| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value
l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the
attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences
opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a
raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed
that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers
(l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and
l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once
the running length has gone negative, by which point the
out-of-bounds read has already executed.
An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being
consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It
is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read
past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it
is fragile to future changes in the callers.
Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into
l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full
option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer
once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of
inferring the error from a negative length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags
mt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(),
mt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a
per-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only
bounded by td->maxcontacts, which is taken from the device's
ContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by
BITS_PER_LONG.
As a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count
makes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and
corrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers
release timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts()
runs
for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++)
clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags);
with num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop
clears the bits that overlap td->applications.next, zeroing that list
head, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then
dereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a
KASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in
mt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is
offsetof(struct mt_application, num_received).
The state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID
multitouch device; no local privileges are required.
Store the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized
for maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots,
and keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two
"mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK" arming checks become
bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts).
Move MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the
same commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits
gone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned
long on 32-bit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap
Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last
destination.
For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data,
while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the
linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but
without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret
uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds
access during frame return.
Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone().
Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in
dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as
nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast
support aligned between native and generic XDP. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate free block extents against the partition length
udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the
partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A
crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count
points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap
array.
A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably
panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop
systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable
UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply
the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable
file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the
image have a higher prerequisite.
No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced
primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by
a kernel panic.
Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the
partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an
out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted
callers cannot walk past the flexible array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()
In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the
output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the
accumulated name length:
if (++order == 2)
uniname = p_uniname->name;
else
uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
name_len += len;
unichar = *(uniname+len);
*(uniname+len) = 0x0;
uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len
grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name
fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is
`name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short
name fragments lets uniname run far past the
p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small,
causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).
The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops
on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard
added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds
max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the
equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a
fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would
exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F3A keymap to the GPIO count
rmi_f3a_initialize() takes the GPIO count from the device query register
(f3a->gpio_count = buf & RMI_F3A_GPIO_COUNT, range 0..127).
rmi_f3a_map_gpios() then allocates gpio_key_map with
min(gpio_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but
rmi_f3a_attention() iterates the full gpio_count and dereferences
gpio_key_map[i], and input->keycodemax is set to the full gpio_count
while input->keycode points at the 6-entry allocation.
A device that reports gpio_count > 6 therefore causes an out-of-bounds
read of gpio_key_map[] on every attention interrupt, and out-of-bounds
accesses through the input core's default keymap ioctls: EVIOCGKEYCODE
reads past the buffer (leaking adjacent slab memory to user space) and
EVIOCSKEYCODE writes a caller-controlled value past it, for any process
able to open the evdev node, since input_default_getkeycode() and
input_default_setkeycode() only bound the index against keycodemax.
Size the keymap for the full gpio_count. The mapping loop is unchanged:
it still assigns only the first min(gpio_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END)
entries; the remaining slots stay KEY_RESERVED (devm_kcalloc zero-fills)
and are skipped when reporting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: simple-mux: Fix enum control bounds check
simple_mux_control_put() rejects values greater than e->items, but
enum control values are zero based. For the two-entry mux used by this
driver, valid values are 0 and 1, so value 2 must be rejected as well.
Accepting e->items can store an invalid mux state, pass it to the GPIO
setter, and pass it on to the DAPM mux update path where it is used as
an index into the enum text array.
Use the same >= e->items check used by the ASoC enum helpers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5
raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header
fits within the message length:
iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;
err = -EINVAL;
if (iphlen > length)
goto error_free;
if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
/* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */
}
It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the
"if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the
crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to
__ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read
iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in
particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4
and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t)
result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to
SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.
An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791:
"Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in
32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header
is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a
packet into its own output path.
Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing
"iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally
constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same
basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.
Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around
the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the
patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it.
Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket
message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message
buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain
the self-reported iph->ihl.
Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with
CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net
namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH
crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing
route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state
and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the
trigger uses a real netdev.
Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with
memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a
rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock
distro kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math
A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length
field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller
than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP
parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode]
.hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length.
siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives
srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd
+ MPA_HDR_SIZE;
where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this
point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest
on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below
hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int.
The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as
bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new);
is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check
addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a valid base when
len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() /
siw_rx_umem() -> skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header
copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a
multi-gigabyte read.
KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive
path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via
kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock
dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480
Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888...
Call Trace:
skb_copy_bits
siw_rx_kva
siw_rx_data
siw_check_mem
siw_proc_write
siw_tcp_rx_data
__tcp_read_sock
siw_qp_llp_data_ready
tcp_data_ready
tcp_data_queue
Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header
is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly
the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each
opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the
protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with
TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which
is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 ("Marker and ULPDU Length fields
do not agree on the start of an FPDU"), the correct framing-error
class for this inconsistency. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: validate rx_req_idx to prevent out-of-bounds array access
In mana_hwc_rx_event_handler(), rx_req_idx is derived from
sge->address in DMA-coherent memory. In Confidential VMs
(SEV-SNP/TDX), this memory is shared unencrypted and HW can modify
WQE contents at any time. No bounds check exists on rx_req_idx,
which can lead to an out-of-bounds access into reqs[].
Add bounds check on rx_req_idx in mana_hwc_rx_event_handler() before
using it to index the reqs[] array. |
| rdesktop through 1.9.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in process_plane() in bitmap.c that allows malicious RDP servers to crash clients by sending malformed 32 bpp compressed bitmaps. Attackers can declare a large bitmap geometry with a short compressed body in bitmap update PDUs or bitmap cache orders, causing unbounded reads past the receive buffer and denial of service. |
| Netpbm through 11.16.00 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in rasttopnm that allows attackers to read heap memory by supplying Sun rasterfiles with short colormaps. Attackers can craft colormapped rasterfiles with pixel bytes exceeding the palette length to leak up to 255 adjacent heap bytes into the PNM output or crash the program. |
| rdesktop through 1.9.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in process_bmpcache2() in orders.c that allows malicious RDP servers to crash clients via crafted revision-2 bitmap cache orders. Attackers can send an uncompressed order with large width/height or an underflowing mode nibble and short payload, causing memcpy() reads past the receive buffer and denial of service. |
| kqueue_fork_copy_knote() indexed into the child's file descriptor table using a knote's file descriptor number without a bounds check. Because the child's table is copied before knotes are transferred, a concurrent thread in the parent could grow the parent's table and register knotes with file descriptor numbers beyond the end of the child's table, causing an out-of-bounds read.
An unprivileged local user may be able to exploit these races to escalate privileges. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office PowerPoint allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Prefer NLA_NUL_STRING
These attributes are evaluated as c-string (passed to strcmp), but
NLA_STRING doesn't check for the presence of a \0 terminator.
Either this needs to switch to nla_strcmp() and needs to adjust printf fmt
specifier to not use plain %s, or this needs to use NLA_NUL_STRING.
As the code has been this way for long time, it seems to me that userspace
does include the terminating nul, even tough its not enforced so far, and
thus NLA_NUL_STRING use is the simpler solution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure hugepage is in by slot before checking max mapping level
When recovering hugepages in the shadow MMU, verify that the base gfn of
the shadow page is actually contained within the target memslot, *before*
querying the max mapping level given the shadow page's gfn. Failure to
pre-check the validity of the gfn can lead to an out-of-bounds access to
the slot's lpage_info (which typically manifests as a host #PF because the
lpage_info is vmalloc'd) if the guest creates a hugepage mapping (in its
PTEs) that extends "below" the bounds of a memslot.
When faulting in memory for a guest, and the size of the guest mapping is
greater than KVM's (current) max mapping, then KVM will create a "direct"
shadow page (direct in that there are no gPTEs to shadow, and so the target
gfn is a direct calculation given the base gfn of the shadow page). The
hugepage recovery flow looks for such direct shadow pages, as forcing 4KiB
mappings when dirty logging generates the guest > host mapping size case.
When the 4KiB restriction is lifted, then KVM can replace the shadow page
with a hugepage.
But if KVM originally used a smaller mapping than the guest because the
range of memory covered by the guest hugepage exceeds the bounds of a
memslot, then KVM will link a direct shadow page with a gfn that is outside
the bounds of the memslot being used to fault in memory. The rmap entry
added for the leaf mapping is correct and within bounds, but the gfn of the
leaf SPTE's parent shadow page will be out of bounds.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000806ffc
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1002a7067 PMD 10612f067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 13 UID: 1000 PID: 757 Comm: mmu_stress_test Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-48ce1e26eace-x86_pir_to_irr_comments-vm #341 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level+0x79/0x2b0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages+0x21b/0x320 [kvm]
kvm_set_memslot+0x1ee/0x590 [kvm]
kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x3a1/0x4d0 [kvm]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x9bf/0x15d0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb7/0xbb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f21c0f1a9bf
</TASK>
Don't bother pre-checking the bounds of the potential hugepage, i.e. don't
check that e.g. sp->gfn + KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(sp->role.level + 1) is also
within the memslot, as the checks performed by kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()
are a superset of the basic bounds checks. I.e. pre-checking the full
range would be a dubious micro-optimization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/vce: Prevent partial address patches
In the case that only one of lo/hi is valid, the patching could result
in a bad address written to in FW. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing
When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached
peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters
are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().
However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not
validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If
the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the
actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential
memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE
processing and kmemdup() copies).
Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT
chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO
buffer before it is used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF
chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls
af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6)
trusting the parameter's declared length.
An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that
declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter
header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then
reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.
Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16
bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.
The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with
sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound.
Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before
from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43
("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop"). |
