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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89977 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ethosu: check MMIO mapping errors in probe devm_platform_ioremap_resource() returns an error pointer when the register resource cannot be mapped. ethosu_probe() stores it and continues until initialization dereferences it through MMIO accessors. Return the mapping error before initializing the device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90029 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: storage: realtek_cr: fix use-after-free on disconnect realtek_cr_destructor() calls timer_delete() before the chip containing the timer is freed. The timer callback may still be running and can rearm itself, resulting in a use-after-free. Use timer_shutdown_sync() to wait for the callback and prevent further rearming. Do this unconditionally because ss_en may be changed after the timer is armed. Move timer_setup() into init_realtek_cr() so the timer is initialized before any failure path can invoke the destructor. Found by static analysis. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90040 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE'd. Use the same core logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page into the vCPU's control structure: 1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter 2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case) 3. Acquire mmu_lock for read 4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change. Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM's retry logic is fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives. If the guest_memfd page has been dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN. If the retry was due to a false positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events (and will retry in the "outer" loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as needed). Note #2! Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated on memslot bindings (KVM doesn't know what GFN range(s) to invalidate without a binding). And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a memslot, i.e. must be invalidated if its memslots disappears, regardless of the state of the underlying guest_memfd inode. Failure to invalidate the vCPU's control.vmsa_pa (which is checked by pre_sev_run()) can prevent KVM from properly freeing the page as firmware will reject the RMPUPDATE to reclaim the page with FAIL_INUSE if the vCPU is actively running, i.e. if VMSA page is in-use. That in turn leads to an RMP #PF on the next use, as the page will still be assigned to the SNP VM. SEV-SNP: RMPUPDATE failed for PFN 78d198, pg_level: 1, ret: 3 SEV-SNP: PFN 0x78d198, RMP entry: [0xfff0000000144001 - 0x000000000000000f] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70 rmpupdate+0x12c/0x140 rmp_make_shared+0x3b/0x60 sev_gmem_invalidate+0xe0/0x170 [kvm_amd] delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0 kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm] vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x496c7e </TASK> ------------[ cut here ]------------ SEV: Failed to update RMP entry for PFN 0x78d198 error -14 WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:5160 at sev_gmem_invalidate+0x126/0x170 [kvm_amd], CPU#3: sev_snp_vmsa_pu/31345 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026 RIP: 0010:sev_gmem_invalidate+0x12b/0x170 [kvm_amd] Call Trace: <TASK> delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0 kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm] vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x496c7e </TASK> irq event stamp: 20689 hardirqs last enabled at (20699): [<ffffffff8e76092c>] __console_unlock+0x5c/0x60 hardirqs last disabled at (20708): [<ffffffff8e760911>] __console_unlock+0x41/0x60 softirqs last enabled at (20722): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140 softirqs last disabled at (20717): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff99 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-89983 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: core: fix debugfs UAF on adapter removal i2c_del_adapter() frees the adapter's debugfs directory before it unregisters the adapter device, but the new_device sysfs attribute stays writable until device_del(). A write racing with removal still reaches i2c_device_probe(), which passes the freed adap->debugfs to debugfs_create_dir() as the new client's parent: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lookup_noperm_common+0x407/0x430 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88803ef87810 by task syz.0.61/6090 lookup_noperm_common+0x407/0x430 simple_start_creating+0x9c/0x110 debugfs_start_creating+0xdb/0x1a0 debugfs_create_dir+0x24/0x350 i2c_device_probe+0x814/0xbf0 It's technically possible to create a client after i2c_deregister_clients has run. That client will never be unregistered and make wait_for_completion hang. Close the window by removing the new_device attribute at the start of i2c_del_adapter(). device_remove_file() will drain any clients left. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90024 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: midi2: Fix null-pointer dereference in f_midi2_free_ep_reqs A null-pointer dereference occurs in f_midi2_free_ep_reqs() when attempting to clean up an endpoint that was never initialized. When configuring the MIDI 2.0 gadget via configfs and setting the block direction to SNDRV_UMP_DIR_INPUT, the initialization of the midi1_ep_out endpoint is explicitly skipped during the gadget bind phase (f_midi2_bind()). As a result, the usb_ep->card field remains NULL. Later, when the host sets the alternate setting, f_midi2_set_alt() unconditionally stops both the IN and OUT endpoints by calling f_midi2_stop_eps(), which in turn calls f_midi2_free_ep_reqs() for both endpoints. When f_midi2_free_ep_reqs() is called for the uninitialized midi1_ep_out, it attempts to dereference usb_ep->card to determine the number of requests to free, leading to a crash. Fix this by using usb_ep->num_reqs instead of usb_ep->card->info.num_reqs in f_midi2_free_ep_reqs(). usb_ep->num_reqs is correctly set during f_midi2_init_ep() and remains 0 if the endpoint was never initialized, safely avoiding the loop. For consistency, apply the same change to f_midi2_alloc_ep_reqs(). Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000ee: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000770-0x0000000000000777] ... RIP: 0010:f_midi2_free_ep_reqs drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi2.c:1166 [inline] RIP: 0010:f_midi2_stop_eps+0x28e/0x4d0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi2.c:1246 ... Call Trace: <TASK> f_midi2_set_alt+0x11c/0xf00 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi2.c:1296 composite_setup+0x1ffd/0x3480 drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c:1933 configfs_composite_setup+0xbd/0x100 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:1877 | ||||
| CVE-2026-89991 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix infinite loop in pcpu_freelist push with one possible CPU __pcpu_freelist_push() can loop forever when only one CPU is possible and an NMI re-enters pcpu_freelist_push() while the interrupted context holds that CPU's freelist lock. After the current-CPU fast path fails, the fallback loop walks cpu_possible_mask while skipping the current CPU. With CONFIG_SMP=n, or when an SMP kernel is limited to one possible CPU with nr_cpus=1 or possible_cpus=1, there are no other possible CPUs to examine. The loop therefore makes no lock acquisition attempt and can never make progress. The following stack was observed on a UP system: NMI context: pcpu_freelist_push free_htab_elem htab_map_delete_elem [perf-event BPF program] __perf_event_overflow perf_event_nmi_handler exc_nmi Interrupted context: __pcpu_freelist_push pcpu_freelist_push free_htab_elem htab_map_delete_elem [raw_tp/sys_enter BPF program] __bpf_trace_sys_enter do_syscall_64 raw_res_spin_lock() detects the same-CPU recursive acquisition and returns -EDEADLK, but the subsequent fallback loop has no candidate head on a system with one possible CPU. Restore the extra fallback head that existed before the rqspinlock conversion. Keep the current-CPU fast path, then try the other possible CPUs and finally the extra head. The additional head lets a push, which cannot fail without losing a preallocated element, make progress when the only per-CPU head is held by the interrupted context. Also check the extra head from the pop path so that nodes placed there can be reused. | ||||
| CVE-2023-4622 | 3 Debian, Linux, Redhat | 9 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux and 6 more | 2026-09-17 | 7.8 High |
| A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's af_unix component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. The unix_stream_sendpage() function tries to add data to the last skb in the peer's recv queue without locking the queue. Thus there is a race where unix_stream_sendpage() could access an skb locklessly that is being released by garbage collection, resulting in use-after-free. We recommend upgrading past commit 790c2f9d15b594350ae9bca7b236f2b1859de02c (or backported equivalents). | ||||
| CVE-2026-93204 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: dat: atomically update mac addresses When a MAC address is updated in batadv_dat_entry_add(), it is done using a simple copy function. A parallel reader might only see parts of this update. In worst case, the reader is transporting the half updated MAC address over the network or is creating an ARP response using it - poisoning the ARP cache. atomic64_t can be used to store the 48 bit of a mac address. A reader will then either see the old mac address or the new one - never a mixture of both. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93203 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: bla: avoid CRC corruption due to parallel claim add batadv_bla_add_claim() is used to add claims and modify the backbone of claims for CLAIM frames from remote backbones and local packets. When it handles a claim, it needs to either * add the new claim's CRC to the backbone CRC * remove the already existing claim's CRC from the old backbone and add it to the new backbone But when the "new" claim code was running in parallel to the "change backbone" code, it can happen that the CRC was invalid because the backbone_gw of the claim was changed twice in the "new" claim code path: * CPU0 creates the claim for gateway A and publishes it in the claim hash. The crc16 of the address has not yet been added to A's crc at this point. * CPU1 processes a claim frame of gateway B for the same client, finds the just published claim, and performs the ownership change: it switches the pointer to B, removes the crc16 from A's crc - which never contained it - and adds it to B's crc. * CPU0 continues behind the creation branch, unconditionally switches the pointer back to A without compensating B's crc (its remove_crc is false for the creation path), and finally adds the crc16 to A's crc The CRC is then wrong for both: * claim belongs to A: but CRC is not part of backbone A's CRC * claim doesn't belong to B: CRC is still part of backbone B's CRC This wrong CRC is never recomputated from the stored claims. For local backbone claims, this can also not recovered using syncs. To avoid this, split the functionality in clear separate parts: * new claim which always adds claim CRC to the backbone CRC (but never changes the already set backbone_gw of the claim back) * update of existing claim which automatically changes the backbone_gw entry and only updates both backbone CRCs when there was an actual change | ||||
| CVE-2026-93202 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: Fix recursive locking during device registration i3c_master_register_new_i3c_devs() registers newly discovered devices while holding i3c_bus_normaluse_lock(), a down_read(). device_register() can immediately probe the device, and probe callbacks typically invoke I3C helpers that take i3c_bus_normaluse_lock() again, leading to a recursive acquisition of the same rwsem. rwsems do not support recursive read locking and can deadlock when a writer is waiting. See the "Recursive read locks" section of Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst. For example, with Intel LPSS I3C, LOCKDEP generates a WARNING like: # echo intel-lpss-i3c.0 > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/mipi-i3c-hci/unbind # echo intel-lpss-i3c.0 > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/mipi-i3c-hci/bind WARNING: possible recursive locking detected kworker/5:1/94 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88811c810d78 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: i3c_device_match_id+0x45/0x370 but task is already holding lock: ffff88811c810d78 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: i3c_master_reg_work_fn+0x21/0x5f0 Fix this by separating device creation from device registration. Populate desc->dev under the maintenance lock, collect the devices that still need registration into a local list, then release the lock before calling device_register(). Finally retake the lock and clean up any devices that failed to register. Use the maintenance lock rather than the normal-use lock while adding device objects. A write-side maintenance lock prevents readers from observing a partially initialized desc->dev during initial device population, or desc->dev disappearing if registration fails. The local list requires a list node, so add a list node member to struct i3c_device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93201 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate seg_id fields from persistent memory cache_pos_decode(), cache_key_decode() and the last-kset branches of cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker take a cache segment id from the cache device metadata and index cache->segments[] with it without checking it against cache->n_segs. That metadata is only CRC-protected with a fixed public seed, so whoever supplies the cache device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls the id; an out-of-range value forms a wild pcache_cache_segment pointer that is dereferenced and written through -- an out-of-bounds read and write driven by on-disk data. Add cache_seg_id_valid() and reject an out-of-range id at each decode site, failing the operation with -EIO instead of indexing past the array. Bound the id against the initialized-segment count (cache_info.n_segs) rather than the physical device total. A forged cache_info.n_segs below seg_num otherwise leaves segments[cache_info.n_segs..seg_num) as zeroed structs whose data pointer is NULL, so a forged id in that window would still be dereferenced. A later patch guarantees cache_info.n_segs <= seg_num, and a driver-created cache sets the two equal, so valid images are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93200 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: Fix use-after-free of master->this sysfs attribute callbacks for the master controller device dereference master->this. However, master->this is freed in i3c_master_detach_free_devs() before the master device itself is released. As a result, sysfs accesses can dereference a freed master->this pointer, leading to a use-after-free. Keep master->this alive until i3c_masterdev_release(), which is called after the master device and its sysfs state are being torn down. Do not free master->this as part of the normal device detach path. On the error path in i3c_master_set_info(), reset master->this and bus.cur_master to NULL before freeing the allocated device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93199 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: Do not treat master device as a duplicate target i3c_master_search_i3c_dev_duplicate() searches the bus for another I3C device with the same PID as the reference device. The search can match master->this, causing the controller itself to be returned as a duplicate. Since the controller is not a target device, it cannot be a duplicate of one. Exclude master->this from matching so that the function only returns real duplicate target devices. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93198 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate the persisted dirty_tail chain at load The writeback worker follows the persisted dirty_tail chain, which is decoded from the cache device independently of the key_tail chain that cache_replay() walks and bounds. A crafted image, whose on-media fields are authenticated only by a crc32c with a fixed seed, can aim dirty_tail at a chain of last ksets that never terminates, so cache_writeback_fn() re-arms itself with no delay forever. Walk the dirty_tail chain once at load with the same hop cap cache_replay() uses and fail the table load with -EIO if it does not reach an end within n_segs hops. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93197 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcg: move LRU size accounting on reparenting instead of copying it When a memory cgroup is offlined its LRU folios are reparented to the parent. lruvec_reparent_lru() splices the child's lists into the parent's and credits the parent with the child's per-zone lru_zone_size[], but never clears the child's copy, so the size is copied rather than moved. lru_gen_reparent_memcg() does the same for MGLRU. The parent is left correct, credited with exactly the folios it took over. The stale value sits on the child and nothing will correct it: folio->memcg_data now resolves to the parent, so every later update_lru_size() for those folios goes there. Dying cgroups are not freed immediately and mem_cgroup_iter() still walks them, so shrink_lruvec() keeps being called on them. get_scan_count() reads the phantom counter through lruvec_lru_size() and the scan loop then grinds through nr[] in SWAP_CLUSTER_MAX steps against an empty list, for as long as the dead cgroup lives. Under MGLRU the MGLRU scanner runs instead, but count_shadow_nodes() sums all of NR_LRU_LISTS through lruvec_lru_size() and over-budgets the shadow node limit just the same. On one 251 GiB host a sweep of every mz->lru_zone_size[] found 380 counters describing folios on no list at all: 124777314 pages, 476 GiB, 1.89x the machine's RAM, across 57 cgroups. All were on memcgs with CSS_DYING set and CSS_ONLINE clear, and parent/child pairs reported byte-identical sizes. LRU_UNEVICTABLE needs its size moved too. Its list is deliberately not spliced because lruvec_init() poisons the head - the unevictable LRU is imaginary and folios are never threaded on it - but the size is kept by lruvec_add_folio()/lruvec_del_folio() and those folios account to the parent from here on. This depends on commit bf4ade7dbd76 ("memcg: keep folio's objcg same as its node") and must not be backported ahead of it. Without that invariant a folio's objcg can belong to another node, so a folio already spliced onto the parent's list can still resolve to the child's lruvec until the objcg's node is reparented in a later iteration of memcg_reparent_objcgs(); clearing the child's counter early then lets lruvec_del_folio() underflow it and trip the WARN_ONCE()/VM_BUG_ON() in mem_cgroup_update_lru_size(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-93196 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvdimm: virtio_pmem: refcount requests for token lifetime KASAN reports slab-use-after-free in __wake_up_common(): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __wake_up_common+0x114/0x160 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810fdcb710 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.19.0-next-20260220-00006-g1eae5f204ec3 #4 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x6d/0xb0 print_report+0x170/0x4e2 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1dc/0x380 kasan_report+0xbc/0xf0 ? __wake_up_common+0x114/0x160 ? __wake_up_common+0x114/0x160 __wake_up_common+0x114/0x160 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 __wake_up+0x36/0x60 virtio_pmem_host_ack+0x11d/0x3b0 ? sched_balance_domains+0x29f/0xb00 ? __pfx_virtio_pmem_host_ack+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x98/0x100 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 vring_interrupt+0x1c9/0x5e0 ? __pfx_vp_interrupt+0x10/0x10 vp_vring_interrupt+0x87/0x100 ? __pfx_vp_interrupt+0x10/0x10 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x17f/0x550 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 handle_irq_event+0xab/0x1c0 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x276/0xae0 __common_interrupt+0x65/0x130 common_interrupt+0x78/0xa0 </IRQ> virtio_pmem_host_ack() wakes a request that has already been freed by the submitter. This happens when the request token is still reachable via the virtqueue, but virtio_pmem_flush() returns and frees it. Fix the token lifetime by refcounting struct virtio_pmem_request. virtio_pmem_flush() holds a submitter reference, and the virtqueue holds an extra reference once the request is queued. The completion path drops the virtqueue reference, and the submitter drops its reference before returning. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93195 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/bridge: synopsys: dw-dp: Support unregistering the AUX channel The DisplayPort AUX channel gets initialized and registered during dw_dp_bind(), but it is never unregistered, which may lead to resource leaks and/or use-after-free. Add the missing dw_dp_unbind() function to allow the users of the library to handle the required cleanup, i.e. unregister the AUX adapter. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93194 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/rockchip: dw_dp: Release core resources Core resources such as the DisplayPort AUX channel get initialized and registered during dw_dp_bind(), but are never unregistered, which may lead to memory leaks and/or use-after-free: [ 224.661371] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in device_is_dependent+0xe0/0x2b0 [ 224.662015] Read of size 8 at addr ffff00011aee8550 by task modprobe/658 [ 224.662612] [ 224.662752] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 658 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2-next-20260305 #14 PREEMPT [ 224.662759] Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT) [ 224.662762] Call trace: [ 224.662764] show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C) [ 224.662772] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x98 [ 224.662777] print_report+0x160/0x4b8 [ 224.662783] kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0 [ 224.662790] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30 [ 224.662796] device_is_dependent+0xe0/0x2b0 [ 224.662802] device_is_dependent+0x108/0x2b0 [ 224.662808] device_link_add+0x1f8/0x10b0 [ 224.662813] devm_of_phy_get_by_index+0x120/0x200 [ 224.662819] dw_dp_bind+0x34c/0xb10 [dw_dp] [ 224.662830] dw_dp_rockchip_bind+0x194/0x250 [rockchipdrm] [ 224.662864] component_bind_all+0x3a8/0x720 [ 224.662869] rockchip_drm_bind+0x120/0x390 [rockchipdrm] [ 224.662899] try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x76c/0x838 [ 224.662904] component_master_add_with_match+0x1f4/0x230 [ 224.662909] rockchip_drm_platform_probe+0x420/0x538 [rockchipdrm] [ 224.662939] platform_probe+0xe8/0x168 [ 224.662945] really_probe+0x340/0x828 [ 224.662950] __driver_probe_device+0x2e0/0x350 [ 224.662954] driver_probe_device+0x80/0x140 [ 224.662959] __driver_attach+0x398/0x460 [ 224.662964] bus_for_each_dev+0xe0/0x198 [ 224.662968] driver_attach+0x50/0x68 [ 224.662972] bus_add_driver+0x2a0/0x4c0 [ 224.662977] driver_register+0x294/0x360 [ 224.662982] __platform_driver_register+0x7c/0x98 [ 224.662987] rockchip_drm_init+0xc4/0xff8 [rockchipdrm] Since a previous commit exported dw_dp_unbind() function in DW DP core library to take care of the necessary cleanup, use this in the component's unbind() callback, as well as in its bind() error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93193 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Fix OF node reference leak via auto cleanup Sashiko reported a reference leak in rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable(), the of_get_child_by_name() function does not call of_node_put() in a symmetrical way [1]. Fix the device node reference leak by using __free(device_node) to automatically manage of_node_put() for all device nodes. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93192 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Clear queue->active_job when v3d_fence_create() fails The run_job() callbacks for BIN, RENDER, TFU and CSD assign the incoming job to queue->active_job before calling v3d_fence_create(). If v3d_fence_create() fails, the callback returns NULL without clearing active_job, leaving a dangling pointer. Create a failure path in all run_job() callbacks that clears the active job before returning NULL. The BIN path takes queue->queue_lock around the clear as it races against v3d_overflow_mem_work(); RENDER, TFU and CSD paths have no concurrent reader, so the clear is lock-free. | ||||