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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-93176 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix dangling pointer in plane reset function amdgpu_dm_plane_drm_plane_reset() frees the old state before allocating a new one. If kzalloc() fails, the function returns without updating the state pointer, leaving a dangling pointer to already freed memory. Fix this by allocating the new state first. On allocation failure, the old state remains untouched and the function safely returns. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. [adjust for movement around current amd-staging-drm-next] | ||||
| CVE-2026-93183 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/lima: call drm_mm_init() with a valid allocation range lima_vm_create() is currently run before va_start and va_end are set up, meaning they are both 0. lima_vm_create() runs drm_mm_init() with them as arguments for the allocator, and if DRM_DEBUG_MM is enabled the DRM_MM_BUG_ON check in drm_mm_init then fires, as seen here on exynos4412-odroid-u2: [ 1.736297] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1.740370] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mm.c:931! [ 1.745574] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM [ 1.750697] Modules linked in: [ 1.753734] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 41 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Not tainted 7.0.10-postmarketos-exynos4 #11 PREEMPT [ 1.763372] Hardware name: Samsung Exynos (Flattened Device Tree) [ 1.769446] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 1.775261] PC is at drm_mm_init+0x9c/0xa4 [ 1.779339] LR is at lima_vm_create+0x144/0x17c [ ... ] Fix the issue by moving the lima_vm_create() call after va_start and va_end are set up. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93185 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove rt700_sdw_remove() drains jack_detect_work and jack_btn_check_work only when rt700->hw_init is true. That state bit is cleared by rt700_update_status() when the SoundWire slave becomes UNATTACHED, but a jack work item can already have been queued by rt700_interrupt_callback() or rt700_jack_init() while the device was initialized. Do not use hw_init as the remove-time guard for draining these work objects. The delayed works are initialized during rt700_init(), so remove can cancel them unconditionally and pair the object lifetime with the codec-private data lifetime instead of a mutable hardware state bit. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by manual review of the SoundWire status, interrupt and remove paths. The remove path should drain work based on whether the work object exists, not on a runtime hardware state bit that can change after the work was queued. A QEMU PoC queued jack_detect_work, simulated SDW_SLAVE_UNATTACHED, and then entered remove. DEBUG_OBJECTS reported an active timer/work object associated with the rt700 jack work path after remove skipped the cancel. This is sent as an RFC because the practical trigger depends on SoundWire core remove ordering after an UNATTACHED status update. If remove cannot run after hw_init has been cleared while jack work is still pending, this is a defensive lifecycle cleanup rather than a reachable race on current systems. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93140 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: Mark LVID buffer as uptodate before marking it dirty When an I/O error occurs while writing the Logical Volume Integrity Descriptor (LVID) buffer to the block device, the block layer's completion handler (`end_buffer_write_sync()`) clears the `BH_Uptodate` flag on the buffer. However, the buffer still contains valid LVID data in memory. If the filesystem is subsequently remounted read-write or synced, `udf_open_lvid()` or `udf_sync_fs()` will modify the LVID buffer and call `mark_buffer_dirty()`. This triggers a spurious `WARN_ON_ONCE(!buffer_uptodate(bh))` warning in `mark_buffer_dirty()` because the buffer is not marked uptodate, even though its in-memory contents are valid and are about to be overwritten. To prevent this spurious warning, unconditionally set the `BH_Uptodate` flag before calling `mark_buffer_dirty()` in `udf_open_lvid()` and `udf_sync_fs()`. This acknowledges that the in-memory buffer is valid and matches the workaround previously applied to `udf_close_lvid()` in commit 853a0c25baf9 ("udf: Mark LVID buffer as uptodate before marking it dirty"). Extending this workaround ensures consistent behavior across all LVID updates. Buffer I/O error on dev loop0, logical block 128, lost sync page write ------------[ cut here ]------------ !buffer_uptodate(bh) WARNING: fs/buffer.c:1087 at mark_buffer_dirty+0x299/0x410 fs/buffer.c:1087 ... Call Trace: <TASK> udf_open_lvid+0x369/0x5b0 fs/udf/super.c:2078 udf_reconfigure+0x336/0x540 fs/udf/super.c:679 reconfigure_super+0x232/0x8f0 fs/super.c:1080 vfs_cmd_reconfigure fs/fsopen.c:268 [inline] vfs_fsconfig_locked+0x171/0x320 fs/fsopen.c:297 __do_sys_fsconfig fs/fsopen.c:463 [inline] __se_sys_fsconfig+0x6b9/0x810 fs/fsopen.c:350 do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 </TASK> | ||||
| CVE-2026-93146 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: time/namespace: Validate nanosecond field in proc_timens_set_offset() The function validates tv_sec to be within [-KTIME_SEC_MAX, KTIME_SEC_MAX] but never validates that tv_nsec is within the valid range of [0, NSEC_PER_SEC-1] before using it in timespec64_add(). timespec64_add() expects both timespec64 structures to have normalized values with tv_nsec in the range [0, 999999999]. If off->val.tv_nsec contains invalid values (negative or >= NSEC_PER_SEC), it could lead to incorrect calculations or unexpected behavior. Add validation to ensure tv_nsec is within the valid range before performing the addition. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93149 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211_hwsim: avoid NULL skb in stop queue drain mac80211_hwsim_stop() drops any frames left in data->pending. The loop currently checks skb_queue_empty() and then dequeues separately. That split is racy with TX status handling, which can remove a pending frame under the queue lock. If the last entry is removed after the empty check, skb_dequeue() returns NULL and the stop path passes that NULL skb to ieee80211_free_txskb(). Use skb_dequeue() as the loop condition instead. The dequeue result is the object that stop owns and frees, and a concurrent status completion that empties the queue simply makes the loop terminate. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93150 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup/cpuset: Make nr_deadline_tasks an atomic_t The nr_deadline_tasks variable in the cpuset structure was introduced by commit 6c24849f5515 ("sched/cpuset: Keep track of SCHED_DEADLINE task in cpusets"). It is reported by sashiko [1] that nr_deadline_tasks can currently be modified by inc_dl_tasks_cs() under rq->lock and by cpuset_attach() under cpuset_mutex. So if both updates happen simultaneously, the nr_deadline_tasks variable can be corrupted leading to incorrect operations down the road. Fix that by changing its type to atomic_t so that nr_deadline_tasks are always atomically updated. This fix patch is a low hanging fruit. It can handle some of the races between a concurrent sched_setscheduler() and cpuset_can_attach()/cpuset_attach() calls, but not all of them like the other issue raised by sashiko [2]. This will be handled hopefully in a future follow up patch. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260626181923.133658-1-longman%40redhat.com [2] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260630033344.352702-1-longman%40redhat.com | ||||
| CVE-2026-93163 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwrng: core - fix rng list on registration error hwrng_register(rng) does the following: 1. Checks if rng has name and read methods set 2. Checks if the name already exists 3. Adds rng to global rng_list 4. May try to set rng to current_rng If step 4 fails, it returns an error. However, it does not remove the rng from rng_list, causing a dangling reference which can result in use-after-free if the caller frees rng, since registration failed. Add a list_del_init() cleanup step. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93164 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10 Andrii reported an issue with optimized uprobes [1] that can clobber redzone area with call instruction storing return address on stack where user code may keep temporary data without adjusting rsp. Fixing this by moving the optimized uprobes on top of 10-bytes nop instruction, so we can squeeze another instruction to escape the redzone area before doing the call, like: lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp call tramp Note the lea instruction is used to adjust the rsp register without changing the flags. We use nop10 and following transformation to optimized instructions above and back as suggested by Peterz [2]. Optimize path (int3_update_optimize): 1) Initial state after set_swbp() installed the uprobe: cc 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 From offset 0 this is INT3 followed by the tail of the original 10-byte NOP. After a previous unoptimization bytes 5..9 may still contain the old call instruction, which remains valid for threads already there. 2) Rewrite the LEA tail and call displacement: cc [8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3] From offset 0 this traps on the uprobe INT3. Bytes 1..9 are not executable entry points while byte 0 is trapped. 3) Publish the first LEA byte: [48] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this is: lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp call <uprobe-trampoline> Unoptimize path (int3_update_unoptimize): 1) Initial optimized state: 48 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 Same as 3) above. 2) Trap new entries before restoring the NOP bytes: [cc] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this traps. A thread that had already executed the LEA can still reach the intact CALL at offset 5. 3) Restore bytes 1..4 of the original NOP while keeping byte 0 trapped and byte 5 as CALL. cc [2e 0f 1f 84] e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this still traps. Offset 5 is still the CALL for any thread that was already past the first LEA byte. 4) Publish the first byte of the original NOP: [66] 2e 0f 1f 84 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this is the restored 10-byte NOP; the CALL opcode and displacement are now only NOP operands. Offset 5 still decodes as CALL for a thread that was already there. Tthere is only a single target uprobe-trampoline for the given nop10 instruction address, so the CALL instruction will not be changed across unoptimization/optimization cycles. Therefore, any task that is preempted at the CALL instruction is guaranteed to observe that CALL and not anything else. Note as explained in [2] we need to use following nop10: PF1 PF2 ESC NOPL MOD SIB DISP32 NOP10: 0x66, 0x2e, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 -- cs nopw 0x00000000(%rax,%rax,1) which means we need to allow 0x2e prefix which maps to INAT_PFX_CS attribute in is_prefix_bad function. Also changing the uprobe syscall error when called out of uprobe trampoline to -EPROTO, so we are able to detect the fixed kernel. The optimized uprobe performance stays the same: uprobe-nop : 3.129 ± 0.013M/s uprobe-push : 3.045 ± 0.006M/s uprobe-ret : 1.095 ± 0.004M/s --> uprobe-nop10 : 7.170 ± 0.020M/s uretprobe-nop : 2.143 ± 0.021M/s uretprobe-push : 2.090 ± 0.000M/s uretprobe-ret : 0.942 ± 0.000M/s --> uretprobe-nop10: 3.381 ± 0.003M/s usdt-nop : 3.245 ± 0.004M/s --> usdt-nop10 : 7.256 ± 0.023M/s [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260509003146.976844-1-andrii@kernel.org/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260518104306.GU3102624@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/#t | ||||
| CVE-2026-93169 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: zynqmp_dma: fix race between runtime PM and device removal In zynqmp_dma_remove(), runtime PM was disabled only after checking state and doing a manual suspend. This can race with runtime PM in the remove/unbind (rmmod) path. Disable runtime PM first, then suspend only if the device is not already suspended. To prevent any further runtime PM transitions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93193 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Fix OF node reference leak via auto cleanup Sashiko reported a reference leak in rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable(), the of_get_child_by_name() function does not call of_node_put() in a symmetrical way [1]. Fix the device node reference leak by using __free(device_node) to automatically manage of_node_put() for all device nodes. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93197 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcg: move LRU size accounting on reparenting instead of copying it When a memory cgroup is offlined its LRU folios are reparented to the parent. lruvec_reparent_lru() splices the child's lists into the parent's and credits the parent with the child's per-zone lru_zone_size[], but never clears the child's copy, so the size is copied rather than moved. lru_gen_reparent_memcg() does the same for MGLRU. The parent is left correct, credited with exactly the folios it took over. The stale value sits on the child and nothing will correct it: folio->memcg_data now resolves to the parent, so every later update_lru_size() for those folios goes there. Dying cgroups are not freed immediately and mem_cgroup_iter() still walks them, so shrink_lruvec() keeps being called on them. get_scan_count() reads the phantom counter through lruvec_lru_size() and the scan loop then grinds through nr[] in SWAP_CLUSTER_MAX steps against an empty list, for as long as the dead cgroup lives. Under MGLRU the MGLRU scanner runs instead, but count_shadow_nodes() sums all of NR_LRU_LISTS through lruvec_lru_size() and over-budgets the shadow node limit just the same. On one 251 GiB host a sweep of every mz->lru_zone_size[] found 380 counters describing folios on no list at all: 124777314 pages, 476 GiB, 1.89x the machine's RAM, across 57 cgroups. All were on memcgs with CSS_DYING set and CSS_ONLINE clear, and parent/child pairs reported byte-identical sizes. LRU_UNEVICTABLE needs its size moved too. Its list is deliberately not spliced because lruvec_init() poisons the head - the unevictable LRU is imaginary and folios are never threaded on it - but the size is kept by lruvec_add_folio()/lruvec_del_folio() and those folios account to the parent from here on. This depends on commit bf4ade7dbd76 ("memcg: keep folio's objcg same as its node") and must not be backported ahead of it. Without that invariant a folio's objcg can belong to another node, so a folio already spliced onto the parent's list can still resolve to the child's lruvec until the objcg's node is reparented in a later iteration of memcg_reparent_objcgs(); clearing the child's counter early then lets lruvec_del_folio() underflow it and trip the WARN_ONCE()/VM_BUG_ON() in mem_cgroup_update_lru_size(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-93742 | 1 Totolink | 1 A3002mu | 2026-09-19 | 9.9 Critical |
| A weakness has been identified in Totolink A3002MU Hh-B20211125.1046. Affected by this issue is the function formWsc of the file /boafrm/formWsc. This manipulation of the argument localPin causes command injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93173 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf,lsm: Drop bpf_prog_free from sleepable_lsm_hooks __bpf_prog_put_rcu() is the call_rcu() callback for non-sleepable programs. security_bpf_prog_free() called from there fires bpf_prog_free in softirq; if a sleepable LSM prog is attached to that hook, might_fault() BUGs: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5038 preempt_count: 101, expected: 0 Call Trace: <IRQ> __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x1cd/0x320 kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:1255 bpf_trampoline_6442549705+0x53/0xd7 security_bpf_prog_free+0xde/0x130 security/security.c:5465 __bpf_prog_put_rcu+0xab/0xd0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2365 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617 [inline] handle_softirqs+0x236/0x800 kernel/softirq.c:622 </IRQ> The call_rcu/call_rcu_tasks_trace split reflects the freed program's sleepability, not that of any attached observer. security_bpf_prog_free() also frees prog->aux->security, which has to stay after the grace period, so drop bpf_prog_free from sleepable_lsm_hooks rather than move the call. Non-sleepable observers still run there. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93174 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Copy per-CPU map value padding in copy_map_value_long() In kernel, per-CPU map elements are stored with round_up(map->value_size, 8) bytes. On UAPI lookup paths, it copies the rounded size for each CPU into a temporary buffer. However, copy_map_value_long() passes 'map->value_size' to bpf_obj_memcpy(). When the map has special fields, bpf_obj_memcpy() copies around those fields with memcpy(), and does not copy the tail padding between 'map->value_size' and round_up(map->value_size, 8). The temporary UAPI lookup buffers are allocated without __GFP_ZERO. As a result, when the per-CPU map's value size is not equal to round_up(map->value_size, 8), UAPI LOOKUP_ELEM and its variants can return stale heap contents from that padding to user space. The same issue applies to bpf_iter for per-CPU maps. Pass round_up(map->value_size, 8) to bpf_obj_memcpy() from copy_map_value_long(), so per-CPU maps both with and without special fields copy the entire per-CPU slot. Remove the now redundant round_up() from bpf_obj_memcpy()'s long_memcpy path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93182 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Fix overflow in update_tg_cfs_runnable() A divide-by-zero crash is observed when running hackbench: [14697.488452] CPU: 112 UID: 0 PID: 124791 Comm: hackbench Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2+ [14697.492627] RIP: 0010:propagate_entity_load_avg+0x35f/0x3e0 [14697.506799] <TASK> [14697.507411] __dequeue_task+0x2b4/0xc70 [14697.508677] dequeue_task_fair+0x36/0x370 [14697.509047] dequeue_task+0x101/0x2f0 [14697.509426] __schedule+0x1b1/0x1a00 [14697.510868] anon_pipe_read+0x3da/0x450 [14697.511400] vfs_read+0x361/0x390 [14697.512053] __x64_sys_read+0x19/0x30 The divide-by-zero happens here: if (scale_load_down(gcfs_rq->load.weight)) { load_sum = div_u64(gcfs_rq->avg.load_sum, scale_load_down(gcfs_rq->load.weight)); } gcfs_rq->load.weight is an insane large value and is truncated to the lower 32 bits by div_u64, which happen to be 0. Using AI for investigation, the cause is a u32 overflow in update_tg_cfs_runnable(), and flat pickup became a victim when using tg_tasks(): u32 new_sum, divider; ... new_sum = se->avg.runnable_avg * divider; <-- boom The following sequence shows how this triggers the crash: propagate_entity_load_avg() update_tg_cfs_runnable() # u32 overflow corrupts runnable_sum __update_load_avg_cfs_rq() ___update_load_avg() # computes insane runnable_avg update_tg_load_avg() # propagates to tg->runnable_avg update_cfs_group() calc_concur_shares() tg_tasks() # long-to-int truncation, negative nr reweight_entity() # corrupted se->load.weight update_load_add() # corrupted cfs_rq->load.weight propagate_entity_load_avg() update_tg_cfs_load() div_u64() # divide-by-zero Fix by widening new_sum from u32 to u64 (no need to force tg_tasks() to return unsigned long after this fix) | ||||
| CVE-2026-93184 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: fsl_audmix: rework runtime PM handling in probe After pm_runtime_enable() the AUDMIX block is powered off and stays suspended until the first runtime resume. Register writes issued between probe() and the first resume (e.g. from DAPM or ALSA control paths) target unpowered hardware and cause a system hang. Fix this by calling pm_runtime_resume_and_get() immediately after pm_runtime_enable() to power the hardware up and enable its clocks. Release the reference afterwards with pm_runtime_put() to allow the runtime PM framework to suspend the device and switch the regmap to cache-only mode when idle. When CONFIG_PM is disabled or runtime PM is not enabled, pm_runtime_* calls are stubs that do not power up the hardware. Handle this case explicitly by calling fsl_audmix_runtime_resume() directly so the hardware is always initialised and its clocks are enabled, ensuring register accesses succeed regardless of PM configuration. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93186 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/mbox: Clamp mailbox output allocation to the payload size CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND bounds the user's in.size to the mailbox payload size but leaves out.size unbounded, then cxl_mbox_cmd_ctor() calls kvzalloc(out.size). A large out.size drives a huge allocation, above INT_MAX it WARNs and taints, and with panic_on_warn=1 it panics. The transport __cxl_pci_mbox_send_cmd() already clamps the response copy to min(out.size, payload_size, device len), so the output buffer is never written beyond payload_size. Clamp the allocation to payload_size too, matching the RAW path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93188 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index kone_keep_values_up_to_date() and kone_profile_activated() use an 8-bit, device-supplied profile value as an index into the 5-element kone->profiles[] array without a range check. A malicious USB device claiming the Roccat Kone id can send a switch-profile event (or a startup_profile read at probe) with an out-of-range value and make the driver read out of bounds; the result is exposed via the actual_dpi sysfs attribute. Reject out-of-range indices in both paths. This was found with static analysis and confirmed with the KUnit test added in the following patch (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds). | ||||
| CVE-2026-9858 | 2026-09-19 | 4.3 Medium | ||
| The Partial Shipment for Woocommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in versions up to, and including, 3.4 via the wxp_order_shipment, wxp_order_item_shipment, and wxp_order_set_shipped AJAX actions. This is due to the AJAX handlers in woocommerce-partial-shipment.php (registered at lines 60–62 and implemented at lines 228, 263, and 291) lacking both capability checks and nonce verification, and not validating the calling user's ownership of the supplied order_id. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read arbitrary order item details (names, quantities, shipped counts) belonging to any customer and to modify the shipment status / shipped quantities of any order, which can also trigger order status transitions via the wxp_order_status action. | ||||