| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_cake: Fix incorrect qlen reduction in cake_drop
In cake_drop(), qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is used to update the qlen
and backlog of the qdisc hierarchy. Its caller, cake_enqueue(), assumes
that the parent qdisc will enqueue the current packet. However, this
assumption breaks when cake_enqueue() returns NET_XMIT_CN: the parent
qdisc stops enqueuing current packet, leaving the tree qlen/backlog
accounting inconsistent. This mismatch can lead to a NULL dereference
(e.g., when the parent Qdisc is qfq_qdisc).
This patch computes the qlen/backlog delta in a more robust way by
observing the difference before and after the series of cake_drop()
calls, and then compensates the qdisc tree accounting if cake_enqueue()
returns NET_XMIT_CN.
To ensure correct compensation when ACK thinning is enabled, a new
variable is introduced to keep qlen unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: imm: Fix use-after-free bug caused by unfinished delayed work
The delayed work item 'imm_tq' is initialized in imm_attach() and
scheduled via imm_queuecommand() for processing SCSI commands. When the
IMM parallel port SCSI host adapter is detached through imm_detach(),
the imm_struct device instance is deallocated.
However, the delayed work might still be pending or executing
when imm_detach() is called, leading to use-after-free bugs
when the work function imm_interrupt() accesses the already
freed imm_struct memory.
The race condition can occur as follows:
CPU 0(detach thread) | CPU 1
| imm_queuecommand()
| imm_queuecommand_lck()
imm_detach() | schedule_delayed_work()
kfree(dev) //FREE | imm_interrupt()
| dev = container_of(...) //USE
dev-> //USE
Add disable_delayed_work_sync() in imm_detach() to guarantee proper
cancellation of the delayed work item before imm_struct is deallocated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: fix use-after-free caused by uec->work
The delayed work uec->work is scheduled in gaokun_ucsi_probe()
but never properly canceled in gaokun_ucsi_remove(). This creates
use-after-free scenarios where the ucsi and gaokun_ucsi structure
are freed after ucsi_destroy() completes execution, while the
gaokun_ucsi_register_worker() might be either currently executing
or still pending in the work queue. The already-freed gaokun_ucsi
or ucsi structure may then be accessed.
Furthermore, the race window is 3 seconds, which is sufficiently
long to make this bug easily reproducible. The following is the
trace captured by KASAN:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x5ec/0x630
Write of size 8 at addr ffff00000ec28cc8 by task swapper/0/0
...
Call trace:
show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90
print_report+0x114/0x580
kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x20/0x2c
__run_timers+0x5ec/0x630
run_timer_softirq+0xe8/0x1cc
handle_softirqs+0x294/0x720
__do_softirq+0x14/0x20
____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
call_on_irq_stack+0x30/0x48
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x28
__irq_exit_rcu+0x27c/0x364
irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x1c
el1_interrupt+0x40/0x60
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8 (P)
do_idle+0x334/0x458
cpu_startup_entry+0x60/0x70
rest_init+0x158/0x174
start_kernel+0x2f8/0x394
__primary_switched+0x8c/0x94
Allocated by task 72 on cpu 0 at 27.510341s:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54
kasan_save_track+0x24/0x5c
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x54
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb8
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1c0/0x588
devm_kmalloc+0x7c/0x1c8
gaokun_ucsi_probe+0xa0/0x840 auxiliary_bus_probe+0x94/0xf8
really_probe+0x17c/0x5b8
__driver_probe_device+0x158/0x2c4
driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x264
__device_attach_driver+0x168/0x2d0
bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x188
__device_attach+0x174/0x368
device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
bus_probe_device+0x120/0x150
device_add+0xb3c/0x10fc
__auxiliary_device_add+0x88/0x130
...
Freed by task 73 on cpu 1 at 28.910627s:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54
kasan_save_track+0x24/0x5c
__kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x74
__kasan_slab_free+0x60/0x8c
kfree+0xd4/0x410
devres_release_all+0x140/0x1f0
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190
device_release_driver_internal+0x344/0x460
device_release_driver+0x18/0x24
bus_remove_device+0x198/0x274
device_del+0x310/0xa84
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff00000ec28c00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 200 bytes inside of
freed 512-byte region
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4ec28
head: order:2 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x3fffe0000000040(head|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 03fffe0000000040 ffff000008801c80 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 03fffe0000000040 ffff000008801c80 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 03fffe0000000002 fffffdffc03b0a01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000004
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff00000ec28b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff00000ec28c00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff00000ec28c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff00000ec28d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff00000ec28d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
================================================================
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
parisc: Avoid crash due to unaligned access in unwinder
Guenter Roeck reported this kernel crash on his emulated B160L machine:
Starting network: udhcpc: started, v1.36.1
Backtrace:
[<104320d4>] unwind_once+0x1c/0x5c
[<10434a00>] walk_stackframe.isra.0+0x74/0xb8
[<10434a6c>] arch_stack_walk+0x28/0x38
[<104e5efc>] stack_trace_save+0x48/0x5c
[<105d1bdc>] set_track_prepare+0x44/0x6c
[<105d9c80>] ___slab_alloc+0xfc4/0x1024
[<105d9d38>] __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x58/0x90
[<105dc80c>] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x2ac/0x4a0
[<105b8e54>] __anon_vma_prepare+0x60/0x280
[<105a823c>] __vmf_anon_prepare+0x68/0x94
[<105a8b34>] do_wp_page+0x8cc/0xf10
[<105aad88>] handle_mm_fault+0x6c0/0xf08
[<10425568>] do_page_fault+0x110/0x440
[<10427938>] handle_interruption+0x184/0x748
[<11178398>] schedule+0x4c/0x190
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, ifconfig/2420
lock: terminate_lock.2+0x0/0x1c, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: ifconfig/2420, .owner_cpu: 0
While creating the stack trace, the unwinder uses the stack pointer to guess
the previous frame to read the previous stack pointer from memory. The crash
happens, because the unwinder tries to read from unaligned memory and as such
triggers the unalignment trap handler which then leads to the spinlock
recursion and finally to a deadlock.
Fix it by checking the alignment before accessing the memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netconsole: Acquire su_mutex before navigating configs hierarchy
There is a race between operations that iterate over the userdata
cg_children list and concurrent add/remove of userdata items through
configfs. The update_userdata() function iterates over the
nt->userdata_group.cg_children list, and count_extradata_entries() also
iterates over this same list to count nodes.
Quoting from Documentation/filesystems/configfs.rst:
> A subsystem can navigate the cg_children list and the ci_parent pointer
> to see the tree created by the subsystem. This can race with configfs'
> management of the hierarchy, so configfs uses the subsystem mutex to
> protect modifications. Whenever a subsystem wants to navigate the
> hierarchy, it must do so under the protection of the subsystem
> mutex.
Without proper locking, if a userdata item is added or removed
concurrently while these functions are iterating, the list can be
accessed in an inconsistent state. For example, the list_for_each() loop
can reach a node that is being removed from the list by list_del_init()
which sets the nodes' .next pointer to point to itself, so the loop will
never end (or reach the WARN_ON_ONCE in update_userdata() ).
Fix this by holding the configfs subsystem mutex (su_mutex) during all
operations that iterate over cg_children.
This includes:
- userdatum_value_store() which calls update_userdata() to iterate over
cg_children
- All sysdata_*_enabled_store() functions which call
count_extradata_entries() to iterate over cg_children
The su_mutex must be acquired before dynamic_netconsole_mutex to avoid
potential lock ordering issues, as configfs operations may already hold
su_mutex when calling into our code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: thead: th1520-ap: set all AXI clocks to CLK_IS_CRITICAL
The AXI crossbar of TH1520 has no proper timeout handling, which means
gating AXI clocks can easily lead to bus timeout and thus system hang.
Set all AXI clock gates to CLK_IS_CRITICAL. All these clock gates are
ungated by default on system reset.
In addition, convert all current CLK_IGNORE_UNUSED usage to
CLK_IS_CRITICAL to prevent unwanted clock gating. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: zynqmp-ipi: Fix out-of-bounds access in mailbox cleanup loop
The cleanup loop was starting at the wrong array index, causing
out-of-bounds access.
Start the loop at the correct index for zero-indexed arrays to prevent
accessing memory beyond the allocated array bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix invalid probe error return value
After DME Link Startup, the error return value is set to the MIPI UniPro
GenericErrorCode which can be 0 (SUCCESS) or 1 (FAILURE). Upon failure
during driver probe, the error code 1 is propagated back to the driver
probe function which must return a negative value to indicate an error,
but 1 is not negative, so the probe is considered to be successful even
though it failed. Subsequently, removing the driver results in an oops
because it is not in a valid state.
This happens because none of the callers of ufshcd_init() expect a
non-negative error code.
Fix the return value and documentation to match actual usage. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: verify orphan file size is not too big
In principle orphan file can be arbitrarily large. However orphan replay
needs to traverse it all and we also pin all its buffers in memory. Thus
filesystems with absurdly large orphan files can lead to big amounts of
memory consumed. Limit orphan file size to a sane value and also use
kvmalloc() for allocating array of block descriptor structures to avoid
large order allocations for sane but large orphan files. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: ip22zilog: Use platform device for probing
After commit 84a9582fd203 ("serial: core: Start managing serial controllers
to enable runtime PM") serial drivers need to provide a device in
struct uart_port.dev otherwise an oops happens. To fix this issue
for ip22zilog driver switch driver to a platform driver and setup
the serial device in sgi-ip22 code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Avoid deadlock between PCI error recovery and mlx5 crdump
Do not block PCI config accesses through pci_cfg_access_lock() when
executing the s390 variant of PCI error recovery: Acquire just
device_lock() instead of pci_dev_lock() as powerpc's EEH and
generig PCI AER processing do.
During error recovery testing a pair of tasks was reported to be hung:
mlx5_core 0000:00:00.1: mlx5_health_try_recover:338:(pid 5553): health recovery flow aborted, PCI reads still not working
INFO: task kmcheck:72 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kmcheck state:D stack:0 pid:72 tgid:72 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
[<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590
[<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0
[<000000065256f572>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x22/0x30
[<0000000652570a94>] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x484/0x8a8
[<000003ff800673a4>] mlx5_unload_one+0x34/0x58 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff8006745c>] mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000652556c5a>] zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xf2/0x398
[<0000000651b9184a>] __zpci_event_error+0x23a/0x2c0
INFO: task kworker/u1664:6:1514 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u1664:6 state:D stack:0 pid:1514 tgid:1514 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000
Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:00:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
[<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590
[<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0
[<0000000652172e28>] pci_wait_cfg+0x80/0xe8
[<0000000652172f94>] pci_cfg_access_lock+0x74/0x88
[<000003ff800916b6>] mlx5_vsc_gw_lock+0x36/0x178 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff80098824>] mlx5_crdump_collect+0x34/0x1c8 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff80074b62>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump+0x6a/0xe8 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000652512242>] devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x82/0x168
[<0000000652513212>] devlink_health_report+0x19a/0x230
[<000003ff80075a12>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xba/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
No kernel log of the exact same error with an upstream kernel is
available - but the very same deadlock situation can be constructed there,
too:
- task: kmcheck
mlx5_unload_one() tries to acquire devlink lock while the PCI error
recovery code has set pdev->block_cfg_access by way of
pci_cfg_access_lock()
- task: kworker
mlx5_crdump_collect() tries to set block_cfg_access through
pci_cfg_access_lock() while devlink_health_report() had acquired
the devlink lock.
A similar deadlock situation can be reproduced by requesting a
crdump with
> devlink health dump show pci/<BDF> reporter fw_fatal
while PCI error recovery is executed on the same <BDF> physical function
by mlx5_core's pci_error_handlers. On s390 this can be injected with
> zpcictl --reset-fw <BDF>
Tests with this patch failed to reproduce that second deadlock situation,
the devlink command is rejected with "kernel answers: Permission denied" -
and we get a kernel log message of:
mlx5_core 1ed0:00:00.1: mlx5_crdump_collect:50:(pid 254382): crdump: failed to lock vsc gw err -5
because the config read of VSC_SEMAPHORE is rejected by the underlying
hardware.
Two prior attempts to address this issue have been discussed and
ultimately rejected [see link], with the primary argument that s390's
implementation of PCI error recovery is imposing restrictions that
neither powerpc's EEH nor PCI AER handling need. Tests show that PCI
error recovery on s390 is running to completion even without blocking
access to PCI config space. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/AER: Fix NULL pointer access by aer_info
The kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) may return NULL, so all accesses to aer_info->xxx
will result in kernel panic. Fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Squashfs: reject negative file sizes in squashfs_read_inode()
Syskaller reports a "WARNING in ovl_copy_up_file" in overlayfs.
This warning is ultimately caused because the underlying Squashfs file
system returns a file with a negative file size.
This commit checks for a negative file size and returns EINVAL.
[phillip@squashfs.org.uk: only need to check 64 bit quantity] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: kvaser_usb: leaf: Fix potential infinite loop in command parsers
The `kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd()` and `kvaser_usb_leaf_read_bulk_callback`
functions contain logic to zero-length commands. These commands are used
to align data to the USB endpoint's wMaxPacketSize boundary.
The driver attempts to skip these placeholders by aligning the buffer
position `pos` to the next packet boundary using `round_up()` function.
However, if zero-length command is found exactly on a packet boundary
(i.e., `pos` is a multiple of wMaxPacketSize, including 0), `round_up`
function will return the unchanged value of `pos`. This prevents `pos`
to be increased, causing an infinite loop in the parsing logic.
This patch fixes this in the function by using `pos + 1` instead.
This ensures that even if `pos` is on a boundary, the calculation is
based on `pos + 1`, forcing `round_up()` to always return the next
aligned boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pid: Add a judgment for ns null in pid_nr_ns
__task_pid_nr_ns
ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
pid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(*task_pid_ptr(task, type)), ns);
if (pid && ns->level <= pid->level) {
Sometimes null is returned for task_active_pid_ns. Then it will trigger kernel panic in pid_nr_ns.
For example:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000007
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000002175aa000
[0000000000000058] pgd=08000002175ab003, p4d=08000002175ab003, pud=08000002175ab003, pmd=08000002175be003, pte=0000000000000000
pstate: 834000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __task_pid_nr_ns+0x74/0xd0
lr : __task_pid_nr_ns+0x24/0xd0
sp : ffffffc08001bd10
x29: ffffffc08001bd10 x28: ffffffd4422b2000 x27: 0000000000000001
x26: ffffffd442821168 x25: ffffffd442821000 x24: 00000f89492eab31
x23: 00000000000000c0 x22: ffffff806f5693c0 x21: ffffff806f5693c0
x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 00000000529c6ef0 x16: 00000000529c6ef0 x15: 00000000023a1adc
x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000007ef6d8 x12: 001167c391c78800
x11: 00ffffffffffffff x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000001
x8 : ffffff80816fa3c0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 49534d702d535449
x5 : ffffffc080c4c2c0 x4 : ffffffd43ee128c8 x3 : ffffffd43ee124dc
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffff806f5693c0
Call trace:
__task_pid_nr_ns+0x74/0xd0
...
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0xd4/0x284
handle_irq_event+0x48/0xb0
handle_fasteoi_irq+0x160/0x2d8
generic_handle_domain_irq+0x44/0x60
gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0x114
call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x74
do_interrupt_handler+0x4c/0x84
el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
account_kernel_stack+0x60/0x144
exit_task_stack_account+0x1c/0x80
do_exit+0x7e4/0xaf8
...
get_signal+0x7bc/0x8d8
do_notify_resume+0x128/0x828
el0_svc+0x6c/0x70
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xbc
el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac
Code: 35fffe54 911a02a8 f9400108 b4000128 (b9405a69)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: Fix bootlog initialization ordering
As soon as we queue MHI buffers to receive the bootlog from the device,
we could be receiving data. Therefore all the resources needed to
process that data need to be setup prior to queuing the buffers.
We currently initialize some of the resources after queuing the buffers
which creates a race between the probe() and any data that comes back
from the device. If the uninitialized resources are accessed, we could
see page faults.
Fix the init ordering to close the race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Fix kernel crash when releasing mtk iso interface
When performing reset tests and encountering abnormal card drop issues
that lead to a kernel crash, it is necessary to perform a null check
before releasing resources to avoid attempting to release a null pointer.
<4>[ 29.158070] Hardware name: Google Quigon sku196612/196613 board (DT)
<4>[ 29.158076] Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth]
<4>[ 29.158154] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
<4>[ 29.158162] pc : klist_remove+0x90/0x158
<4>[ 29.158174] lr : klist_remove+0x88/0x158
<4>[ 29.158180] sp : ffffffc0846b3c00
<4>[ 29.158185] pmr_save: 000000e0
<4>[ 29.158188] x29: ffffffc0846b3c30 x28: ffffff80cd31f880 x27: ffffff80c1bdc058
<4>[ 29.158199] x26: dead000000000100 x25: ffffffdbdc624ea3 x24: ffffff80c1bdc4c0
<4>[ 29.158209] x23: ffffffdbdc62a3e6 x22: ffffff80c6c07000 x21: ffffffdbdc829290
<4>[ 29.158219] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff80cd3e0648 x18: 000000031ec97781
<4>[ 29.158229] x17: ffffff80c1bdc4a8 x16: ffffffdc10576548 x15: ffffff80c1180428
<4>[ 29.158238] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 000000000000e380 x12: 0000000000000018
<4>[ 29.158248] x11: ffffff80c2a7fd10 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000100000000
<4>[ 29.158257] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 2d7223ff6364626d
<4>[ 29.158266] x5 : 0000008000000000 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 2e7325006465636e
<4>[ 29.158275] x2 : ffffffdc11afeff8 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffdc11be4d0c
<4>[ 29.158285] Call trace:
<4>[ 29.158290] klist_remove+0x90/0x158
<4>[ 29.158298] device_release_driver_internal+0x20c/0x268
<4>[ 29.158308] device_release_driver+0x1c/0x30
<4>[ 29.158316] usb_driver_release_interface+0x70/0x88
<4>[ 29.158325] btusb_mtk_release_iso_intf+0x68/0xd8 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)]
<4>[ 29.158347] btusb_mtk_reset+0x5c/0x480 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)]
<4>[ 29.158361] hci_cmd_sync_work+0x10c/0x188 [bluetooth (HASH:a4fa 6)]
<4>[ 29.158430] process_scheduled_works+0x258/0x4e8
<4>[ 29.158441] worker_thread+0x300/0x428
<4>[ 29.158448] kthread+0x108/0x1d0
<4>[ 29.158455] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
<0>[ 29.158467] Code: 91343000 940139d1 f9400268 927ff914 (f9401297)
<4>[ 29.158474] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
<0>[ 29.167129] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
<2>[ 29.167144] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
<4>[ 29.167158] ------------[ cut here ]------------ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Account for failed debug initialization
When the SCMI debug subsystem fails to initialize, the related debug root
will be missing, and the underlying descriptor will be NULL.
Handle this fault condition in the SCMI debug helpers that maintain
metrics counters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: amd/sdw_utils: avoid NULL deref when devm_kasprintf() fails
devm_kasprintf() may return NULL on memory allocation failure,
but the debug message prints cpus->dai_name before checking it.
Move the dev_dbg() call after the NULL check to prevent potential
NULL pointer dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/namespace: fix reference leak in grab_requested_mnt_ns
lookup_mnt_ns() already takes a reference on mnt_ns.
grab_requested_mnt_ns() doesn't need to take an extra reference. |
