| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. The existing KVM SEV API has a vulnerability that allows a non-root (host) user-level application to crash the host kernel by creating a confidential guest VM instance in AMD CPU that supports Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). |
| An out-of-bounds (OOB) memory access flaw was found in the Linux kernel's eBPF due to an Improper Input Validation. This flaw allows a local attacker with a special privilege to crash the system or leak internal information. |
| A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel's EBPF verifier when handling internal data structures. Internal memory locations could be returned to userspace. A local attacker with the permissions to insert eBPF code to the kernel can use this to leak internal kernel memory details defeating some of the exploit mitigations in place for the kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: take invalidate_lock in ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite()
ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() calls iomap_page_mkwrite() without holding
mapping->invalidate_lock, so a concurrent truncate or fallocate can be
in the middle of invalidating pagecache and rewriting the runlist while
the write fault maps blocks and dirties the folio. This races with
ntfs_attr_fallocate(), which merges clusters into the in-memory
runlist, drops the runlist lock, and only afterwards zeroes the newly
allocated clusters on disk; and with the punch-hole/insert/collapse
paths that free clusters after truncating the cache.
Per Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst, ->page_mkwrite() must ensure
there are no truncate/invalidate races, "usually mapping->invalidate_lock
is suitable for proper serialization". xfs takes its mmaplock (= the
invalidate_lock rwsem) shared in exactly this path.
Take invalidate_lock shared around iomap_page_mkwrite(). The read-only
fault path is already covered because filemap_fault() itself grabs
invalidate_lock shared on instantiation/read paths; only page_mkwrite
was bypassing it in this driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: fix race between fallocate and mmap reads
The fallocate implementation only takes invalidate_lock for punch hole,
collapse range, and insert range operations. For standard allocation modes
(mode == 0, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE), the lock is not held.
During ntfs_attr_fallocate(), new clusters are mapped to the runlist via
ntfs_attr_map_cluster() before being zeroed by ntfs_dio_zero_range(). This
creates a window where concurrent mmap page faults can read uninitialized
disk data.
Since mmap uses filemap_fault() which takes invalidate_lock in shared mode,
it can fault in pages during this window and expose old disk contents to
userspace. This is an information leak and data integrity issue.
Fix by taking invalidate_lock for all fallocate operations, not just for
punch/collapse/insert modes. This prevents concurrent page faults from
accessing unzeroed clusters during the allocation window. |
| An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 5.2.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference caused by a malicious USB device in the flexcop_usb_probe function in the drivers/media/usb/b2c2/flexcop-usb.c driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix perf_pmu_migrate_context() leaving events behind
__perf_pmu_remove() walks the group leaders of a CPU and PMU with
perf_event_groups_for_cpu_pmu(), removing each one as it goes.
perf_remove_from_context() takes the leader out of the groups rbtree,
after which rb_next() on that node returns NULL, prematurely ending the
walk. Other groups stay behind in the source context.
On CPU hotplug, they are then torn down with the dying CPU. They keep
running until teardown, while the PMU's interrupt and migrated events
are on a new CPU, which drivers rely on never happening.
Walk ctx->event_list instead and pick out the PMU's events by their
pmu_ctx. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: mxc: fix race between chained IRQ handler install and probe completion
mxc_update_irq_chained_handler() is called before the IRQ domain, the
generic IRQ chip, and the port list entry are set up. If an interrupt
arrives in that window:
- mx3_gpio_irq_handler() calls generic_handle_domain_irq() with
port->domain still NULL.
- mx2_gpio_irq_handler() walks mxc_gpio_ports, but the port has not
been added to the list yet.
Additionally, if any of the subsequent probe steps
(gpio_generic_chip_init(), devm_gpiochip_add_data(),
irq_domain_create_legacy(), or mxc_gpio_init_gc()) fail, the error
paths never unregister the chained handler, leaving a dangling handler
that points at freed memory.
Move the handler installation after all its dependencies are ready and
after list_add_tail(), so the handler is never live while the data
structures it touches are incomplete, and is never installed if probe
fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
autofs: ignore notification errors from a replaced pipe
autofs_notify_daemon() takes a reference to the current notification
pipe under wq_mutex, then drops the mutex before writing the request. The
write can block while the daemon enters catatonic mode and installs a
replacement pipe.
If the old pipe's reader is then closed, the delayed write returns -EPIPE
and the generic error path enters catatonic mode again. That transition
acts on the current superblock state, closes the replacement pipe, and
releases the new daemon generation's wait queues.
Only enter catatonic mode when the pipe which failed is still the current
pipe. Factor the already-locked transition so the identity check and state
change are atomic with respect to another replacement.
This was reproduced on v7.3-rc5-337-gff47652a4b66c in a local QEMU guest.
An unprivileged UID 65534 lookup filled the old packet pipe before a
normal CATATONIC/SETPIPEFD restart. On the unmodified kernel, the new pipe
received HUP and both a pending victim lookup and a later lookup failed
with ENOENT in two out of two fresh-mount runs.
With this change, the new pipe remained active, received an intact
304-byte request, and both victim lookups completed in two out of two
runs. Normal lookup and restart-without-a-blocked-writer controls passed.
No KASAN, oops, refcount, or lock diagnostic was observed. A source
reproducer and complete local logs are available privately on request.
The demonstrated impact is limited to denial of a shared autofs service
during a legitimate daemon restart. No memory corruption, information leak,
privilege escalation, or code execution primitive was observed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmgenet: unshare the skb before writing the control block
bcmgenet stores first_cb, last_cb and bytes_sent in the skb control
block and reads them back on completion to free the skb and credit BQL.
ether_setup() leaves IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set, so the stack can resubmit
a shared skb that is still in the ring. The next transmit overwrites
last_cb, so the earlier slots complete without crediting their bytes
and BQL stalls the queue until the watchdog resets it.
Unshare the skb before writing the control block.
Reproduce with pktgen in clone_skb mode, which hands the driver the same
skb while earlier copies are still in the ring:
modprobe pktgen
pg=/proc/net/pktgen
echo "add_device eth0" > $pg/kpktgend_0
echo "dst_mac AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF" > $pg/eth0
echo "dst 192.0.2.1" > $pg/eth0
echo "clone_skb 8" > $pg/eth0
echo "count 0" > $pg/eth0
echo start > $pg/pgctrl &
sleep 5
echo stop > $pg/pgctrl
wait
cat /sys/class/net/eth0/queues/tx-0/byte_queue_limits/inflight
inflight stays nonzero on the now idle queue. clone_skb 0 leaves it at
zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libsas: Fix SMP IO deadlock during HA resume
smp_execute_task_sg() calls pm_runtime_get_sync() on the host before
issuing an SMP command. When that command is itself issued from the HA
resume path, the get_sync() deadlocks: it waits for the ongoing resume
(the device is RPM_RESUMING), while the resume is blocked in
sas_drain_work() waiting for that same SMP IO to complete.
The deadlock needs an expander-attached SATA disk. During
sas_resume_ha() -> sas_drain_work(), DISCE_RESUME -> sas_resume_sata()
-> ata_sas_port_resume() requests ATA_EH_RESET, and the hard reset for
such a disk is done via SMP PHY CONTROL (sas_ata_hard_reset() ->
sas_phy_reset() -> sas_smp_phy_control() ->
smp_execute_task_sg()). Direct-attached SATA resets through
lldd_control_phy() and SSP devices use TMFs, so neither hits this.
Replace the get_sync()/put_sync() pair with
pm_runtime_get_noresume()/pm_runtime_put(). smp_execute_task_sg() only
needs to hold off autosuspend while the SMP is in flight, and it must
not try to resume the host: a sync resume issued from the HA resume path
itself is what deadlocks, and by the time sas_resume_ha() runs, hw_init
has already reinitialized the hardware, so the device is accessible
without one.
The usage reference is still required. Discovery work normally runs
inside an event worker's PM reference, taken at sas_notify_port_event()
notify time and held until the handler has flushed the disco
queue. sas_rediscover_ex_phy() however requeues DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN
from within the revalidation worker itself, and flush_workqueue() does
not wait for work items queued during execution, so that chained
revalidation runs with no outer PM reference - without the
get_noresume(), its SMP could race autosuspend.
For the BSG path, sas_smp_handler() is the only caller which may find
the host autosuspended: expander SMP requests do not go through any SCSI
device request queue, so nothing else in that path holds the host
awake. Resume it there with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and check the
result. |
| A flaw was found in the libblkid library of util-linux. During nested partition probing, the BSD, Minix, Solaris x86, and UnixWare partition probers cache a raw pointer to a parent partition entry in a dynamically allocated array. When subsequent partition additions cause the array to be reallocated, this pointer becomes stale, leading to a heap use-after-free read. An attacker who can present a crafted block device image (for example, via USB insertion or a loop-mounted disk image) can trigger this flaw without user interaction, as libblkid is invoked automatically by udev/udisks as root on block-device hot-plug events. This could lead to limited information disclosure or denial of service. |
| A flaw was found in util-linux. Restricted bind mounts take the source path from fstab but do not pin that source before the privileged mount. A local unprivileged user who can replace the authorized source or a writable ancestor can redirect SUID mount(8) to bind another host directory. If the fstab entry also sets X-mount.owner, X-mount.group, or X-mount.mode, root then changes ownership or mode on that redirected inode. |
| The nsenter --join-cgroup option opens the target cgroup.procs file as root and leaves that file descriptor open across later namespace and credential changes and across execve(). Because the kernel checks later cgroup migrations using the credentials from the original open, a program run in an attacker-controlled target can inherit root's ability to move host processes between cgroups. After a privileged operator uses --join-cgroup against that target, an unprivileged user can migrate and terminate unrelated root processes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix the sub-buffer array base in rb_meta_subbuf_idx()
On a persistent ring buffer, rb_meta_subbuf_idx() can return an index one
sub-buffer too high. rb_setup_ids_meta_page() then fills subbuf_ids[]
shifted by one and leaves subbuf_ids[0] NULL, which __rb_map_vma()
dereferences when userspace maps trace_pipe_raw. rb_update_meta_reader()
writes two such indices into meta->buffers[], which rb_cpu_meta_valid()
would reject on the next boot, discarding the previous boot's trace.
A CPU's sub-buffer array starts after its meta header and the nr_subbufs
integers that follow, aligned up to a sub-buffer. rb_meta_subbuf_idx()
inverts that calculation but skips only the integers, not the header, so
its base is one sub-buffer low whenever the omitted header size crosses
the alignment boundary.
Invert the calculation with rb_subbufs_from_meta() rather than repeating
it. rb_range_buffer() maps an index back to an address through the same
helper, so the two directions can no longer disagree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Reject a negative task index from parse_pdu_itt
A transport that implements parse_pdu_itt hands libiscsi an index taken
from the PDU, and both lookups bound it from above only:
if (i >= session->cmds_max)
i and cmds_max are both int, so a negative index passes and
session->cmds[i] is read from before the array.
be2iscsi produces one. beiscsi_parse_pdu() assigns the raw tag,
*index = (int)itt;
and beiscsi_complete_pdu() forwards an unsolicited NOP-In from the
hardware async ring without replacing its ITT, so the value is the
target's. It also reports the session's own age rather than the one in
the tag, which leaves the age comparison in iscsi_verify_itt() with
nothing to reject.
Bound the index from below in both lookups. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: st: Fix use-after-free race between st_remove() and st_open()
st_remove() drops the probe reference on the scsi_tape with kref_put()
and only afterwards removes its index from st_index_idr. If that was the
last reference, scsi_tape_release() frees the structure while it is
still published in the idr.
scsi_tape_get(), called from st_open(), looks up the tape in
st_index_idr and takes a reference under st_ref_mutex and
st_index_lock. remove_cdevs() does not wait for opens that are already
past chrdev_open(), so an open that is blocked on st_ref_mutex while
st_remove() holds it can take the mutex as soon as st_remove() drops it,
find the freed tpnt in the idr and call kref_get() on it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in st_open
Write of size 4 ...
st_open (drivers/scsi/st.c:254 drivers/scsi/st.c:1291)
chrdev_open
...
Freed by task ...:
kfree
st_remove (drivers/scsi/st.c:4512)
Remove the index from the idr before dropping the reference, all under
st_ref_mutex. A concurrent scsi_tape_get() now either runs first and
holds a valid reference that keeps the tape alive, or runs afterwards
and finds nothing, so st_open() fails with -ENXIO.
This restores the ordering st_remove() had before the conversion to
st_index_idr, where the tape was unpublished from scsi_tapes[] before
the final kref_put(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix false warning in ring_buffer_map_get_reader()
The mmap reader can warn when it catches up with a writer that is still
committing events. rb_get_reader_page() returns NULL in this case, but
ring_buffer_map_get_reader() treats that result as an error.
The initial rb_per_cpu_empty() check filters out an empty buffer, but it
does not guarantee that the next reader page has committed data. Writers
do not take reader_lock and can advance commit_page before publishing the
committed length on the new page. rb_get_reader_page() can swap to that
page, catch up with the writer and return NULL.
Handle NULL through the existing no-data exit without warning. Remove the
caller's reader_page == commit_page check as well, since the reader-page
helper already handles that case. The existing metadata update and return
path remain in place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Do not show buffer_meta for CPUs without a buffer
The per_cpu/cpuN/buffer_meta files are created for every possible CPU,
but buffer->buffers[cpu] is only allocated once that CPU comes online.
Reading the file of a CPU that never came online dereferences a NULL
cpu_buffer in rbm_start().
Fail the open with -ENODEV when the CPU has no buffer, as the other
per CPU ring buffer interfaces do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: viai2c-wmt: Fix clock leak in wmt_i2c_probe()
In wmt_i2c_probe(), i2c->clk is acquired using of_clk_get(). If any
subsequent operation fails or when the module is unloaded, the clock
reference count is never decremented via clk_put(), leading to a
resource leak.
Switch to devm_clk_get() so that the clock is automatically managed
and released. |
