| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix vmlinux BTF prep race in bpf_get_btf_vmlinux
bpf_get_btf_vmlinux() lazily parses the vmlinux BTF under the
bpf_verifier_lock, but publishes the result through a plain store
and re-checks it through a plain lockless load. Nothing orders
the stores initializing the struct btf inside btf_parse_vmlinux()
against the store publishing the pointer: On a weakly ordered
arch, a concurrent first-time caller taking the lockless fast
path could in principle observe the pointer before the parsed
contents are visible. The mutex_unlock() does not help such a
reader given it only synchronizes with a later acquisition of the
same lock. Thus, publish the pointer with smp_store_release()
and read it on the fast path with smp_load_acquire().
Acquire semantics are needed rather than a dependency-ordered
READ_ONCE(): btf_parse_vmlinux() also populates globals outside
the returned object (e.g. bpf_ctx_convert.t). An address
dependency would only order accesses performed through the
pointer and not cover other globals. |
| The Booking Calendar plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 11.8.2 via the `wpbc_ajax_option_save` AJAX action. The vulnerability exists because the `handle_ajax_save()` function applies per-option safeguards only to names explicitly registered via `register_option_policy()`, causing `get_option_policy()` to return an empty policy — bypassing all can_save, force_mode, and allowed_keys checks — for any unregistered option name, including core WordPress options, while an attacker-controlled `data_name` parameter passes through `sanitize_key()` and is written directly to `update_option()` without restriction. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Editor-level access and above to escalate their privileges to Administrator by writing core WordPress options such as `default_role=administrator` and `users_can_register=1`, then self-registering a new Administrator account. The nonce check does not meaningfully restrict this attack, as both the nonce value and nonce action are attacker-supplied POST parameters, and a valid nonce is trivially obtainable via `admin-ajax.php?action=rest-nonce`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Add refcounting to user ring MRs
Prevent userspace from deregistering the MRs that back QP/CQ/SRQ rings
by bumping the MR's refcount upon association. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()
esp_ssg_unref() releases the page references held on the source
scatterlist after the AEAD operation completes. It calls
skb_page_unref() on every frag page for an out-of-place transform
(req->src != req->dst), and in the error path of esp_output_tail()
(already_unref == true) on the request's own scatterlist.
This is wrong when the skb carries managed frags
(SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS). Managed frags are owned by a zerocopy ubuf
and the skb does not hold a per-frag page reference; io_uring SEND_ZC
with a registered buffer attaches the bvec pages this way via
io_sg_from_iter(). The rest of the stack honours this invariant:
skb_release_data() skips the per-frag unref when SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS
is set, and skb_zcopy_managed() is the guard used at the other unref
sites.
esp_ssg_unref() is missing that guard, so for a managed-frag skb it
drops a page reference the skb never acquired. This can underflow the
page reference count and free a page that is still in use.
Guard the function with skb_zcopy_managed() so both unref paths are
skipped for managed-frag skbs, matching skb_release_data(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix dangling pointer in plane reset function
amdgpu_dm_plane_drm_plane_reset() frees the old state before allocating
a new one. If kzalloc() fails, the function returns without updating
the state pointer, leaving a dangling pointer to already freed memory.
Fix this by allocating the new state first. On allocation failure, the
old state remains untouched and the function safely returns.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
[adjust for movement around current amd-staging-drm-next] |
| go-openapi/swag jsonutils before 0.27.1 contains a stack overflow vulnerability in ordered JSON parsing and serialization due to unbounded recursion with no depth limit. Remote unauthenticated attackers can submit deeply nested JSON documents to services accepting OpenAPI specifications, causing fatal stack overflow that terminates the process and all in-flight requests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix channel idle state management in AXIDMA and MCDMA interrupt handlers
Fix a race condition in AXIDMA and MCDMA irq handlers where the channel
could be incorrectly marked as idle and attempt spurious transfers when
descriptors are still being processed.
The issue occurs when:
1. Multiple descriptors are queued and active.
2. An interrupt fires after completing some descriptors.
3. xilinx_dma_complete_descriptor() moves completed descriptors to
done_list.
4. Channel is marked idle and start_transfer() is called even though
active_list still contains unprocessed descriptors.
5. This leads to premature transfer attempts and potential descriptor
corruption or missed completions.
Only mark the channel as idle and start new transfers when the active list
is actually empty, ensuring proper channel state management and avoiding
spurious transfer attempts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Avoid reprocessing the current packet after the QP enters the error state
When do_complete() finds the QP in the error state it returns
RESPST_CHK_RESOURCE. Before commit 49dc9c1f0c7e ("RDMA/rxe: Cleanup
reset state handling in rxe_resp.c") this was the flush loop:
check_resource() had an error-state branch that fetched each remaining
recv WQE and completed it with IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR, without touching
the current packet. That commit removed the error-state branch from
check_resource() (draining is now done at rxe_receiver() entry) but
kept the do_complete() error-state return.
As a result, when a QP moves to the error state while a packet is
being completed - e.g. an rdma_cm disconnect racing with receive
processing - the responder state machine loops back into the request
processing chain with the already-completed packet still in hand:
check_resource() fetches a fresh recv WQE, execute()/send_data_in()
copies the same packet payload again, do_complete() posts another
IB_WC_SUCCESS CQE (qp->resp.status is still 0), and control returns
to the error-state check. The loop re-executes the same packet once
per posted recv WQE (observed: ~1000 duplicate IB_WC_SUCCESS
completions of one SEND, one per ~8us, matching the RQ occupancy)
until the RQ is exhausted, after which qp->resp.wqe is NULL and
send_data_in() dereferences it:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014
Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work
RIP: copy_data+0x29/0x1f0
Call Trace:
send_data_in+0x25/0x50
rxe_receiver+0xf36/0x1dd0
The duplicate completions are indistinguishable from real receives to
the ULP. During an rds stress test, the message was accepted as new and
delivered the same datagram to user space hundreds of times, corrupting
the stream; any ULP that relies on RC exactly-once delivery is affected.
A live packet reaching the error-state check in do_complete() has
been executed and completed exactly once and must be consumed, not
re-processed. Return RESPST_CLEANUP for it (dequeue and free); keep
returning RESPST_CHK_RESOURCE for the pkt == NULL case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject arena frees below the arena base
bpf_arena_free_pages() accepts scalar arena addresses. The runtime
masks the address to the low 32 bits and reconstructs a full user
address from the arena base before returning the range to the arena
free tree.
When the scalar value is below the low 32 bits of the arena base,
full_uaddr falls below user_vm_start. The existing upper-end clipping
then turns this into an out-of-range free-tree offset. A later
allocation can reuse that offset and return an address below the arena
mapping.
Reject such frees before computing the clipped range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: processor: validate MADT IOAPIC entry bounds
The IOAPIC hotplug lookup parses both MADT and _MAT records directly.
The MADT walk previously used a subtable's declared length to advance
the cursor after only locating a generic header. The _MAT path likewise
passed a generic header to the IOAPIC helper.
Validate that a current record has a complete generic header, that its
declared length is contained in the available record range, and that a
typed IOAPIC record contains the full fixed IOAPIC body before reading
its fields. Use the same relation for both MADT and _MAT provider
paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix ext PHY use-after-free on register error path
After mt7915_register_ext_phy() succeeded, a failure of the main PHY
mt7915_init_debugfs() or mt7915_coredump_register() unwound through
free_phy2, which called ieee80211_free_hw() on the ext PHY hw while it
was still registered with mac80211, since mt76_unregister_device() only
unregisters the main hw. Unregister the ext PHY (thermal + phy + hw)
first and skip the redundant free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: unlink TWT flow if the MCU rejects the agreement
The flow is added to dev->twt_list before sending the agreement to the
firmware, but the error path leaves it linked while flowid_mask is
never set. The flow slot can then be reused and memset while still on
the list, corrupting twt_list, and station removal leaves a dangling
entry behind that mt7915_mac_twt_sched_list_add() later walks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, x86: Fix trampoline stack size for 128-bit arguments
btf_distill_func_proto() accepts a function argument up to 16 bytes, so a
128-bit scalar such as __int128 reaches the x86 trampoline with
arg_size == 16. But the current implementation assumes an __int128
argument only needs one register, so the register save area is
under-allocated and save_args() overwrites adjacent stack slots.
Compute the register count from arg_size for all arguments to fix it. |
| Grafana OSS and Grafana Enterprise did not safely resolve symbolic links when
extracting plugin archives. A crafted plugin archive can chain relative symbolic link
entries to escape the plugin installation directory, writing arbitrary files and an
executable backend binary outside that directory. The dropped executable runs with the
privileges of the Grafana server process, resulting in remote code execution.
Plugin archives are extracted before their signature is verified, so a valid plugin
signature does not prevent the write. An operator can therefore be affected by
installing a plugin that appears legitimate, as well as by installing a plugin from an
arbitrary archive using grafana-cli, the GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS environment variable, or
preinstall configuration.
Grafana Enterprise is affected because it includes the same plugin extraction code as
Grafana OSS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: renesas: rcar-gen2: Fix double of_node_put on phy creation failure
for_each_child_of_node_scoped() releases the node reference on scope
exit, so the explicit of_node_put(np) in the devm_phy_create() error
path drops it twice.
Drop the redundant of_node_put() and let the scoped cleanup handle it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check
verify_tags() validates the tagset table unpacked from a policy blob.
For each set it reads a count and checks that advancing the index by
that count stays inside sets.table[]:
u32 cnt = tags->sets.table[i];
if (i+cnt >= tags->sets.size) {
i, cnt and sets.size are all u32, so i+cnt is evaluated modulo 2^32.
sets.table[] is filled by unpack_tagsets() with aa_unpack_u32(), so
every entry is a raw unbounded 32-bit word taken from the policy blob,
and verify_tags() is the function that is supposed to validate it. A
count close to U32_MAX makes the sum wrap to a small value, the guard
passes, and the inner loop then walks sets.table[++i] past the end of
the kcalloc(size, sizeof(u32)) allocation.
Note that sets.size is bounded by 65535, because unpack_tagsets() reads
it with aa_unpack_array() as a u16, so the wrap cannot be reached by
growing the table; it is reached purely through the attacker-supplied
count.
With sets.size = 2 and sets.table = { 0, 0xffffffff }:
i = 0: cnt = 0, guard 0 + 0 >= 2 is false, inner loop does not run
i = 1: cnt = 0xffffffff, guard (1 + 0xffffffff) mod 2^32 == 0 >= 2 is
false, so the guard is bypassed and the inner loop reads
sets.table[2] -- one element past a two element allocation
The walk continues until an out-of-bounds value happens to be >=
hdrs.size or the access faults, so a crafted policy yields an
out-of-bounds read on the policy load path
(aa_replace_profiles -> aa_unpack -> unpack_policydb -> unpack_tags ->
verify_tags). unpack_tags() runs before the perms and DFA tables are
unpacked, so no other table needs to be well formed to reach it.
Policy load is gated by aa_may_manage_policy(), which checks
CAP_MAC_ADMIN relative to the subject's own user namespace rather than
the init user namespace, so with the default
unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy=1 the path is reachable from an
unprivileged task in a matched-level nested namespace, not only by a
globally privileged one.
Perform the addition in u64 so that it cannot wrap, restoring the
intended i + cnt < sets.size guarantee. |
| HUBzero CMS through 2.2.32 contains a path traversal vulnerability in project file upload handlers that allows authenticated project members to write arbitrary files outside the project repository. Attackers can supply traversal sequences in upload parameters to write files to attacker-chosen paths with web server privileges, potentially enabling code execution. |
| Grav is a flat-file CMS. In versions 2.0.0-rc.1 through 2.0.21, the Twig content sandbox fails to restrict the dump and serialize filters (print_r, vardump, json_encode, yaml_encode, string): GravExtension::assertSandboxDumpSafe() determines sandbox state by calling SandboxExtension::isSandboxed() without a Source argument, which reports only the global sandbox flag that Grav never enables, so the guard added in GHSA-mc5q-6hpj-rp7j never executes. As a result, an authenticated user with page-edit rights can render {{ config|print_r }} in page content with Twig processing enabled and dump Grav's entire merged configuration — print_r reflects the real Config object held in a private property of the SandboxConfig facade, bypassing its path redaction — exposing plugin secrets such as SMTP credentials, API tokens, webhook secrets and cache backend passwords. Grav 1.7 is not affected because it ships no Twig content sandbox. The issue is fixed in 2.0.22, where the affected filters are registered with Twig's needs_is_sandboxed flag. |
| Administrator SQL Injection in PublishPress Series <= 3.1.3 versions. |
| Administrator SQL Injection in Newsletters <= 4.18 versions. |
