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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-19754 | 1 Baserow | 1 Baserow | 2026-10-19 | N/A |
| Baserow versions 2.2.0 through 2.3.3 contain an SQL injection vulnerability in the index() formula function. An authenticated user who can create or edit Formula fields can pass an undocumented fourth argument. Baserow inserts this argument into a PostgreSQL expression. The injected SQL runs with the Baserow database role permissions and can read or modify database data outside the user's workspace permissions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112371 | 1 H3c | 1 Magic Nx15 Firmware | 2026-10-19 | 9.9 Critical |
| A vulnerability was determined in H3C Magic NX15 NX15V100R017. Impacted is the function write of the file /api/esps of the component RPC Interface. Executing a manipulation of the argument path can lead to code injection. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97832 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-19 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53995 | 1 Mlflow | 1 Mlflow | 2026-10-19 | 8.2 High |
| MLflow 3.17.1 and earlier contains a path traversal vulnerability in the FileStore tracking backend that allows unauthenticated attackers to control filesystem paths by submitting a crafted trace ID containing traversal sequences to the POST /api/3.0/mlflow/traces endpoint. Attackers can exploit FileStore.start_trace() to write trace_info.yaml, request_metadata, and tag files with attacker-controlled metadata outside the intended experiment trace directory, subject to the server process's filesystem permissions. FileStore is the default tracking backend before MLflow 3.7.0 and opt-in thereafter (the default changed to a SQLite database), so deployments in the earlier part of the affected range are vulnerable without special configuration while later ones are affected only when FileStore is explicitly selected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112405 | 1 Python-pillow | 1 Pillow | 2026-10-19 | N/A |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 12.0.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow's Image.merge() can dereference a null image8 plane. Validation skips the first input band, allowing a 32-bit integer or floating-point image backed by image32 storage to be merged as a narrower multiband image. A crafted IPTC file can reach this path when an application opens and loads it, or a caller can invoke Image.merge() directly with such a first band. This causes a native process crash. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112406 | 1 Python-pillow | 1 Pillow | 2026-10-19 | N/A |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow can enter an infinite loop while rewriting PDF pages. PdfParser.rewrite_pages() follows Parent relationships without detecting a cycle in the page tree. An attacker can supply a cyclic PDF to an application that appends an image to that PDF. This can hold the worker at full CPU and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112891 | 1 Python-pillow | 1 Pillow | 2026-10-19 | N/A |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 9.2.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow performs quadratic copying when saving a GIF with a long comment. _get_global_header() repeatedly copies portions of comment data while assembling the global header, including comments retained from an untrusted input image. An attacker can supply an image with a large GIF comment to an application that saves it as GIF. This can consume excessive CPU and delay or deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112892 | 1 Python-pillow | 1 Pillow | 2026-10-19 | N/A |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 4.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow's MSP RLE decoder can expand a small file into an unbounded in-memory buffer. The decoder writes run-length output to BytesIO without limiting expansion to the declared image size. An attacker can supply a crafted MSP image to an application that loads its pixels. This can exhaust memory and deny service even when the declared pixel count passes the decompression-bomb check. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112991 | 1 Misp | 1 Misp Modules \(html To Markdown Expansion Module\) | 2026-10-19 | N/A |
| The html_to_markdown expansion module in MISP Modules contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its is_safe_url() URL validation function. The BLOCKED_RANGES list used to reject unsafe destination addresses was incomplete, omitting several critical IP address ranges. Specifically, the following ranges were not blocked: 0.0.0.0/8 (unspecified, which routes to loopback on Linux), 100.64.0.0/10 (carrier-grade NAT per RFC 6598), ::/128 (IPv6 unspecified), fc00::/7 (IPv6 Unique Local Addresses), and fe80::/10 (IPv6 link-local). The existing list only covered IPv4 loopback (127.0.0.0/8), RFC 1918 private ranges, IPv4 link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and IPv6 loopback (::1/128). An authenticated user with the ability to create or modify MISP attributes that trigger the html_to_markdown expansion module could supply URLs pointing to these unblocked internal address ranges. Because the module fetches the URL server-side to convert HTML content to Markdown, the request is made from the MISP server's network context. This allows an attacker to probe and read responses from internal services, carrier-grade NAT infrastructure, or link-local endpoints that would otherwise be unreachable from external networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms (e.g., [::ffff:0.0.0.0]) also bypassed the existing checks. The security impact is primarily confidentiality: an attacker can read data served by internal services reachable from the MISP server. The MISP instance itself is not compromised, but it is abused as a proxy to access otherwise restricted network resources. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99999 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum If a packet with bad checksum metadata gets into the ipv4 stack, skb_checksum_help can corrupt the network header and cause a bunch of mischief. This was discovered and reported by Paulos, and has been reporoduced by others independently since. We really shouldn't allow such packets in, but as a defence in depth measure, let's also check before we complete the checksum. A more complete validation at input is forthcoming, but needs more work. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72108 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm thin metadata: fix metadata snapshot consistency on commit failure __reserve_metadata_snap() and __release_metadata_snap() modify the superblock's held_root directly in the block_manager's buffer. If the subsequent metadata commit fails, the held_root gets flushed to disk through the abort_transaction path, resulting in inconsistent metadata. Reproducer 1: __reserve_metadata_snap() 1. Create a 2 MiB metadata device and make the region after the 14th block inaccessible, to trigger metadata commit failure in the subsequent reserve_metadata_snap operation. The 14th block will be the shadow destination for the index block. dmsetup create tmeta --table "0 112 linear /dev/sdc 0 112 3984 error" 2. Create a 16 MiB thin-pool dmsetup create tdata --table "0 32768 zero" dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/tmeta bs=4k count=1 dmsetup create tpool --table "0 32768 thin-pool /dev/mapper/tmeta \ /dev/mapper/tdata 128 0 1 skip_block_zeroing" 3. Take a metadata snapshot to trigger metadata commit failure and transaction abort. However, the held_root is written to disk, breaking metadata consistency. dmsetup message tpool 0 "reserve_metadata_snap" thin_check v1.2.2 result: Bad reference count for metadata block 6. Expected 2, but space map contains 1. Bad reference count for metadata block 7. Expected 2, but space map contains 1. Bad reference count for metadata block 13. Expected 1, but space map contains 0. Reproducer 2: __release_metadata_snap() 1. Create a 2 MiB metadata device and make the region after the 16th block inaccessible, to trigger metadata commit failure in the subsequent release_metadata_snap operation. The 16th block will be the shadow destination for the index block. dmsetup create tmeta --table "0 128 linear /dev/sdc 0 128 3968 error" 2. Create a 16 MiB thin-pool dmsetup create tdata --table "0 32768 zero" dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/tmeta bs=4k count=1 dmsetup create tpool --table "0 32768 thin-pool /dev/mapper/tmeta \ /dev/mapper/tdata 128 0 1 skip_block_zeroing" 3. Reserve then release the metadata snapshot, to trigger metadata commit failure and transaction abort. The held_root gets removed from the on-disk superblock, causing inconsistent metadata. dmsetup message tpool 0 "reserve_metadata_snap" dmsetup message tpool 0 "release_metadata_snap" thin_check v1.2.2 result: Bad reference count for metadata block 6. Expected 1, but space map contains 2. Bad reference count for metadata block 7. Expected 1, but space map contains 2. 1 metadata blocks have leaked. Fix by deferring the held_root update to commit time. Additionally, move the existing-snapshot check in __reserve_metadata_snap before the shadow operation to avoid unnecessary work. In __release_metadata_snap, clear pmd->held_root before btree deletion so partial failure leaks blocks rather than leaving a stale reference, and unlock the snapshot block before decrementing its refcount. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72103 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm: avoid leaking the caller's thread keyring via the table device file The refactoring in commit a28d893eb327 ("md: port block device access to file") accidentally causes the caller's thread keyring to be kept alive long beyond the caller's lifetime. As a result, "cryptsetup luksSuspend" silently fails to wipe the LUKS volume key from memory. In detail: "cryptsetup luksOpen" uses its supposedly ephemeral thread keyring to pass the volume key to the kernel. dm-crypt's crypt_set_keyring_key() copies the key material into its own crypt_config structure and then drops its own reference to the key in the keyring with key_put(). With this fix, restoring pre-v6.9 behavior, the copy in the thread keyring is then promptly garbage collected, such that exactly one copy of the volume key remains. This single copy is correctly wiped from memory on "cryptsetup luksSuspend". Without this fix, the thread keyring and the volume key in it remains. This second copy is only freed on "luksClose". "luksSuspend" neither knows about this copy nor has any way to remove it, so the key remains recoverable from RAM after a suspend that is documented to have wiped it. This fix should not introduce new security problems, as the code is anyway gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The device-mapper core, not the calling task, is the legitimate owner of this long-lived file. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72102 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm_early_create: fix freeing used table on dm_resume failure If dm_resume fails, the kernel attempts to free table with dm_table_destroy, but the table was already instantiated with dm_swap_table. This commit skips the call to dm_table_destroy in this case. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72100 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: fix a bug if the bio is out of limits If dm_integrity_check_limits fails, the code would exit with DM_MAPIO_KILL. However, the range would be already locked at this point, and it wouldn't be unlocked, resulting in a deadlock. Let's move the limit check up, so that when it exits, no resources are leaked. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72099 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: don't increment hash_offset twice hash_offset is already incremented in the loop "for (i = 0; i < to_copy; i++, ts--)". Do not increment it again. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72095 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-fence: Make dma_fence_dedup_array() robust against 0-count input dma_fence_dedup_array() returns 1 when called with num_fences == 0: the for-loop body never executes, j stays at 0, and the final `return ++j` yields 1. This contradicts both the kernel-doc ("Return: Number of unique fences remaining in the array") and the natural expectation that 0 input gives 0 output. The caller __dma_fence_unwrap_merge() bails out via the `if (count == 0 || count == 1)` fast path and so is save. But amdgpu_userq_wait_*() could reach the dedup call with a zero local count and dereference an uninitialized fence slot in the array. Make the contract match the documentation by returning 0 early. This also skips an unnecessary sort() call on an empty array. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72085 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: xen: scsiback: Free unsubmitted command instead of double-putting it scsiback_get_pend_req() obtains a command tag and returns a vscsibk_pend whose embedded se_cmd has only been memset to 0, so its cmd_kref is 0; the se_cmd is initialised (kref_init() via target_init_cmd()) only later, in scsiback_cmd_exec(), on the successful VSCSIIF_ACT_SCSI_CDB path. The two error paths in scsiback_do_cmd_fn() taken before the command is submitted -- a failed scsiback_gnttab_data_map() and an unknown ring_req.act -- call transport_generic_free_cmd(&pending_req->se_cmd, 0), which kref_put()s a refcount of 0. That underflows it ("refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free") and, as the release function is not run, leaks the command tag. Impact: a pvSCSI guest can leak every command tag of a LUN's session, stopping the LUN, by submitting requests with a bad grant reference or an unknown request type; under panic_on_warn the refcount underflow panics the host. Add a helper that just returns the tag with target_free_tag() and sends the error response. It frees the tag while the v2p reference still pins the session, and snapshots the response fields beforehand because freeing the tag can let another ring reuse the pending_req slot. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72083 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: core: Fix iSCSI ISID use-after-free in REGISTER AND MOVE core_scsi3_emulate_pro_register_and_move() maps the PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter list with transport_kmap_data_sg() and parses the destination TransportID with target_parse_pr_out_transport_id(). For an iSCSI TransportID (FORMAT CODE 01b), iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() returns the ISID in iport_ptr as a raw pointer into that mapped buffer. The function then unmaps the buffer with transport_kunmap_data_sg() before dereferencing iport_ptr in strcmp(), __core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg() and core_scsi3_alloc_registration(). When the parameter list spans more than one page (PARAMETER LIST LENGTH > 4096), transport_kmap_data_sg() uses vmap() and transport_kunmap_data_sg() does vunmap(), so the kernel virtual address backing iport_ptr is torn down and every subsequent dereference is a use-after-free read of the unmapped region. Keep the parameter list mapped until iport_ptr is no longer needed: drop the early transport_kunmap_data_sg() and unmap once on the success path, right before returning. The error paths already unmap through the existing "if (buf) transport_kunmap_data_sg(cmd)" at the out: label, which now runs on every post-map error exit because buf is no longer cleared early. Only reads of the mapping happen while spinlocks are held; the map and unmap calls remain outside any lock. The sibling caller core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() already uses the buffer before unmapping it and is left unchanged. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72080 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/resctrl: Fix use-after-free during unmount During unmount or failure teardown all mon_data structures that contain monitoring event file private data are freed after which kernfs nodes are removed. However, the RDT_DELETED flag is never set for the statically allocated default resource group. A concurrent reader of an event file associated with the default resource group may, after dropping kernfs active protection, block on rdtgroup_mutex while unmount proceeds to free the file private data and destroy the kernfs node without waiting for the reader. When the mutex is released, the reader wakes up, observes that RDT_DELETED is not set for the default group, and dereferences the already-freed file private data. The scenario can be depicted as follows: CPU0 CPU1 /* * Default resource group's * monitoring data accessible via * kernfs file with kernfs_node::priv * pointing to a struct mon_data. * User opens the file for reading. */ rdtgroup_mondata_show() /* arch encounters fatal error */ rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() resctrl_exit() atomic_inc(&rdtgroup_default.waitcount) cpus_read_lock() kernfs_break_active_protection(kn) mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex) cpus_read_lock() resctrl_fs_teardown() mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex) rmdir_all_sub() mon_put_kn_priv() /* Delete all mon_data structures */ rdtgroup_destroy_root() kernfs_destroy_root() rdtgroup_default.kn = NULL mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex) /* * rdtgroup_default.flags is empty so * rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() returns * &rdtgroup_default */ md = of->kn->priv; /* md points to freed mon_data */ Set RDT_DELETED for the default group unconditionally since the flag does not lead to the freeing of this statically allocated group. Do not allow a new resctrl mount if there are any waiters on default group of previous mount. A new mount will re-initialize the default group that would appear to waiters from previous mount as though the default group is accessible causing them to access the mon_data structures from the previous mount that have been removed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72072 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: macsec: fix use-after-free of metadata_dst on RX SC delete When an offloaded MACsec RX SC is deleted, macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() freed the per-SC metadata_dst with metadata_dst_free(), which kfree()s the object unconditionally and ignores the dst reference count. The RX datapath in mlx5e_macsec_offload_handle_rx_skb() looks up the SC under rcu_read_lock() via xa_load(), takes a reference with dst_hold() and attaches the dst to the skb with skb_dst_set(). A reader that already obtained the rx_sc pointer can race with the delete path and operate on freed memory. Fix the owner side by dropping the reference with dst_release() instead of freeing unconditionally, and convert the RX datapath to dst_hold_safe() so a reader racing the SC delete cannot attach a dst whose last reference was just dropped; only attach it when a reference was actually taken. mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsc() also published sc_xarray_element via xa_alloc() before rx_sc->md_dst was allocated and initialised, so a datapath reader that looked the SC up by fs_id could observe rx_sc with md_dst still NULL or, on weakly-ordered architectures, a non-NULL md_dst pointer whose contents were not yet visible. NULL-check the xa_load() result and md_dst on the datapath, and reorder add_rxsc() so the xa_alloc() publish happens only after md_dst is fully initialised; the xarray RCU publish then pairs with the rcu_read_lock()/xa_load() in the datapath. Note: macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() also kfree()s rx_sc->sc_xarray_element without an RCU grace period while the same datapath reads it under rcu_read_lock(); that is a separate pre-existing issue left to a follow-up patch. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||