| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rpcrdma: arm rn_done before publishing the notification
rpcrdma_rn_register() inserts @rn into rd_xa with xa_alloc() before
storing the caller's callback in rn->rn_done. The xarray makes @rn
reachable to rpcrdma_remove_one(), which walks rd_xa and invokes
rn->rn_done(rn) for every registered notification. A device removal
that races a fresh registration can therefore observe @rn with
rn_done still NULL, because the notification objects are zero
allocated by their owners, and call through a NULL function pointer.
Store rn->rn_done before xa_alloc() publishes @rn. The xarray's
store-side and load-side ordering then guarantees that any CPU which
finds @rn in rd_xa also observes the armed callback.
rpcrdma_rn_unregister() treats a non-NULL rn_done as the sentinel
for a completed registration, so the early store must not survive a
failed registration. Clear rn_done again when xa_alloc() fails.
Were it left set, the failed-accept cleanup path would call
rpcrdma_rn_unregister() on an @rn that was never inserted, erasing
an unrelated rd_xa slot and underflowing rd_kref. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Avoid req_q_map double-read in qla2x00_error_entry()
qla2x00_error_entry() reads ha->req_q_map[que] twice: once for the NULL
check and again when assigning it to req. The map slot is cleared by
qla25xx_free_req_que() (ha->req_q_map[que_id] = NULL under mq_lock)
during queue teardown, while the response-queue interrupt that drives
qla2x00_error_entry() is still registered (the IRQ is released later in
qla25xx_free_rsp_que()). If the slot is set to NULL between the two
reads, req becomes NULL and is dereferenced.
Read the slot once into req and NULL-check the local before use. mq_lock
is a mutex and cannot be taken from interrupt context, so the single
read plus local check is the appropriate fix for the reported NULL
dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ethosu: check MMIO mapping errors in probe
devm_platform_ioremap_resource() returns an error pointer when the register
resource cannot be mapped. ethosu_probe() stores it and continues until
initialization dereferences it through MMIO accessors.
Return the mapping error before initializing the device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: storage: realtek_cr: fix use-after-free on disconnect
realtek_cr_destructor() calls timer_delete() before the chip containing
the timer is freed. The timer callback may still be running and can
rearm itself, resulting in a use-after-free.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() to wait for the callback and prevent further
rearming. Do this unconditionally because ss_en may be changed after
the timer is armed.
Move timer_setup() into init_realtek_cr() so the timer is initialized
before any failure path can invoke the destructor.
Found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped
Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force
vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem
page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE'd. Use the same core
logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the
two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page
into the vCPU's control structure:
1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter
2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)
3. Acquire mmu_lock for read
4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change.
Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM's retry logic is
fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives. If the guest_memfd page has been
dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from
guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN. If the retry was due to a false
positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events
(and will retry in the "outer" loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as
needed).
Note #2! Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is
DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated
on memslot bindings (KVM doesn't know what GFN range(s) to invalidate
without a binding). And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a
memslot, i.e. must be invalidated if its memslots disappears, regardless of
the state of the underlying guest_memfd inode.
Failure to invalidate the vCPU's control.vmsa_pa (which is checked by
pre_sev_run()) can prevent KVM from properly freeing the page as firmware
will reject the RMPUPDATE to reclaim the page with FAIL_INUSE if the vCPU
is actively running, i.e. if VMSA page is in-use. That in turn leads to an
RMP #PF on the next use, as the page will still be assigned to the SNP VM.
SEV-SNP: RMPUPDATE failed for PFN 78d198, pg_level: 1, ret: 3
SEV-SNP: PFN 0x78d198, RMP entry: [0xfff0000000144001 - 0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
rmpupdate+0x12c/0x140
rmp_make_shared+0x3b/0x60
sev_gmem_invalidate+0xe0/0x170 [kvm_amd]
delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0
kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm]
vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x496c7e
</TASK>
------------[ cut here ]------------
SEV: Failed to update RMP entry for PFN 0x78d198 error -14
WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:5160 at sev_gmem_invalidate+0x126/0x170 [kvm_amd], CPU#3: sev_snp_vmsa_pu/31345
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
RIP: 0010:sev_gmem_invalidate+0x12b/0x170 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0
kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm]
vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x496c7e
</TASK>
irq event stamp: 20689
hardirqs last enabled at (20699): [<ffffffff8e76092c>] __console_unlock+0x5c/0x60
hardirqs last disabled at (20708): [<ffffffff8e760911>] __console_unlock+0x41/0x60
softirqs last enabled at (20722): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140
softirqs last disabled at (20717): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff99
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: core: fix debugfs UAF on adapter removal
i2c_del_adapter() frees the adapter's debugfs directory before it
unregisters the adapter device, but the new_device sysfs attribute
stays writable until device_del(). A write racing with removal still
reaches i2c_device_probe(), which passes the freed adap->debugfs to
debugfs_create_dir() as the new client's parent:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lookup_noperm_common+0x407/0x430
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88803ef87810 by task syz.0.61/6090
lookup_noperm_common+0x407/0x430
simple_start_creating+0x9c/0x110
debugfs_start_creating+0xdb/0x1a0
debugfs_create_dir+0x24/0x350
i2c_device_probe+0x814/0xbf0
It's technically possible to create a client after i2c_deregister_clients
has run. That client will never be unregistered and make
wait_for_completion hang.
Close the window by removing the new_device attribute at the start of
i2c_del_adapter(). device_remove_file() will drain any clients left. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: midi2: Fix null-pointer dereference in f_midi2_free_ep_reqs
A null-pointer dereference occurs in f_midi2_free_ep_reqs() when attempting
to clean up an endpoint that was never initialized.
When configuring the MIDI 2.0 gadget via configfs and setting the block
direction to SNDRV_UMP_DIR_INPUT, the initialization of the midi1_ep_out
endpoint is explicitly skipped during the gadget bind phase
(f_midi2_bind()). As a result, the usb_ep->card field remains NULL.
Later, when the host sets the alternate setting, f_midi2_set_alt()
unconditionally stops both the IN and OUT endpoints by calling
f_midi2_stop_eps(), which in turn calls f_midi2_free_ep_reqs() for both
endpoints. When f_midi2_free_ep_reqs() is called for the uninitialized
midi1_ep_out, it attempts to dereference usb_ep->card to determine the
number of requests to free, leading to a crash.
Fix this by using usb_ep->num_reqs instead of usb_ep->card->info.num_reqs
in f_midi2_free_ep_reqs(). usb_ep->num_reqs is correctly set during
f_midi2_init_ep() and remains 0 if the endpoint was never initialized,
safely avoiding the loop. For consistency, apply the same change to
f_midi2_alloc_ep_reqs().
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc00000000ee: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000770-0x0000000000000777]
...
RIP: 0010:f_midi2_free_ep_reqs drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi2.c:1166
[inline]
RIP: 0010:f_midi2_stop_eps+0x28e/0x4d0
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi2.c:1246
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f_midi2_set_alt+0x11c/0xf00 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi2.c:1296
composite_setup+0x1ffd/0x3480 drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c:1933
configfs_composite_setup+0xbd/0x100 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:1877 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix infinite loop in pcpu_freelist push with one possible CPU
__pcpu_freelist_push() can loop forever when only one CPU is possible
and an NMI re-enters pcpu_freelist_push() while the interrupted context
holds that CPU's freelist lock.
After the current-CPU fast path fails, the fallback loop walks
cpu_possible_mask while skipping the current CPU. With CONFIG_SMP=n, or
when an SMP kernel is limited to one possible CPU with nr_cpus=1 or
possible_cpus=1, there are no other possible CPUs to examine. The loop
therefore makes no lock acquisition attempt and can never make progress.
The following stack was observed on a UP system:
NMI context:
pcpu_freelist_push
free_htab_elem
htab_map_delete_elem
[perf-event BPF program]
__perf_event_overflow
perf_event_nmi_handler
exc_nmi
Interrupted context:
__pcpu_freelist_push
pcpu_freelist_push
free_htab_elem
htab_map_delete_elem
[raw_tp/sys_enter BPF program]
__bpf_trace_sys_enter
do_syscall_64
raw_res_spin_lock() detects the same-CPU recursive acquisition and
returns -EDEADLK, but the subsequent fallback loop has no candidate head
on a system with one possible CPU.
Restore the extra fallback head that existed before the rqspinlock
conversion. Keep the current-CPU fast path, then try the other possible
CPUs and finally the extra head. The additional head lets a push, which
cannot fail without losing a preallocated element, make progress when the
only per-CPU head is held by the interrupted context.
Also check the extra head from the pop path so that nodes placed there
can be reused. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's af_unix component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation.
The unix_stream_sendpage() function tries to add data to the last skb in the peer's recv queue without locking the queue. Thus there is a race where unix_stream_sendpage() could access an skb locklessly that is being released by garbage collection, resulting in use-after-free.
We recommend upgrading past commit 790c2f9d15b594350ae9bca7b236f2b1859de02c (or backported equivalents). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: dat: atomically update mac addresses
When a MAC address is updated in batadv_dat_entry_add(), it is done using a
simple copy function. A parallel reader might only see parts of this
update. In worst case, the reader is transporting the half updated MAC
address over the network or is creating an ARP response using it -
poisoning the ARP cache.
atomic64_t can be used to store the 48 bit of a mac address. A reader will
then either see the old mac address or the new one - never a mixture of
both. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: master: Fix recursive locking during device registration
i3c_master_register_new_i3c_devs() registers newly discovered devices
while holding i3c_bus_normaluse_lock(), a down_read(). device_register()
can immediately probe the device, and probe callbacks typically invoke
I3C helpers that take i3c_bus_normaluse_lock() again, leading to a
recursive acquisition of the same rwsem. rwsems do not support recursive
read locking and can deadlock when a writer is waiting. See the
"Recursive read locks" section of Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst.
For example, with Intel LPSS I3C, LOCKDEP generates a WARNING like:
# echo intel-lpss-i3c.0 > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/mipi-i3c-hci/unbind
# echo intel-lpss-i3c.0 > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/mipi-i3c-hci/bind
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
kworker/5:1/94 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88811c810d78 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: i3c_device_match_id+0x45/0x370
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88811c810d78 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: i3c_master_reg_work_fn+0x21/0x5f0
Fix this by separating device creation from device registration.
Populate desc->dev under the maintenance lock, collect the devices that
still need registration into a local list, then release the lock before
calling device_register(). Finally retake the lock and clean up any
devices that failed to register.
Use the maintenance lock rather than the normal-use lock while adding
device objects. A write-side maintenance lock prevents readers from
observing a partially initialized desc->dev during initial device
population, or desc->dev disappearing if registration fails.
The local list requires a list node, so add a list node member to struct
i3c_device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: master: Fix use-after-free of master->this
sysfs attribute callbacks for the master controller device dereference
master->this. However, master->this is freed in
i3c_master_detach_free_devs() before the master device itself is
released.
As a result, sysfs accesses can dereference a freed master->this
pointer, leading to a use-after-free.
Keep master->this alive until i3c_masterdev_release(), which is called
after the master device and its sysfs state are being torn down. Do not
free master->this as part of the normal device detach path.
On the error path in i3c_master_set_info(), reset master->this and
bus.cur_master to NULL before freeing the allocated device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: master: Do not treat master device as a duplicate target
i3c_master_search_i3c_dev_duplicate() searches the bus for another I3C
device with the same PID as the reference device. The search can match
master->this, causing the controller itself to be returned as a
duplicate.
Since the controller is not a target device, it cannot be a duplicate of
one. Exclude master->this from matching so that the function only
returns real duplicate target devices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-pcache: validate the persisted dirty_tail chain at load
The writeback worker follows the persisted dirty_tail chain, which is
decoded from the cache device independently of the key_tail chain that
cache_replay() walks and bounds. A crafted image, whose on-media fields are
authenticated only by a crc32c with a fixed seed, can aim dirty_tail at a
chain of last ksets that never terminates, so cache_writeback_fn() re-arms
itself with no delay forever.
Walk the dirty_tail chain once at load with the same hop cap cache_replay()
uses and fail the table load with -EIO if it does not reach an end within
n_segs hops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcg: move LRU size accounting on reparenting instead of copying it
When a memory cgroup is offlined its LRU folios are reparented to the
parent. lruvec_reparent_lru() splices the child's lists into the
parent's and credits the parent with the child's per-zone
lru_zone_size[], but never clears the child's copy, so the size is
copied rather than moved. lru_gen_reparent_memcg() does the same for
MGLRU.
The parent is left correct, credited with exactly the folios it took
over. The stale value sits on the child and nothing will correct it:
folio->memcg_data now resolves to the parent, so every later
update_lru_size() for those folios goes there.
Dying cgroups are not freed immediately and mem_cgroup_iter() still
walks them, so shrink_lruvec() keeps being called on them.
get_scan_count() reads the phantom counter through lruvec_lru_size() and
the scan loop then grinds through nr[] in SWAP_CLUSTER_MAX steps against
an empty list, for as long as the dead cgroup lives. Under MGLRU the
MGLRU scanner runs instead, but count_shadow_nodes() sums all of
NR_LRU_LISTS through lruvec_lru_size() and over-budgets the shadow node
limit just the same.
On one 251 GiB host a sweep of every mz->lru_zone_size[] found 380
counters describing folios on no list at all: 124777314 pages, 476 GiB,
1.89x the machine's RAM, across 57 cgroups. All were on memcgs with
CSS_DYING set and CSS_ONLINE clear, and parent/child pairs reported
byte-identical sizes.
LRU_UNEVICTABLE needs its size moved too. Its list is deliberately not
spliced because lruvec_init() poisons the head - the unevictable LRU is
imaginary and folios are never threaded on it - but the size is kept by
lruvec_add_folio()/lruvec_del_folio() and those folios account to the
parent from here on.
This depends on commit bf4ade7dbd76 ("memcg: keep folio's objcg same as
its node") and must not be backported ahead of it. Without that
invariant a folio's objcg can belong to another node, so a folio already
spliced onto the parent's list can still resolve to the child's lruvec
until the objcg's node is reparented in a later iteration of
memcg_reparent_objcgs(); clearing the child's counter early then lets
lruvec_del_folio() underflow it and trip the WARN_ONCE()/VM_BUG_ON() in
mem_cgroup_update_lru_size(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: synopsys: dw-dp: Support unregistering the AUX channel
The DisplayPort AUX channel gets initialized and registered during
dw_dp_bind(), but it is never unregistered, which may lead to resource
leaks and/or use-after-free.
Add the missing dw_dp_unbind() function to allow the users of the
library to handle the required cleanup, i.e. unregister the AUX adapter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: dw_dp: Release core resources
Core resources such as the DisplayPort AUX channel get initialized and
registered during dw_dp_bind(), but are never unregistered, which may
lead to memory leaks and/or use-after-free:
[ 224.661371] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in device_is_dependent+0xe0/0x2b0
[ 224.662015] Read of size 8 at addr ffff00011aee8550 by task modprobe/658
[ 224.662612]
[ 224.662752] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 658 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2-next-20260305 #14 PREEMPT
[ 224.662759] Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT)
[ 224.662762] Call trace:
[ 224.662764] show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)
[ 224.662772] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x98
[ 224.662777] print_report+0x160/0x4b8
[ 224.662783] kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
[ 224.662790] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30
[ 224.662796] device_is_dependent+0xe0/0x2b0
[ 224.662802] device_is_dependent+0x108/0x2b0
[ 224.662808] device_link_add+0x1f8/0x10b0
[ 224.662813] devm_of_phy_get_by_index+0x120/0x200
[ 224.662819] dw_dp_bind+0x34c/0xb10 [dw_dp]
[ 224.662830] dw_dp_rockchip_bind+0x194/0x250 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662864] component_bind_all+0x3a8/0x720
[ 224.662869] rockchip_drm_bind+0x120/0x390 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662899] try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x76c/0x838
[ 224.662904] component_master_add_with_match+0x1f4/0x230
[ 224.662909] rockchip_drm_platform_probe+0x420/0x538 [rockchipdrm]
[ 224.662939] platform_probe+0xe8/0x168
[ 224.662945] really_probe+0x340/0x828
[ 224.662950] __driver_probe_device+0x2e0/0x350
[ 224.662954] driver_probe_device+0x80/0x140
[ 224.662959] __driver_attach+0x398/0x460
[ 224.662964] bus_for_each_dev+0xe0/0x198
[ 224.662968] driver_attach+0x50/0x68
[ 224.662972] bus_add_driver+0x2a0/0x4c0
[ 224.662977] driver_register+0x294/0x360
[ 224.662982] __platform_driver_register+0x7c/0x98
[ 224.662987] rockchip_drm_init+0xc4/0xff8 [rockchipdrm]
Since a previous commit exported dw_dp_unbind() function in DW DP core
library to take care of the necessary cleanup, use this in the
component's unbind() callback, as well as in its bind() error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: Fix OF node reference leak via auto cleanup
Sashiko reported a reference leak in rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable(),
the of_get_child_by_name() function does not call of_node_put() in a
symmetrical way [1].
Fix the device node reference leak by using __free(device_node) to
automatically manage of_node_put() for all device nodes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smack: fix incorrect task context in smack_msg_queue_msgrcv
The smack_msg_queue_msgrcv() function incorrectly checks
the permissions of the 'current' task instead of the
'target' task.
In the msgsnd() syscall path, if a receiver is already waiting,
the pipelined_send() optimization is used to push the message
directly to the receiver task:
ipc/msg.c`pipelined_send():
` smp_store_release(&msr->r_msg, msg)
In this case, the 'sender' (current) task performs the check
on behalf of the 'receiver' task (msr->r_tsk, passed as the
'target' parameter):
ipc/msg.c`pipelined_send():
` security_msg_queue_msgrcv(,, target := msr->r_tsk,,)
However, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv() ignores the 'target' and
checks 'current':
smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(…)
` smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE); // current task
'current' MAY satisfy smack_msg_queue_msgrcv r/w requirement,
but 'target' (the receiver task) might NOT;
as a result, an unauthorized receiver gets the message,
violating MAC policy.
Test:
1) create a sysv message queue with label “foo”
2) echo "bar foo r" >/smack/load2
3) msgrcv(,,,0,MSG_NOERROR) in "bar"-labeled task.
The task is waiting for the messages ...
4) msgsnd() from a "foo"-labeled task:
"bar"-labeled task gets the message.
This patch fixes the issue by checking permission on the
'target' task instead of 'current'.
(2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index
kone_keep_values_up_to_date() and kone_profile_activated() use an
8-bit, device-supplied profile value as an index into the 5-element
kone->profiles[] array without a range check. A malicious USB device
claiming the Roccat Kone id can send a switch-profile event (or a
startup_profile read at probe) with an out-of-range value and make the
driver read out of bounds; the result is exposed via the actual_dpi
sysfs attribute.
Reject out-of-range indices in both paths.
This was found with static analysis and confirmed with the KUnit test
added in the following patch (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds). |
