| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.
The camel-hazelcast component applies a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig to the instances it creates from its own configuration, a protection introduced by CVE-2026-43865. That change did not reach two of the configuration paths Camel builds itself, so those paths continued to create Hazelcast instances whose Java deserialization is unrestricted. ReplicatedHazelcastAggregationRepository extends HazelcastAggregationRepository but overrides doStart() without calling super.doStart(), keeping its own copy of the bootstrap block, and therefore never received the filter: a route using it without supplying a hazelcastInstance starts a Hazelcast member that deserializes values read from the backing ReplicatedMap with no class restriction. HazelcastDefaultComponent#getOrCreateHzClientInstance() builds its own ClientConfig when hazelcastMode=client is selected and neither a referenced ClientConfig nor hazelcastConfigUri is supplied, and likewise applied no filter, so client-mode endpoints behaved differently from node-mode endpoints for an otherwise identical configuration. In both cases an attacker able to publish into the Hazelcast cluster that the affected instance is attached to can cause a serialized Java object of their choosing to be deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer, before Camel processes the exchange, resulting in remote code execution. Hazelcast clusters have neither authentication nor TLS enabled by default. Selecting client mode is a topology choice rather than a security option, so neither path required the deployment to opt in to unsafe behaviour.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, supply an explicit Hazelcast configuration carrying a JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or inject a pre-built HazelcastInstance, since a user-supplied configuration is never overwritten by Camel. Alternatively set the JVM-wide filter -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.;java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!* and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster. |
| **UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED** Unbounded allocation in XML parsing in Apache Vysper; all versions, may lead to an out of memory condition.
This issue affects all versions of Apache Vysper. Apache Vysper is an XMPP (Jabber) server library.
As this project is retired, we do not plan to release a version that fixes this issue. Users are recommended to find an alternative. |
| **UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED** Authorization bypass in Apache Vysper, all versions.
Apache Vysper is an XMPP (Jabber) server library. Its XEP-0077 (In-Band Registration) implementation is missing an authentication check, allowing any authenticated user to compromise other accounts.
As this project is retired, we do not plan to release a version that fixes this issue. Users are recommended to find an alternative. |
| This issue affects Apache Fineract versions up to and including 1.15.0. The Center read endpoint (GET /api/v1/centers) and the datatable entry read endpoints (GET /api/v1/datatables/{datatable}/{apptableId} and GET /api/v1/datatables/{datatable}/{apptableId}/{datatableId}) concatenate caller-supplied ordering parameters (orderBy, sortOrder, order) directly into the SQL ORDER BY clause. The existing regex-based input validation can be bypassed, allowing time-based blind SQL injection by any authenticated user with read access to centers or to the targeted datatable.
Users are recommended to upgrade to 1.16.1 which fixes the issue. |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ("SQL Injection") vulnerability exists in Apache Fineract (through version 1.15.0). The vulnerability affects the outStandingAmountPercentageCondition parameter of the /fineract-provider/api/v1/search/advance HTTP API endpoint, allowing SQL injection due to insufficient input neutralization. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.16.1, which will fix the issue. |
| **UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED**
JavaNativeMessageDecoder in the MINA 3.0 codec module calls ObjectInputStream.readObject() on frame bytes with no class filter, so an
application that puts it in front of an untrusted peer is open to gadget-chain RCE.
As the 3.0.0 branch is inactive, we do not plan to release a version that fixes this issue.
Users are recommended to use the latest Apache MINA 2.2.X branch. |
| A buffer overflow vulnerability in the Brotli decoder (c/dec/decode.c) in Google Brotli versions 1.0.3 through 1.2.0 on all platforms allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to corrupt adjacent decoder state memory, disclose sensitive memory contents, cause a denial of service, or potentially execute arbitrary code using a crafted Brotli-compressed stream.
Users need to update any Brotli libraries or binaries between 1.0.3 through 1.2.0 to the latest available version: 1.0.10 or 1.1.1 or 1.2.1. |
| An integer underflow in the mcpack2pb component of Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to crash a bRPC server by sending a request containing a string field with a zero value_size. The UnparsedValue::as_string() function computes `_size - 1` without validating `_size`; when value_size is 0 the expression underflows to SIZE_MAX, resize() throws std::length_error, and because the exception is not caught on the request parsing path the process aborts (SIGABRT).
Root Cause:
In src/mcpack2pb/parser.cpp, UnparsedValue::as_string() resizes the output string to `_size - 1`, where `_size` is the value_size of a string field taken directly from the network data. A value_size of 0 underflows the unsigned size_t, and the subsequent resize() throws an exception that is not caught.
Affected Scenarios:
bRPC servers that accept nshead frames wired to the ubrpc mcpack2 adaptor (for example the NsheadService + UbrpcMcpack2Adaptor deployment pattern) can be crashed by a single unauthenticated request. Stock open-source bRPC registers the ubrpc/nshead_mcpack protocols as client-only, so default server configurations are not affected.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade bRPC to a version that includes this fix.
2. Apply the patch in PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3450 |
| Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in Apache IoTDB.
This issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 2.0.0 before 2.0.11.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.11, which fixes the issue. |
| An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in Apache IoTDB's Thrift RPC service
This issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 2.0.0 before 2.0.11.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.11, which fixes the issue. |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache IoTDB JDBC driver.
This issue affects Apache IoTDB JDBC driver: from 1.3.3 before 2.0.11.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.11, which fixes the issue. |
| On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403.
Mitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 .
Users who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start(). |
| An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the streaming RPC client of Apache bRPC (versions 1.11.0 through 1.17.0) on all platforms. A client that creates multiple streams in a single RPC expects the server response to carry exactly one extra_stream_id for every additional stream. The response handling path indexed the returned identifiers using the locally created stream count without first validating the size of the returned list, so a malicious or compromised server (or an on-path attacker) can trigger an out-of-bounds read in the client by returning a malformed StreamSettings response with fewer extra_stream_ids than expected. This may crash the client process (denial of service) or leak unintended memory contents into subsequent stream handling; surplus identifiers have no valid client-stream mapping and are processed inconsistently.
Root Cause:
Since bRPC 1.11.0, a client can create multiple streams in one RPC via batch StreamCreate. The expected behavior is that the server response must return exactly (N-1) extra_stream_ids, where N is the number of locally created streams. In Controller::HandleStreamConnection, the response path reads extra_stream_ids[i-1] for each additional local stream without first comparing the returned list size with (N-1). If the server returns fewer identifiers, the read runs past the end of the returned list (out-of-bounds read); if it returns more, the surplus identifiers have no corresponding client-side stream.
Affected Scenarios:
A bRPC client using multi-stream RPC (creating more than one stream in a single RPC) that connects to an untrusted, malicious, or compromised server or to a server reached through an untrusted network path. The server sends a malformed StreamSettings response to trigger the issue.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3485
Note:
The fix makes the client reject responses whose extra_stream_ids count does not exactly match the number of additional client streams. Such mismatched responses now fail the RPC with ERESPONSE and go through the existing stream cleanup path, instead of being partially processed. |
| Missing authentication in the streaming RPC path of Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows a remote attacker to bypass server authentication and inject or deliver streaming frames, when a server is configured with an Authenticator.
Root Cause:
When authentication is configured, streaming RPC frames are consumed directly by the streaming parser (ParseStreamingMessage) and never pass through InputMessenger's authentication hook, so an unauthenticated peer can exchange frames without being authenticated. In addition, a server-accepted stream is bound lazily to the first frame that happens to carry its id, so a stream could accept a frame carrying its id from a socket other than the socket that created the stream.
Affected Scenarios:
A bRPC server configured with authentication that serves streaming RPC from an untrusted network, or a deployment where a foreign connection can impersonate a stream by id, can be made to accept unauthorized streaming frames.
How to Fix:
Upgrade bRPC to 1.18.0, which fixes this issue, or apply the patch in PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3481.
Note:
The fix rejects streaming frames on server sockets when configured authentication has not completed, and keeps server-accepted streams bound to the socket of their creating RPC and rejects frames arriving from another socket. Authenticated streaming RPC behavior and the wire format are unchanged; only unauthenticated or foreign-socket frames are now rejected. |
| Resource exhaustion in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms: multiple parsers that accept wire-controlled input bound no limit on the sizes declared by the client or on decompressed output, which attackers can use to drive disproportionate memory use and crash the process.
Root Cause:
1) The gzip/zlib/snappy decompressors enforce no output limit: -max_body_size is checked against the compressed bytes only, so a cap-compliant body (e.g. 64 MiB) can decompress to tens of GiB.
2) The AMF string readers allocate the declared length before the bytes are actually available.
3) RTMP chunk headers may re-declare a message length mid-stream; the declared length was never bounded and the partial reassembly buffer kept growing.
4) The sofa-pbrpc parser does not bound meta_size.
5) mcpack2pb trusts wire-declared item counts for Reserve() and a string value_size of 0 underflows the buffer size, aborting the process.
Affected Scenarios:
Any bRPC service accepting gzip/zlib/snappy-compressed bodies or rtmp, sofa-pbrpc, or mcpack2pb messages from untrusted clients.
How to Fix:(Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3476
Note:
After the fix, requests whose decompressed size, RTMP message length, or mcpack declared count exceed the new limits are rejected. Operators who legitimately need larger values can raise the corresponding flag (-max_decompressed_body_size, max_body_size). |
| Uncontrolled resource consumption in the HTTP/2 (h2) receive path of Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash the server or grow its memory without bound by sending crafted HTTP/2 frames.
Root Cause:
The h2 parser, enabled by default on every bRPC server port and used by h2/gRPC clients, trusts the peer to respect receive-side limits that bRPC advertises but never enforces:
1. SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS defaulted to unlimited and was never checked on the server, letting a peer pin an unbounded number of pending streams per connection (~100x memory amplification).
2. SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE defaulted to unlimited and was never enforced; 1-byte HPACK indexed references amplify a small HEADERS frame ~4000x into an unbounded decoded header list ("HPACK bomb"), and a never-completed HEADERS/CONTINUATION block accumulates memory without limit.
3. Control-frame acks (PING/SETTINGS acks, RST_STREAM, GOAWAY, WINDOW_UPDATE) unconditionally bypassed the -socket_max_unwritten_bytes write cap, so a PING flood combined with withheld TCP reads grew the connection buffer without the documented bound.
4. The HPACK dynamic table size update was validated against the protocol default (4096) instead of the advertised SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE, which together with the dynamic-table queue/accounting issue can desynchronize the decoder and dereference NULL (crash).
Affected scenarios:
Any bRPC server serving HTTP/h2/gRPC to an untrusted network, and any bRPC h2/gRPC client connecting to an untrusted backend. The h2 parser runs before any Authenticator check on the shared port.
How to fix:
Upgrade bRPC, or apply the patch in https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3474.
Note:
After applying the fix the following limits are enforced by default:
- max_concurrent_streams: 1024 per connection (4294967295 restores unlimited).
- max_header_list_size: 1 MiB decoded size per stream (4294967295 restores unlimited; -h2_client_max_header_list_size for clients).
- h2 control-frame acks respect -socket_max_unwritten_bytes (-h2_ack_ignore_eovercrowded restores the old behavior).
Requests exceeding these limits are rejected (RST_STREAM(REFUSED_STREAM) or a connection error). |
| A reachable-assertion flaw in the HPACK header-compression decoder of the HTTP/2 (h2/gRPC) stack in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows a remote attacker to crash the server process by sending a crafted sequence of HPACK headers, resulting in a denial of service.
Root Cause:
In src/brpc/details/hpack.cpp, IndexTable::Init sizes the dynamic-table ring buffer as num_headers = max_size / (32 + 2), i.e. it assumes a minimum table entry of 34 bytes (name >= 1 byte + value >= 1 byte + 32 bytes of overhead). However, RFC 7541 section 4.1 specifies that the minimum entry size is 33 bytes, because the value may be empty (name >= 1 byte + value == 0 + 32 bytes). For the default 4096-byte table this allocates only 120 slots (4096/34). Eviction in AddHeader is driven by byte usage (_max_size), not by slot count, so a peer can add 121 minimal 33-byte entries (121*33 = 3993 <= 4096) without triggering eviction. The 121st AddHeader then hits CHECK(!_header_queue.full()), which aborts the process.
Affected Scenarios:
Use a bRPC server that serves HTTP/2 or gRPC requests (e.g. via the h2 protocol) from an untrusted network. The malicious header block is processed during HPACK decoding of incoming requests without authentication.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3462
Note:
The fix sizes the dynamic table for the 33-byte minimum entry (max_size / (32 + 1)) and ensures at least one ring-buffer slot is kept when max_size is smaller than the minimum entry, so that initialization cannot fail on malloc(0). |
| A heap use-after-free in the RTMP protocol component of Apache bRPC (versions < 1.18.0) allows a remote attacker to crash a bRPC RTMP server by sending a crafted Abort control message. No authentication or application-level request is required.
Root Cause:
When an RTMP Abort control message names the chunk stream that is currently being parsed (the chunk stream carrying the message itself), RtmpChunkStream::OnAbortMessage calls RtmpContext::ClearChunkStream, which deletes the RtmpChunkStream while its Feed() is still running. After the message handler returns, Feed() continues to access members of the deleted object, resulting in a heap-use-after-free.
Affected Scenarios:
bRPC servers that enable RTMP support (ServerOptions.rtmp_service set) and accept connections from untrusted networks.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3452
The fix skips clearing the chunk stream when the Abort message targets the chunk stream that is currently being parsed. |
| Missing authentication for in-house broadcast and polymorphic deserialization vulnerability in Apache Kylin. Impact most to the kylin services that are directly exposed to public network, which is not common. In-house kylin deployments are mostly not impacted.
This issue affects Apache Kylin: from 4.0.0 through 5.0.4.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.0.5, which fixes the issue. |
| Path-confinement bypass during metadata backup deletion in Apache Kylin. Impact most to the kylin services that are directly exposed to public network, which is not common. In-house kylin deployments are mostly not impacted.
This issue affects Apache Kylin: from 4.0.0 through 5.0.4.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.0.5, which fixes the issue. |
