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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90370 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7996: bound TLV walk in mt7996_mcu_get_chip_config The response TLV loop advanced by tlv->len without a minimum, so a theoretical firmware response containing a zero-length TLV could spin forever, hanging the CPU during device probe. The u32 payload was also read without bounds checking. Reject a short fixed field, stop on a TLV whose length underruns the header or overruns the skb. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90386 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: dw: avoid shift-out-of-bounds when DAA assigns no devices On an empty bus ENTDAA assigns nothing, so cmd->rx_len (the count of addresses left unassigned) equals master->maxdevs. The GENMASK() index master->maxdevs - cmd->rx_len - 1 then becomes -1, which trips up UBSAN. This happens every time on boot on a Gigabyte/AMD server: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/i3c/master/dw-i3c-master.c:905:12 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 963 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.0.11-200.fc44.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: Giga Computing E163-Z34-AAH1-000/MZ33-DC1-000, BIOS R32_F45 04/01/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x2b __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xd7/0x1ab dw_i3c_master_daa.cold+0x1b/0x96 [dw_i3c_master] i3c_master_do_daa_ext.part.0+0x3e/0xf0 [i3c] Skip the mask when no new device was assigned. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90398 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse() Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the allocation. The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match that stride. Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides. Compile tested only. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90314 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry() table->offset[i] is a u32 from firmware, but was stored into a signed int. A crafted offset like 0xFFFFFFF0 becomes -16, placing hdr 16 bytes before the table buffer. The subsequent avail check was bypassed because the negative int was promoted to a large size_t in the expression "table_sz - offset - sizeof(*hdr)", yielding a large positive avail and letting the out-of-bounds hdr->type read proceed undetected. Store the offset as u32 and validate it with unsigned comparisons before any pointer arithmetic. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90322 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/cluster: keep heartbeat local node stable o2nm_node_local_store() handles local=0 by stopping o2net and setting cl_local_node to O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM, but it leaves cl_has_local set. That stale state makes o2nm_this_node() return 255, blocks a later local=1 attempt with -EBUSY, and can feed 255 to heartbeat users that call o2nm_this_node() dynamically. Clearing cl_has_local is required when the local node is reset. But heartbeat threads can still be running at that point. They pin the local node config item at startup, yet o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat() and thread teardown re-read o2nm_this_node() for the local slot and for o2nm_undepend_this_node(). Once local=0 has cleared the live local-node state, those dynamic reads return O2NM_MAX_NODES, which is also the invalid node number 255. Store the local node number in the heartbeat region when the region starts. Use that stable node for heartbeat slot writes/checks, negotiation messages, and the final configfs undepend. Stop the heartbeat loop when the current local node no longer matches the stored node, and clear cl_has_local together with cl_local_node in the local=0 path so nodemanager state matches node removal. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x372/0xb30 RIP: 0010:memset+0xf/0x20 Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xd0/0x630 o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x372/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x5/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079) o2hb_thread+0x14e/0x770 kthread_affine_node+0x139/0x180 lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190 trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 kthread+0x19d/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x37a/0x4d0 __switch_to+0x2d5/0x6f0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 | ||||
| CVE-2026-90331 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence Multiple issues have been found within the hid-asus driver: - unchecked size in asus_raw_event() - unclean teardown of asus_probe on failure - possible use-after-free in asus_probe - multiple workqueue used for jobs where one was enough - sleeping calls in atomic context - packets of incorrect size being sent to the keyboard controller Join the two workqueues into one reusing the stopping mechanism of the brightness workqueue, use the joined workqueue to also move the asus_wmi_send_event() sleeping call away from atomic context and add a size check in asus_raw_event(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-90348 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath10k: snoc: use memcpy_fromio() for MSA ramdump On WCN3990/SNOC the MSA region is mapped with devm_memremap(MEMREMAP_WT). On arm64 such a mapping is not Normal-cacheable, so unaligned accesses to it are not permitted. ath10k_msa_dump_memory() copies the region with a plain memcpy(), whose optimized __pi_memcpy_generic implementation issues wide/unaligned loads. This triggers an alignment fault (FSC=0x21) Oops in ath10k_snoc_fw_crashed_dump() while collecting the devcoredump: Unable to handle kernel paging request ... FSC=0x21: alignment fault pc : __pi_memcpy_generic lr : ath10k_snoc_fw_crashed_dump [ath10k_snoc] The Oops both leaves the firmware RAM dump buffer zeroed (no dump is captured) and crashes the kernel, which in turn breaks modem SSR recovery. Use memcpy_fromio(), which only performs accesses that are valid for such a device-memory mapping. The generic memcpy_fromio() implementation aligns the source before issuing word-sized reads and stores the destination with put_unaligned(), so it is also safe for the coherent DMA allocation used on the non-reserved-memory path. ath11k and ath12k use the same pattern when copying target memory into crash dumps, so call it unconditionally here too. The MEMREMAP_WT pointer is a plain void *, so an explicit __iomem cast is needed; use __force to keep sparse happy. Tested-on: WCN3990 hw1.0 SNOC WLAN.HL.3.3.7.c5-00107-QCAHLSWMTPL-1 | ||||
| CVE-2026-90350 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: reject out-of-range link ids in mt76_vif_link() mt76_vif_link() indexes mvif->link[] without validating link_id, but callers pass mvif->deflink_id / msta->deflink_id, which hold IEEE80211_LINK_UNSPECIFIED (0xf) until the first link has been added. Since IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS is 15, that reads one element past the end of the array, aliasing mt76_vif_data.offchannel_link. Reachable via mt7996_set_tsf()/mt7996_offset_tsf() and mt7996_net_fill_forward_path(). Bounds check link_id and return NULL, matching mt7996_sta_link() and mt7996_sta_link_protected(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-90259 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: qgroup: fix a wrong length calculation in qgroup_free_reserved_data() In that function, we round down the start position and round up the ending position. But during the calculation of @len, we use "round_up(start + len, sectorsize)", which is the rounded up end position, not the rounded up length. Which results a much larger length, and later we are still using "start + len", which is completely incorrect. Fix it by declaring a local @aligned_start and @aligned_len and use them instead. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90358 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, x86: Fix trampoline stack size for 128-bit arguments btf_distill_func_proto() accepts a function argument up to 16 bytes, so a 128-bit scalar such as __int128 reaches the x86 trampoline with arg_size == 16. But the current implementation assumes an __int128 argument only needs one register, so the register save area is under-allocated and save_args() overwrites adjacent stack slots. Compute the register count from arg_size for all arguments to fix it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90289 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Resize MST HDCP per-connector arrays to 32 AMDGPU_DM_MAX_DISPLAY_INDEX is 31. It suggest a maximum number of 32 connectors. But the way it's used is like MAX_DISPLAY_COUNT. Hence we're off by one with DRM core, which supports a max of 32 connectors. Rename AMDGPU_DM_MAX_DISPLAY_INDEX to AMDGPU_DM_MAX_DISPLAY_COUNT to match its actual use, and increase the size to 32 to match the originally intended size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90230 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: fix heap out-of-bounds read in nvmet_auth_negotiate() nvmet_execute_auth_send() allocates the DH-HMAC-CHAP message buffer with the host-supplied transfer length (tl) and hands it to nvmet_auth_negotiate() without passing tl along. nvmet_auth_negotiate() then reads the negotiate header and, for each of the halen hash identifiers and dhlen DH group identifiers, indexes into the fixed idlist[60] array (hashes at idlist[0..halen), groups at idlist[30..]). Neither the transfer length nor halen/dhlen is validated. A malicious or non-conformant host can report a tl smaller than the negotiate structure, or a halen/dhlen larger than the array (both are u8, up to 255), making the loops read past the end of the allocated buffer (heap out-of-bounds read). The sibling nvmet_auth_reply() already validates tl against the structure size; the negotiate path did not. Pass tl into nvmet_auth_negotiate(), reject a tl that does not cover the negotiate data plus one full protocol descriptor, and reject halen/dhlen larger than NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MAX_DH_IDS. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90246 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check verify_tags() validates the tagset table unpacked from a policy blob. For each set it reads a count and checks that advancing the index by that count stays inside sets.table[]: u32 cnt = tags->sets.table[i]; if (i+cnt >= tags->sets.size) { i, cnt and sets.size are all u32, so i+cnt is evaluated modulo 2^32. sets.table[] is filled by unpack_tagsets() with aa_unpack_u32(), so every entry is a raw unbounded 32-bit word taken from the policy blob, and verify_tags() is the function that is supposed to validate it. A count close to U32_MAX makes the sum wrap to a small value, the guard passes, and the inner loop then walks sets.table[++i] past the end of the kcalloc(size, sizeof(u32)) allocation. Note that sets.size is bounded by 65535, because unpack_tagsets() reads it with aa_unpack_array() as a u16, so the wrap cannot be reached by growing the table; it is reached purely through the attacker-supplied count. With sets.size = 2 and sets.table = { 0, 0xffffffff }: i = 0: cnt = 0, guard 0 + 0 >= 2 is false, inner loop does not run i = 1: cnt = 0xffffffff, guard (1 + 0xffffffff) mod 2^32 == 0 >= 2 is false, so the guard is bypassed and the inner loop reads sets.table[2] -- one element past a two element allocation The walk continues until an out-of-bounds value happens to be >= hdrs.size or the access faults, so a crafted policy yields an out-of-bounds read on the policy load path (aa_replace_profiles -> aa_unpack -> unpack_policydb -> unpack_tags -> verify_tags). unpack_tags() runs before the perms and DFA tables are unpacked, so no other table needs to be well formed to reach it. Policy load is gated by aa_may_manage_policy(), which checks CAP_MAC_ADMIN relative to the subject's own user namespace rather than the init user namespace, so with the default unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy=1 the path is reachable from an unprivileged task in a matched-level nested namespace, not only by a globally privileged one. Perform the addition in u64 so that it cannot wrap, restoring the intended i + cnt < sets.size guarantee. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90251 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MSFT: validate evt_prefix_len against the response length read_supported_features() only checks that the response covers the fixed part of struct msft_rp_read_supported_features, which is 11 bytes: if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) { bt_dev_err(hdev, "MSFT supported features length mismatch"); goto failed; } evt_prefix[] is a flexible array member and rp->evt_prefix_len is an unvalidated u8 taken straight out of that response, so msft->evt_prefix = kmemdup(rp->evt_prefix, rp->evt_prefix_len, GFP_KERNEL); copies up to 255 bytes from a reply that may have carried none of them. What is copied is data the controller never sent, and it is then used to match incoming vendor events in msft_vendor_evt(). This is not an out-of-bounds access. An skb data allocation always has at least SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)) bytes past the payload, which is more than the 255 byte maximum, so the read stays inside the allocation and KASAN does not report it. It is still a read of bytes the host was never given, with the length fully controlled by the controller. Reject a response that is too short for the prefix it declares. Verified with an emulated controller over /dev/vhci on a KASAN kernel, with vhci made to advertise an MSFT opcode the way btintel, btqca, btmtk and btrtl do unconditionally. A reply of exactly 11 bytes declaring evt_prefix_len = 255 reaches kmemdup and copies 255 bytes ("skb->len=11 evt_prefix_len=255", with the copied buffer dumped); since the reply ends at the fixed part, all 255 come from past the end of the response. No KASAN report is produced, as expected from the allocation slack described above. With this patch the response is rejected with "MSFT event prefix length mismatch" and msft->evt_prefix is left unset. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90205 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read". OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes. A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is reported. Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing. Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode validation boundary. This patch (of 2): [BUG] A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range. ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85 Call Trace: ... ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102 ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840 ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline] ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295 evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810 iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline] iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline] iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926 ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374 ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373 ... [CAUSE] ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots. [FIX] Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90223 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and add length checks nfc_llcp_recv_snl() walked the SNL TLV list using a u16 offset/length pair derived from skb->len, without bounding reads to the actual skb data. Three problems followed: - For a short frame (skb->len < LLCP_HEADER_SIZE), tlv_len underflowed. - The per-TLV header (type, length) was read without checking that two bytes remained. - A declared TLV length could run past the end of the buffer, and an SDREQ with length == 0 made "service_name_len = length - 1" underflow (size_t), driving an out-of-bounds read in the following strncmp() / nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). The SDRES case likewise read tlv[2]/tlv[3] without a length check. A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP. Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer() over the linear skb data, and validate each TLV declared length before use. Add explicit length checks for SDREQ (>= 1) and SDRES (exactly 2). Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-90170 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate ipc response length before dereferencing its fields ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size by reading length fields out of the response buffer supplied by the userspace ksmbd daemon (payload_sz, session_key_len, ngroups, ...). Those fields are read before the buffer is verified to be large enough to contain the struct they belong to, so a short response makes the read land past the end of the allocation. handle_response() sizes entry->response purely from the netlink attribute length (nla_len()) and only guards the leading handle read, so the daemon can install a response as small as the kmalloc-8 object seen below. When ipc_msg_send_request() then calls ipc_validate_msg() for a KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST, the cast to struct ksmbd_rpc_command reads resp->payload_sz at offset 8 of an 8-byte allocation: [ 3697.841381] ================================================================== [ 3697.844099] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800 [ 3697.846604] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888105f95910 by task kworker/4:3/20682 [ 3697.849061] [ 3697.849801] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 20682 Comm: kworker/4:3 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc3-next-20260717-virtme #117 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 3697.850077] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 3697.850303] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ 3697.850592] Call Trace: [ 3697.850794] <TASK> [ 3697.850952] __dump_stack+0x21/0x60 [ 3697.851239] dump_stack_lvl+0xc2/0x100 [ 3697.851528] print_address_description+0x77/0x200 [ 3697.851816] ? ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800 [ 3697.852024] print_report+0x58/0x70 [ 3697.852316] kasan_report+0x117/0x150 [ 3697.852585] ? down_write+0x146/0x1f0 [ 3697.852809] ? ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800 [ 3697.853082] ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800 [ 3697.853385] ? __pfx_ipc_msg_send_request+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.853604] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70 [ 3697.853936] ? __pfx___up_read+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.854221] ksmbd_rpc_ioctl+0x380/0x520 [ 3697.854542] ? __pfx_ksmbd_rpc_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.854757] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70 [ 3697.854962] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x32c/0x4e0 [ 3697.855166] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70 [ 3697.855416] fsctl_pipe_transceive+0x139/0x7a0 [ 3697.855705] ? __pfx_copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.855937] ? __pfx_fsctl_pipe_transceive+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.856388] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140 [ 3697.856620] smb2_ioctl+0x1141/0x3420 [ 3697.856994] ? __pfx_smb2_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.857182] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0 [ 3697.857655] handle_ksmbd_work+0x9ad/0x15e0 [ 3697.858034] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.858251] ? lock_release+0xf7/0x360 [ 3697.858466] ? process_scheduled_works+0x954/0x1600 [ 3697.858698] ? process_scheduled_works+0x954/0x1600 [ 3697.858905] process_scheduled_works+0xc22/0x1600 [ 3697.859368] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.859637] ? __pfx_assign_work+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.859896] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110 [ 3697.860146] worker_thread+0x975/0xee0 [ 3697.860524] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.860830] ? __kthread_parkme+0x21e/0x260 [ 3697.861105] kthread+0x3a6/0x490 [ 3697.861423] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.861643] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.861878] ret_from_fork+0x55a/0xa20 [ 3697.862194] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.862480] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.862714] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 3697.862965] </TASK> [ 3697.863039] [ 3697.938882] Allocated by task 20761: [ 3697.940257] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 3697.941782] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 [ 3697.943228] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3e9/0x6a0 [ 3697.944948] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750 [ 3697.946592] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x3d6/0x560 [ 3697.946977] genl_rcv_msg+0x67c/0x900 [ 3697.947224] netlink_rcv_skb+0x286/0x580 [ 3697.947488] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x80 [ 3 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-90174 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user() ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC login response with user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz; user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP); if (user->passkey) memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz); resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy() reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack hash[] buffer before allocating and copying. [ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611 [ 2030.242296] [ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ 2030.242763] Call Trace: [ 2030.242769] <TASK> [ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0 [ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200 [ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70 [ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150 [ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0 [ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 [ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120 [ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00 [ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0 [ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140 [ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0 [ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300 [ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0 [ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280 [ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490 [ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490 [ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490 [ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300 [ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110 [ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20 [ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470 [ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910 [ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0 [ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2030.243564] </TASK> [ 2030.243570] [ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279: [ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 [ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0 [ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750 [ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340 [ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0 [ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0 [ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40 [ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930 [ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00 [ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140 [ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470 [ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100 [ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460 [ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 2030.305594] [ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640 [ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192 [ 2030.309595] The buggy address ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-93376 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-09-19 | 6.3 Medium |
| Out of bounds read in DataTransfer in Google Chrome prior to 153.0.8010.52 allowed a local attacker leveraging social engineering to read memory outside the sandbox via a local program. (Chromium security severity: Medium) | ||||
| CVE-2026-13635 | 2026-09-19 | 5.3 Medium | ||
| An improper encoding or escaping of output vulnerability in Auth API in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 7.2.1-69057-12, 7.2.2-72806-9, 7.3.2-86009-4 and 7.4-90075 allows remote attackers to obtain non-sensitive information. | ||||