| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Race condition in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Race condition in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| A race condition was addressed with improved handling of symbolic links. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. An app may be able to modify protected parts of the file system. |
| A race condition was addressed with improved locking. This issue is fixed in Safari 27.2, iOS 26.7.2 and iPadOS 26.7.2, iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, tvOS 27.2, visionOS 27.2, watchOS 27.2. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected process termination. |
| A race condition was addressed with improved state handling. This issue is fixed in Safari 27.2, iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, tvOS 27.2, watchOS 27.2. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash. |
| A race condition was addressed with improved state handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7.2 and iPadOS 26.7.2, iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2, tvOS 27.2, visionOS 27.2, watchOS 27.2. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
| In __pkvm_pages_to_ppages of mmu.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| A race condition was addressed with additional validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27, visionOS 27. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or write kernel memory. |
| A Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability exists in the EVS HAL, allowing a privileged client to free a `buffer_handle_t` while the producer thread is still using it. This race condition, triggered via `doneWithFrame` and `setMaxFramesInFlight`, enables an attacker to manipulate freed heap memory, potentially leading to the leakage of file descriptors from the EVS HAL process. |
| FreeRDP before 3.32.2 contains a use-after-free in the urbdrc USB redirection channel because FindChannelById returns a channel pointer without a reference and the control-channel close path does not take the device manager's loading_lock. A malicious RDP server can send a control-channel CLOSE_REQUEST while the client announces a USB device, freeing the channel before the announcement thread reads channel->Write and crashing the client. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/openclose: keep the lock in io_pipe_fixed()
io_pipe_fixed() installs both ends of the pipe in the fixed file table,
drops ->uring_lock, and copies the slot numbers to the application. If
that faults, it takes the lock again and removes whatever is in these
slots.
If the request is run by io-wq the lock really is dropped in between, and
the slots are visible to everybody else. By the time the error path gets
to them, they may have been closed and reused, by IORING_OP_CLOSE and a
direct open or accept, or by IORING_REGISTER_FILES_UPDATE. Then a file is
removed from the table that has nothing to do with the failed request.
Do the copy with the lock held. Faulting in user memory under
->uring_lock is fine, the registration paths do it all the time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/poll: avoid retry wakeup loss when dropping ownership
If a wakeup sets IO_POLL_RETRY_FLAG between the owning task consuming
the existing instance of IO_POLL_RETRY_FLAG and the loop check
of io_poll_check_events(), then we stall on processing the request
until an unrelated wakeup comes along.
Using atomic_cmpxchg instead of atomic_sub_return to guarantee both the
count v and poll_refs are 0 and no wake-ups are missed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: don't hide a link from cancellations
A task that exits cancels its tracked requests and waits until they are
gone. io_uring_cancel_generic() looks everywhere a request can be, and
goes to sleep if it found nothing to cancel. It is woken up each time
one of the requests of the task is completed by task work or freed.
When io-wq is done with a request that has a link, there is a time in which
the next request of the link can't be found:
io_worker_handle_work()
io_assign_current_work(worker, NULL)
io_wq_free_work(work)
io_req_find_next() // takes the link off the request
io_free_req() // task work for the task
io_assign_current_work(worker, linked)
io_run_task_work()
cond_resched()
worker->cur_work = linked
It is not pending, it is not the current work of a worker, and it is not
yet on the list that it is about to be parked on. If the pass that the
exiting task makes because of io_free_req() falls into that time, it finds
nothing and the task goes to sleep. The worker then runs the link, which
IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT doesn't prevent for bounded work. If that parks the request
nothing is completed or freed, and nobody wakes up the task. If it is the
process that exits it can't be killed any more either.
NOP, IOSQE_ASYNC | IOSQE_IO_LINK
FUTEX_WAIT, FUTEX2_PRIVATE
exit of the thread, or of the process, up to 63us later
With four of these per round 5 to 8 of 10,000 rounds hang (4 CPUs, KVM):
io_uring_cancel_generic
do_exit
Commit f8b632e89a10 ("io_uring: tighten task exit cancellations") is about
the same gap, and makes the task look again for whatever happens before
io_free_req().
Free the request once the link is the current work of the worker, or
pending. Whoever is woken up by that can find the link, until it is parked
where cancellations look as well. To do so split io_wq_free_work() in two. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/cancel: rearm local work wake up before sleep
io_uring_try_cancel_requests() sets ->cq_wait_nr to 1 so that the next
io_req_local_work_add() wakes the cancelling task. The add that takes the
count to zero is the only one that wakes, later ones see a count <= 0 and
return. io_uring_cancel_generic() however only becomes
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE much later, so the one wake up can be spent on a
running task. That is fine as long as the entry of that add is still
queued, as the io_local_work_pending() check then skips the sleep. It is
not if the add was delayed after queueing its entry:
CPU0 (submitter in exec or exit) CPU1 (io_req_local_work_add)
mpscq_push(req A)
io_uring_try_cancel_requests()
io_run_local_work() // runs req A
io_uring_try_cancel_requests()
atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, 1)
atomic_read(&ctx->cq_wait_nr) == 1
count taken, wake_up_state()
// task is running, no-op
prepare_to_wait(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE)
io_local_work_pending() == false
schedule()
mpscq_push(req B)
cq_wait_nr <= 0, return
Only the sleeping task can run req B, so it is stuck in execve() until a
signal happens to wake it. An exiting task doesn't even get that.
Arm the count again once the task state is set and before the work list
is checked, for the rings whose local work this task is the one to run. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pid_namespace: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting the reaper
Since commit 7fea700e04bd ("zap_pid_ns_processes: clear
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL along with TIF_SIGPENDING") zap_pid_ns_processes()
clears TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL before every kernel_wait4() call. Otherwise
kernel_wait4() doesn't sleep and returns -ERESTARTSYS if
signal_pending() is true and the reaper busy-waits.
But clearing TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL doesn't fix it. It can get raised again.
For example, klp_send_signals() sets it raw against any task that hasn't
transitioned yet. And it keeps sending it until the livepatch finishes.
The sleep loop waiting for pid_allocated to drop has the same problem
and it doesn't even clear anything. So a schedule() in
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE returns immediately.
Use a no_notify_signal guard. signal_pending() will ignore
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and the pid namespace reaper sleeps until a child
exits or free_pid() wakes it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Hold trace_types_lock when updating modules in persistent instances
trace_module_record() walks ftrace_trace_arrays from the module notifier
without trace_types_lock. A concurrent rmdir of an instance removes it
from the list and frees it under that lock, so a module load or unload
can walk into a freed trace_array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup
Named keyring lookup must keep the storage containing the owner UID
alive through the namespace mapping check. find_keyring_by_name()
reads keyring->user->uid under keyring_name_lock, but that lock protects
the keyring's name entry and allocation, not its separate key_user.
A named session-keyring join can overlap a privileged KEYCTL_CHOWN on
another CPU. If the keyring holds the last reference to its old dynamic
key_user and the ownership transfer succeeds, the following ordering is
possible:
Named join Chown
find_keyring_by_name() keyctl_chown_key()
read_lock(keyring_name_lock) down_write(key->sem)
load old keyring->user
replace key->user and key->uid
up_write(key->sem)
key_put(key)
key_user_put(old user): free
read old user->uid
read_unlock(keyring_name_lock)
Chown neither takes keyring_name_lock nor key_session_mutex, so it can
free the old account between the pointer load and the UID read. The
lookup then reads freed memory even though the keyring itself is alive.
Use keyring->uid for the mapping check. key_alloc() initializes this
inline owner UID and keyctl_chown_key() updates it on chown.
The existing name lock keeps its containing keyring allocated throughout
the check, so lookup no longer depends on the account's lifetime. This
also matches the owner UID used by the permission check.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_keyring_by_name+0x577/0x5d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881128ae2ec by task keycase/500 |
| A race condition was addressed with additional validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7.2 and iPadOS 26.7.2, iOS 27.2 and iPadOS 27.2, macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2, tvOS 27.2, visionOS 27.2, watchOS 27.2. An app may be able to access sensitive user data. |
| A flaw was found in DPDK lib/vhost. A TOCTOU double-fetch of control-queue descriptors allows a heap buffer overflow with attacker-controlled content in the VDUSE control-queue handler. |
| In arm_lpae_split_blk_unmap of io-pgtable-arm-common.c, there is a possible memory corruption due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
