| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in Netty. SpdySessionHandler accepts an unlimited number of concurrent remote-initiated streams because localConcurrentStreams defaults to Integer.MAX_VALUE and the handler provides no API to change it. A remote peer can open a SPDY connection and send a large number of SYN_STREAM frames with FLAG_FIN=0, causing unbounded heap and direct memory allocation that can lead to JVM OutOfMemoryError and a denial of service. |
| Keycloak provides a Dynamic Client Registration feature that allows users with specific tokens to register their own applications. A flaw in how Keycloak validates these registration requests allows an attacker to create a malicious application that forges identity information. By mapping their own user profile details to protected fields like the user ID (sub) or intended audience (aud), an attacker can generate signed security tokens that make them appear to be a different user. This could allow an attacker to impersonate other users or gain unauthorized access to services that rely on these tokens for identity verification. |
| A flaw was found in the SAML identity broker component of Keycloak, which is used to delegate authentication to external identity providers. The issue occurs because the broker fails to verify that a user actually possesses the private key associated with a holder-of-key assertion. An attacker who intercepts a victim signed assertion can replay it to gain unauthorized access and impersonate the victim without needing their private key. |
| XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between <![CDATA[ and ]]> and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder's character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters <, >, &, ", and ', but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]> substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]><![CDATA[>. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.
An application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]> is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.
Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.
The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --> is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the <!-- and --> delimiters.
When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| undici is an HTTP client for Node.js. In versions 7.0.0 through 7.30.1 and 8.0.0 through 8.12.3, when an Agent composes the redirect and shared cache interceptors, a cached response that is revalidated with a conditional request can be validated by a 304 Not Modified from a different origin. When the origin that stored the response redirects the conditional revalidation request to another origin, the redirect handler strips origin-bound credential headers but not the cache-generated If-None-Match or If-Modified-Since validators, so the redirect destination receives the original origin's validator and undici treats its 304 as successful revalidation of the stored representation. As a result, a shared cache can serve the original origin's stored authenticated response, including one gated by Authorization, to a later unauthenticated caller. The issue is fixed in undici 7.30.2 and 8.12.4, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, compose the interceptors as cache then redirect, use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests. |
| undici is an HTTP client for Node.js. In versions 7.0.0 through 7.30.1 and 8.0.0 through 8.12.3, the redirect interceptor strips sensitive headers such as Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, and Host when a request is redirected to a different origin, but when request headers are supplied as an array of name and value tuples (a valid documented input, for example from Object.entries), the redirect handler misreads them as a flat list so the header names never match and the sensitive headers are not removed. If a header-normalizing interceptor such as cache or deduplicate is composed outside the redirect interceptor, it then serializes the retained headers onto the cross-origin request, disclosing the caller's origin-bound credentials to the unrelated redirect destination. This is a representation-dependent bypass of the cross-origin header stripping added in CVE-2024-30260. The issue is fixed in undici 7.30.2 and 8.12.4, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, supply request headers as a plain object or a flat name and value array rather than an array of tuples, or compose the redirect interceptor outside the normalizing interceptor. |
| undici is an HTTP client for Node.js. In versions 7.15.0 through 7.30.1 and 8.0.0 through 8.12.3, fetch verifies Subresource Integrity metadata by splitting the integrity string on a single space, but the SRI grammar separates metadata by ASCII whitespace, which also includes the horizontal tab. An integrity value whose digest is preceded by a tab or other ASCII whitespace is parsed as a single unrecognized token and skipped, and when no recognized algorithm remains undici treats the integrity list as empty and accepts the response, so a server returning a body different from the pinned digest passes the check. An application that pins a response with a valid but whitespace-surrounded SRI value receives attacker-controlled bytes with no integrity error, and the attacker needs only to control the response body, not the integrity metadata. The issue is fixed in undici 7.30.2 and 8.12.4, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, supply SRI integrity metadata without surrounding whitespace, using a single space to separate multiple digests. |
| A user with any role, including Viewer or a service account with no permissions, can create, externally publish, and delete dashboard snapshots (missing authorization). Only Grafana OSS and Grafana Enterprise 12.4 are affected; earlier versions and Grafana 13 are not. |
| undici is an HTTP client for Node.js. In versions 7.30.1 and 8.12.2 through 8.12.3, when an originless Agent composes the redirect and shared cache interceptors, undici decides whether to store the final response under the original request key by inspecting only the final redirect hop, which bypasses the earlier fix for CVE-2026-109829 that compared only the initial and final origins. A redirect that bounces through an untrusted origin and returns to the trusted origin is still cached under the trusted key, an intermediate hop's Vary is dropped so a response that varies on Authorization or Cookie can be served to a different user, and an intermediate hop's no-cache or default-uncacheable status is ignored so a non-storable redirect is laundered into a cacheable entry. An attacker who controls a redirect target from a trusted URL can poison the cached entry for that URL or have a private, per-user response served to a later caller. The issue is fixed in undici 7.30.2 and 8.12.4, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, compose the interceptors as cache then redirect, use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests. |
| undici is an HTTP client for Node.js. In versions 7.0.0 through 7.30.1 and 8.0.0 through 8.12.3, when the cache interceptor is composed with a downstream handler that throws during response processing (such as the built-in dump interceptor exceeding its maxSize, or the decompress interceptor rejecting more than five Content-Encoding values), a throw raised asynchronously while a cached response is replayed escapes as an uncaught exception or unhandled promise rejection and terminates the Node.js process. A malicious or compromised HTTP server can crash any such client by serving a cacheable response that triggers the throw on replay, including on a 304 revalidation of a stale entry, so the impact is availability only. The issue is fixed in undici 7.30.2 and 8.12.4, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, avoid composing the cache interceptor with a response handler that throws during response processing until upgrading. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in armeria-xds versions 1.40.0 through 1.42.0, where DataSourcePolicy checks filename containment without resolving symbolic links, allowing a compromised or semi-trusted xDS control plane to cause the xDS client to read files outside configured allowed root directories when a symbolic link inside an allowed directory points outside it. In deployments using a credential injector, header-compatible text secrets may be exposed to an attacker-observable upstream. |
| undici is an HTTP client for Node.js. In versions 7.0.0 through 7.30.1 and 8.0.0 through 8.12.3, when the redirect interceptor and a shared response cache are used together, an authenticated request that is redirected to a same-origin target has the final response stored under the original request's cache key. That key omits the credential and carries no Vary header, so a later anonymous or different user can be served the first user's private response body. This results in cross-user disclosure of cached private responses. The issue is fixed in undici 7.30.2 and 8.12.4, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in armeria-saml versions prior to 1.43.0, where the HTTP-Redirect binding decoder decompresses attacker-supplied SAML messages without limiting the output size before signature validation, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory and cause a denial of service. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in armeria versions 0.84.0 through 1.42.0, where any-origin CORS policies do not enforce configured path restrictions, allowing an attacker-controlled website visited by an authenticated victim to read sensitive responses from excluded paths when credentials are enabled and the victim's browser sends authentication credentials. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in armeria versions 0.80.0 through 1.42.0, where attackers who control file names can cause stored cross-site scripting (XSS) when directory listing is enabled and a user views the listing. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in armeria versions prior to 1.43.0, where inconsistent request path normalization can allow unauthenticated attackers to bypass path-based access controls and access protected resources. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in David Anderson Redux Framework redux-framework allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Redux Framework: from n/a through 4.5.16. |
| The Graphina – Charts and Graphs For Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'iq_tree_chart_node_font_family (and any text control serialized into chart_data['settings'])' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.13 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Elementor's Utils::kses_post_deep() does not strip the attack payload on save because the payload contains no disallowed HTML tags — only a single quote and an event-handler fragment — allowing the malicious value to survive persistence. |
