| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, when pattern-based ACL rules are configured, AuthorizationsCollector.canDoOperation substitutes client ID and username values directly into rules containing %c or %u and then treats the result as an MQTT topic filter. A client that uses + or # in either identity can broaden the substituted filter and gain cross-tenant read and write access. A # identity can also produce an invalid filter that triggers a NullPointerException in Topic.match and disrupts session processing. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1. |
| Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, SessionEventLoop.run catches only InterruptedException, and SessionEventLoopGroup does not restart a terminated loop. An MQTT command that raises an uncaught exception can terminate an event loop shared by multiple client sessions, preventing every co-located client from processing PUBLISH, SUBSCRIBE, PUBACK, and other commands. An attacker can select client IDs that map across the available loops to disrupt session processing for the entire broker. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1. |
| Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, PostOffice.subscribe parses a shared-subscription filter through SharedSubscriptionUtils.extractShareName before validating the complete $share/{shareName}/{topicFilter} structure. A remote client can send a filter such as $share/grp without a topic-filter portion, causing a StringIndexOutOfBoundsException while calculating the share name. The exception terminates command handling on the shared session event loop and can deny service to other client sessions assigned to that loop. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1. |
| Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, the broker does not enforce a maximum length for pending per-session message queues. When a fast publisher sends messages to a slow subscriber whose in-flight window is full, queued messages can accumulate without bound in memory or persistent storage. Remote clients can use this condition to exhaust broker resources and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1. |
| Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, PostOffice.publishWill publishes a client's Last-Will message without applying the canWrite authorization and reserved-topic checks used for a normal PUBLISH. A client can configure a Will for a topic that the client is not permitted to write and cause the broker to publish the unauthorized message when the client disconnects unexpectedly. This issue allows unauthorized message injection into restricted topics. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: check_cond_jmp_op(): properly infer if register is null
Nicholas Carlini reported a bug when verifier can incorrectly infer
that a pointer is non-null. The bug occurs when two pointers are
compared and one of them has a type w/o PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag,
but which allows a value to be NULL at runtime.
Here is an example:
// `a` is PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED
// `a` is 0 at runtime.
// `b` is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | PTR_MAYBE_NULL
void *a = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
int *b = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...);
if (a == b)
*b = 42; // verifier does not catch null pointer dereference
This happens because of a special case in check_cond_jmp_op(),
which attempts to strip PTR_MAYBE_NULL flags from pointer types,
when processing comparisons like `rA == rB`, if either rA or rB can't
be null.
The non-null property is derived based on the absence of
PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag on rA's or rB's type. But that is not sufficient
for types like PTR_TO_MEM, as in the example.
This patch replaces type_may_be_null() call with reg_not_null(),
which contains an allowlist of types for which absence of
PTR_MAYBE_NULL actually means that the value can't be NULL at runtime.
At the moment, the list in the reg_not_null() omits two types for
which PTR_MAYBE_NULL is applicable: PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK and PTR_TO_BUF.
In order to remain backward compatible, and assuming that only
comparison between pointers of the same type makes sense,
this commit extends reg_not_null(). W/o such an extension e.g.
verifier_jeq_infer_not_null/null_ptr_to_map_value fails.
reg_not_null() can be extended further, but I deem that out of scope
for the fix at hand. Explicit base_type(...) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID
checks in the check_cond_jmp_op() can be removed with migration to
reg_not_null(), but that is a behavioural change, as the special case
would start matching for PTR_TO_BTF_ID that is also is_trusted_reg().
I omit the behavioural change from this commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: bound $AttrDef table walk to the loaded table size
ntfs_attr_find_in_attrdef() walks the in-memory $AttrDef table, but the
loop condition bounds only the start of each entry, not the whole entry:
for (ad = vol->attrdef; (u8 *)ad - (u8 *)vol->attrdef <
vol->attrdef_size && ad->type; ++ad)
struct attr_def is 160 bytes; the guard reads ad->type at offset 128 and
the loop body reads further fields. vol->attrdef is kvzalloc(i_size),
where i_size is the on-disk $AttrDef data size, checked in
load_and_init_attrdef() only as 0 < i_size <= 0x7fffffff. A volume whose
$AttrDef data size is smaller than one entry (e.g. 120 bytes) makes the
read of ad->type run past the allocation. Creating a file reaches this
through ntfs_attr_size_bounds_check() and reads out of bounds:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ntfs_attr_find_in_attrdef+0x66/0xa0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888005833280 by task init/1
ntfs_attr_find_in_attrdef
ntfs_attr_size_bounds_check
ntfs_attr_can_be_non_resident
ntfs_attr_add
Require the whole entry to lie within attrdef_size in the loop guard, and
reject at mount a $AttrDef too small to hold one attr_def entry. |
| Out-of-bounds Write in the natural width branch of the text sizing protocol in kitty from 0.40.0 before 0.49.0 allows a program writing to the terminal to write past the end of a fixed-size buffer, because screen_handle_multicell_command() in kitty/screen.c appends each codepoint of a grapheme cluster with lc.chars[lc.count++] = ch without any capacity check, while lc is declared by the RAII_ListOfChars macro as a four-element char_type array in the function's stack frame, so an OSC 66 escape code whose payload carries a grapheme cluster longer than four codepoints writes beyond that buffer, one 32-bit value per additional codepoint, in the order the codepoints appear. Where the cluster is preceded in the same payload by a sequence that causes an intermediate flush, the buffer is first migrated to the heap by ensure_space_for_chars() and the write occurs past the heap allocation instead. This results in termination of the kitty process and therefore of all its windows, tabs and child processes. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in dashbitco lazy_html allows mutation XSS via a parse and serialize round-trip of attacker-supplied HTML.
LazyHTML.to_html/2 and LazyHTML.Tree.to_html/2 decide whether to escape an element's text from its tag name alone. A style or script element inside SVG or MathML foreign content is parsed with character references decoded, but is serialized as an HTML raw-text element, so its text is emitted unescaped. Encoded markup such as </style><img src=x onerror=...> inside <svg><style> therefore closes the element on re-parse and becomes live markup. Applications that parse untrusted HTML with lazy_html, filter the document or tree, and serialize it for display are affected, since the payload is a plain text node that no element or attribute filter sees.
This issue affects lazy_html: from 0.1.0 before 0.1.13. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Enhance OEM ID and Table ID validation in acpi_ex_load_table_op()
Enhance OEM ID and Table ID validation in acpi_ex_load_table_op() to
prevent buffer overflows. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix P2P-Device binding handling
Our binding handling for P2P-Device can run into the following
scenario, as observed by our testing:
- a station interface is connected on some channel
- the P2P-Device does a remain-on-channel (ROC) on that channel
- the ROC ends, and the P2P-Device is removed from the binding,
but the phy_ctxt pointer is left around as a PHY cache so we
don't need to recalibrate to the channel again and again in
case it's not shared
- a binding update by the station interface, even a removal,
will re-add the P2P-Device to the binding
- the P2P-Device is removed, which removes the PHY context, but
it's still in the binding so the firmware crashes
Since the P2P device is removed from the binding and only re-
added by unrelated code, but we want to keep the phy_ctxt around
as a cache for future ROC usage, fix it by adding a boolean that
indicates whether or not the P2P-Device should be added to the
binding, and handle that in the binding iterator. That way, the
station interface cannot re-add the P2P-Device to the binding
when that isn't active. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Avoid DPMS-on for phantom stream
[Why & How]
Calling dc_update_planes_and_stream separately for stream and its
phantom stream causes a NULL pointer dereference, since the phantom is
destroyed on the first call.
Skip the call for phantom streams. |
| ESF-IDF is the Espressif Internet of Things (IOT) Development Framework. In 5.5.5, 6.0.1, and 6.1, the BlueDroid A2DP sink function btc_a2dp_sink_handle_inc_media() reads a timestamp field from the received media buffer before validating that the packet layout contains the field. A paired BR/EDR audio source within radio range can send a malformed A2DP media packet to a build with BlueDroid Classic Bluetooth and A2DP sink support enabled, causing an out-of-bounds read into adjacent heap memory and limited disclosure of heap contents. Arbitrary memory disclosure and code execution are not established. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix SMI event cross-process information leak
kfd_smi_ev_enabled() skips the suser privilege check when pid=0.
PROCESS_START, PROCESS_END, and VMFAULT events are emitted with
pid=0 while carrying another process's PID and command name, so any
/dev/kfd user in the render group can monitor all GPU workloads.
Pass the target process PID into kfd_smi_event_add() for these events
so the existing per-client filter restricts delivery to the owning
process or CAP_SYS_ADMIN subscribers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: mediatek: mt8365-afe-pcm: fix possible NULL-pointer dereferences in mt8365_afe_suspend()
mt8365_afe_suspend() allocates the register backup buffer with
devm_kcalloc(), but does not check for allocation failure before using the
returned pointer. This may lead to a NULL pointer dereference when
accessing afe->reg_back_up[i].
Add the missing NULL check and return -ENOMEM on allocation failure after
disabling the main clock.
Also propagate the return value of mt8365_afe_suspend() in
mt8365_afe_dev_runtime_suspend() so that the suspended state is not updated
when suspend fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: validate TX_CMD response layout
TX_CMD parsing uses frame_count to walk status entries and then
read the trailing SCD SSN. Make the minimum-length check follow
that exact runtime layout calculation before parsing the payload.
For new TX API, reject TX_CMD responses with frame_count != 1 and
warn/return in the aggregation handler to document that aggregated
accounting is expected via BA notifications. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix maximum allowed access checks
The DACL permission check looks for an ACE matching the current user and
falls back to the Everyone ACE. It does not consider an Authenticated
Users ACE, even though an authenticated session is a member of that
well-known group.
As a result, opening a file whose access is granted through S-1-5-11 can
incorrectly fail with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. Treat an Authenticated Users
ACE as a fallback entry alongside Everyone.
The maximal access calculation also combines access masks from every ACE,
regardless of whether its SID applies to the current user. This can grant
rights belonging to an unrelated principal. Process only ACEs applying to
the user, Everyone, or Authenticated Users, and accumulate allowed and
denied masks in ACL order. Preserve explicitly requested access bits so
they are validated against the resulting maximal mask.
When ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY is denied, report STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD
instead of the generic STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. Access to the system ACL
requires a security privilege that ksmbd does not grant.
For regular files, include FILE_EXECUTE in maximal access when the client
requested GENERIC_EXECUTE and the DACL grants the complete file-read set.
Keep a direct FILE_EXECUTE request subject to the explicit DACL bit. This
matches the POSIX file ACL mapping without broadening specific execute
requests.
Do not replace rights from an applicable NT ACE with a POSIX ACL entry.
The POSIX ACL is only a fallback when no user, Everyone, or Authenticated
Users ACE applies; otherwise it can incorrectly broaden the stored DACL.
This fixes smb2.maximum_allowed.maximum_allowed. |
| A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type size/count handling to cause excessive allocation leading to potential denial of service.
This issue affects Apache Qpid Broker-J: through 10.1.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.1.1, which fixes the issue. |
| Use after free in Windows Management Instrumentation allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| In openLogicalChannel of multiple files, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
