EINVAL. Checking in the proc handlers, rather than in nfsd_setattr(), keeps the rejection in front of object creation. The create operations create the object before nfsd_create_setattr() runs, so a late failure would leave the new object behind and turn a non-idempotent request into a namespace change that reports failure. The check is therefore done up front, for the create operations before the object is created. tv_nsec is a long, so the comparison casts it to unsigned long (the same width) rather than to u32, matching timespec64_valid(). A u32 cast would truncate on 64-bit; the unsigned long cast also rejects a value that became negative when an out-of-range u32 wire nseconds was assigned to a 32-bit long. Only client-supplied times are checked: SET_TO_SERVER_TIME requests carry no client value. The sattrguard3 ctime is deliberately left alone: an out-of-range guard simply never matches the object's ctime and yields NFS3ERR_NOT_SYNC via the existing guardtime comparison, which is the protocol-correct outcome rather than rejecting the request. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89759 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-12 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/kmemleak: avoid soft lockup when scanning task stacks Patch series "mm/kmemleak: avoid soft lockup when scanning task", v3. kmemleak_scan() scans every task stack under one rcu_read_lock() with no reschedule point, which can trip the soft lockup watchdog on hosts with very many threads. That prints the following message, depending on the workload+host configuration: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#35 stuck for 22s! [kmemleak:537] scan_block kmemleak_scan kmemleak_scan_thread kthread Patch 1 walks the tasks with find_ge_pid() so the scan reschedules between tasks Patches 2-3 let the scan loops stop early once a scan is interrupted. This patch (of 3): kmemleak_scan() walks every thread and scans its kernel stack under a single rcu_read_lock() with no reschedule point. On a host with very many threads -- amplified by KASAN/lockdep in debug builds -- this loop can hog a CPU long enough to trip the soft lockup watchdog: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#35 stuck for 22s! [kmemleak:537] scan_block kmemleak_scan kmemleak_scan_thread kthread A cond_resched() cannot be added directly: the loop runs inside an RCU read-side critical section. Walk the tasks one PID at a time with find_ge_pid(), taking the RCU read lock only to look up and pin each task. The stack is then scanned with no lock held, so cond_resched() runs between tasks and the scan stops early on scan_should_stop(). This follows the next_tgid()/task_seq_get_next() iteration pattern and keeps each RCU critical section short. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89556 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-12 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: module: validate string table section types In elf_validity_cache_sechdrs, section sizes and offsets are validated, unless the section type is SHT_NULL or SHT_NOBITS. Later, elf_validity_cache_secstrings and elf_validity_cache_index_str access the section name table (.shstrtab) and symbol string table (.strtab) headers without first ensuring that their types are SHT_STRTAB. If a section type is SHT_NULL or SHT_NOBITS, sh_offset has not been validated and may reference out-of-bounds memory when dereferenced in elf_validity_cache_secstrings or elf_validity_cache_strtab. Validate that both string section headers are of type SHT_STRTAB before caching them. | ||||
| CVE-2026-85875 | 1 Microsoft | 16 365, 365 Apps, Excel and 13 more | 2026-09-12 | 5.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72973 | 1 Microsoft | 15 365, 365 Apps, Microsoft 365 and 12 more | 2026-09-12 | 8.8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||