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CVEs in KEV CVEs with EPSS >= 80% Crit. Microsoft High Apache SQL Injection (CWE-89) Linux Kernel High (CVSS 3.1) Apache Struts RCE (Remote Code Execution) XSS (CWE-79) Critical (CVSS 4.0) CVEs to check

Search Results (2 CVEs found)

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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-54510 1 Murtaza-nasir 1 Speakr 2026-09-18 7.1 High
Speakr is a personal, self-hosted web application designed for transcribing audio recordings. Prior to 0.8.21-alpha, the csrf_exempt_for_api_tokens() before_request hook in src/app.py calls csrf.exempt(view_func), permanently adding the selected view to Flask-WTF's process-global exemption set. The is_token_authenticated() function in src/utils/token_auth.py calls extract_token_from_request() and treats any present token, including request.args.get('token'), as authenticated without hashing the token, querying the database, or checking validity. A network-reachable attacker can therefore send a false token to disable CSRF protection for the targeted view for the worker lifetime. Because the exemption applies to the view function across HTTP methods, a cross-origin GET to /account with a query token can poison CSRF state for a later state-changing POST without triggering CORS preflight. This browser sequence requires attacker-controlled content on a sibling subdomain under the documented cookie conditions. The bypass can modify profile data, custom prompts, transcription settings, preferences, and administrative status through routes such as admin_toggle_admin. The change_password route also skips current-password verification when current_user.password is empty, allowing the chain to set a local password on an SSO-only account and bypass SSO. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.21-alpha.
CVE-2026-45307 1 Murtaza-nasir 1 Speakr 2026-05-29 6.1 Medium
Speakr is a personal, self-hosted web application designed for transcribing audio recordings. Prior to 0.8.20-alpha, the is_safe_url() helper used to validate post-login redirect targets applied urljoin(request.host_url, target) before parsing, while the controller passed the raw target to redirect(). A scheme-relative input such as ////evil.com resolved to a same-host URL during validation but was emitted verbatim in the Location header, where the browser interpreted it as a network-path-relative redirect to an attacker-controlled host. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.20-alpha.