| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: don't overconsume buffers when using MSG_TRUNC
When a recv/recvmsg is issued with MSG_TRUNC and the incoming packet is
larger than the provided buffer, the net layer returns the full length
of the packet rather than the number of bytes actually copied into the
buffer. As a result, io_uring advances more of the provided buffer ring
than was actually filled. Use the actual filled region size to consume
the buffer, but still return the full size to preserve MSG_TRUNC
semantics.
Take care with multishot, because that seems to already truncate the
consumption based on the available payload size.
This was reported in https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/1619.
[axboe: fold in size_t unsigned fix] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bootconfig: Fix integer overflow in initrd size check
Sashiko reported that in get_boot_config_from_initrd(), a crafted initrd
with a huge bootconfig size (such as 0xFFFFFFFF) can cause the pointer
arithmetic:
data = ((void *)hdr) - size;
to wrap around on 32-bit systems (or when pointer subtraction overflows).
Because data wraps around, the subsequent bounds check:
if ((unsigned long)data < initrd_start)
evaluates to false, bypassing the check. The kernel then calls
xbc_calc_checksum(data, size), which attempts to read 4GB of memory,
hitting unmapped pages and triggering a fatal kernel page fault during
early boot. Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, an
unbounded 32-bit size can similarly bypass the initrd_start check.
Fix this by:
1. Ensuring the initrd is at least large enough to contain the bootconfig
footer and verifying hdr is within the initrd bounds.
2. Checking that size does not exceed XBC_DATA_MAX and does not exceed
the available space between initrd_start and hdr before performing
pointer subtraction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: Don't leak return code when parsing firmware format v2
When key_id from chip is zero, rtlbt_parse_firmware_v2() intentionally
ignores all security headers. However, the implementation simply breaks
from a switch statement and leaks uninitialized return code `rc' (if the
first section is a security one) or the previous section's `rc'.
Fix it by really skipping a loop with `continue'. For consistency and
readability, also do the same for the default case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel: ethosu: Fix ethosu_job_open() return value
A WARN_ON() returns a 0 or 1, not the original negative errno. Just drop
the WARN_ON() as the FD open will pass the return code to userspace and
there's only one possible source of the error (drm_sched_entity_init()). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
print_entries() uses n_entries both as the number of sort entries and as
its own return value, so the -ENOMEM it stores when the stats allocation
fails overwrites the count that the cleanup still needs:
n_entries = tracing_map_sort_entries(map, ...);
if (n_entries < 0)
return n_entries;
...
if (!stats) {
n_entries = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
...
out:
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries(sort_entries, n_entries);
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries() takes an unsigned int and loops up to
it, so -ENOMEM arrives as 4294967284. It walks an array of at most
map->max_elts pointers and calls destroy_sort_entry(), which dereferences
and frees, on whatever lies past the end.
Reading the hist file of a trigger with a .percent value, with that
allocation forced to fail:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000045000 by task init/1
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
hist_show+0x6f7/0x1df0
seq_read_iter+0x2b8/0x1190
vfs_read+0x176/0xa40
The buggy address belongs to a 4-page vmalloc region starting at
ffffc90000041000 allocated at tracing_map_sort_entries+0x5c/0xd50
A few pages further the fault is fatal. The registers at the oops confirm
the bound: the loop's end pointer less the array start, over the pointer
size, is 4294967284.
Return the error in a separate variable and leave n_entries holding the
count, the way tracing_map_sort_entries() does on its own error path.
The stats block is only entered for a value carrying .percent or .graph,
which __create_val_field() has rejected since v6.3, so this cannot be
reached in mainline as it stands. It becomes reachable again with
"tracing: hist: let values keep the percent and graph modifiers", so it
should be applied first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
create_var_ref() allocates a VAR_REF hist_field and then calls
init_var_ref() to fill it in. When that fails the field is leaked.
commit 656fe2ba85e8 ("tracing: Use hist trigger's var_ref array to destroy
var_refs") made destroy_hist_field() return early for
HIST_FIELD_FL_VAR_REF, since var refs are freed by walking the trigger's
var_refs[] array instead. create_var_ref() adds the field to that array
only after init_var_ref() has succeeded, so on this path the field is in
neither place and nothing frees it. The call was correct when it was
written, before var refs were taken out of destroy_hist_field().
init_var_ref() cannot free it either. The caller owns the field, so
init_var_ref() undoes only its own string allocations and leaves the
field alone. Freeing it there would leave create_var_ref() passing freed
memory to destroy_hist_field(), which reads its flags.
Call __destroy_hist_field(), which frees the field without consulting
the flag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback
i_usx2y_in04_int() processes the interrupt URB data without checking
urb->actual_length. A short transfer from a malfunctioning device
would cause the handler to process uninitialized heap data from the
kmalloc-allocated in04_buf, which is then copied to the mmap-accessible
ctl_snapshot[] array.
Fix by using kzalloc() for in04_buf to zero-initialize the buffer,
and adding an actual_length check to skip processing on short
transfers while still resubmitting the URB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
When a tracer option file is opened, it is passed a descriptor that points
to an element on the trace_array's topts array. This element has
information to find the trace array and other information. It uses this
element to take a reference of the trace_array so that the trace_array
does not get removed while this file is opened.
Unfortunately, there's a race condition where the element itself could be
freed by the removal of the instance the trace_array represents causing a
use-after-free as this element that is used to find the trace_array to
increment its reference counter is also freed when the instance is
removed.
To solve this, add a trace_array_tracer_options_get() helper function that
will take the address of the element that is passed to the open function
by the inode->i_private pointer and search all the trace_arrays under a
lock to find the one that the element's address is in the range of the
trace_arrays topts array elements. When a match happens, that trace_array's
reference would be increased.
Note, there's a race where if an admin was deleting and creating trace
instances at the same time and the memory of the old trace_array's array
matched the memory of the new trace_array that it could in theory open the
option from the wrong trace array. But we do not care because it would be
stupid to perform that kind of action. As long as the only thing that can
happen is that the option from the wrong trace array is used and doesn't
crash the kernel it will only make the user confused. But if they are
doing something stupid like this, they are already confused, so no harm
done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
"cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined
with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them
by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for
backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the
placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL.
create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record
carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc
word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16
bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there
becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is
small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length
is a kernel text address:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trigger
# echo hello > trace_marker
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x23/0x60
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
event_hist_trigger+0x2e7/0x12c0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Leave the field NULL, which is what the comment above the branch says
the code does and what common_stacktrace already does. FILTER_CPU and
FILTER_COMM are left alone, their create_hist_field() branches never
look at the field. |
| Concrete CMS before 9.5.3 did not validate an anti-CSRF token in the Calendar event duplicate dialog controller (concrete/controllers/dialog/event/duplicate.php) submit() action, which duplicated a calendar event after checking only canAccess() and the per-resource canAddCalendarEvent() permission, so a crafted cross-site request could cause an authenticated user with add-event permission to create duplicate CalendarEvents and CalendarEventVersions records under their own authority. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v4.0 score of 5.3 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks Winston Crooker for reporting. |
| A flaw in libmongoc's SCRAM authentication implementation caused the client to continue the authentication handshake and transmit the client proof even when a nonce mismatch was detected in the server's first message. An unauthorized party with a man-in-the-middle position could exploit this by injecting a crafted server-first-message containing a controlled salt and low iteration count, then capturing the resulting client proof to perform offline password cracking. This vulnerability is mitigated by TLS, which is standard in production deployments. |
| A missing lower-bound validation in the bson_new_from_buffer() function of libbson allows an integer underflow when processing BSON data with a zero-length prefix. The function reads a 32-bit document length from the input buffer but does not verify that the value is at least 5 (the minimum valid BSON document size) before using it in an array index calculation. When the length field is zero, the expression used to check the document's null terminator wraps to UINT32_MAX, causing a heap out-of-bounds read that crashes the process. An unauthorized party who can supply crafted BSON input to an application using this API can cause a denial of service. |
| Improper neutralization of special elements used in a command ('command injection') in Microsoft Copilot allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
hist_register_trigger() puts the trigger on the global named_triggers
list in cmd_ops->init(), and only then sets the trace clock:
if (data->cmd_ops->init) {
ret = data->cmd_ops->init(data);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
if (hist_data->enable_timestamps) {
ret = tracing_set_clock(file->tr, hist_data->attrs->clock);
if (ret) {
hist_err(tr, HIST_ERR_SET_CLOCK_FAIL, errpos(clock));
goto out;
}
The clock string is not checked anywhere before that call, so a named
trigger using common_timestamp with an unknown clock fails after it has
already become findable. event_hist_trigger_parse() then frees it
without taking it off the list, and the next lookup by name reads the
freed object:
~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch
~# echo 'hist:name=foo:keys=common_pid:ts=common_timestamp:clock=bogus' > trigger
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
~# echo 'hist:name=foo:keys=common_pid' > trigger
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800915d760 by task init/1
find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
hist_register_trigger+0xc1/0x900
event_hist_trigger_parse+0x3146/0x6af0
event_trigger_write+0xce/0x160
Freed by task 63:
kfree+0x154/0x420
trigger_kthread_fn+0xfd/0x160
Set the clock before the trigger is registered, so that nothing which
can fail runs after it is published, the way commit 6f86bdeab633
("tracing: Fix bad hist from corrupting named_triggers list") moved the
registration below the rest of the setup.
tracing_set_filter_buffering() is reference counted, so the init failure
path has to drop the reference that the clock block now takes first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
parse_field() sets HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE from the ".stacktrace"
modifier before it looks the field name up, and nothing afterwards
checks that the name resolved to a field which holds a stacktrace.
create_hist_field() picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK on the strength of the
field pointer alone, which reads a __data_loc word from the record and
follows its low 16 bits as an offset into the same record.
event_hist_trigger() takes the first word there as an entry count and
copies that many longs into a 31 entry array:
n_entries = *stack;
memcpy(entries, ++stack, n_entries * sizeof(unsigned long));
Neither end of that copy is bounded, and the count is whatever the event
holds at the offset, so any field will do:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_process_fork
# echo 'hist:keys=parent_pid.stacktrace' > trigger
# (true)
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
RIP: 0010:rb_insert_color+0x18/0x130
timerqueue_linked_add+0x7e/0xd0
enqueue_hrtimer+0x39/0xb0
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x10f/0x1f0
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30
event_hist_trigger+0x165/0x690
The timer interrupt landed on the rbtree the copy had already run over.
No debug options are needed for this; KASAN reports the same write as an
out-of-bounds read of 13835058055416381440 bytes.
Documentation/trace/histogram.rst already states the rule, "must be a
long[] type", so enforce it once the name has been resolved. Names which
resolve to no field at all, "hitcount.stacktrace" and the common_*
pseudo-fields, are refused for the same reason: they hold no stacktrace
to read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: fork: Initialize function graph state before copy_exec_state()
dup_task_struct() copies the parent's task_struct, including ret_stack.
ftrace_graph_init_task() clears the copied function graph state, but it
currently runs after copy_exec_state().
For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new task_exec_state.
If that allocation fails, copy_process() reaches bad_fork_free and
free_task() calls ftrace_graph_exit_task(). Since the child still carries
the parent's ret_stack pointer, the unwind frees the parent's active
function graph return stack. The parent subsequently accesses freed memory
from function_graph_enter_regs().
KASAN reports:
[ 22.190920] ==================================================================
[ 22.195899] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in function_graph_enter_regs+0xa76/0xb90
[ 22.200747] Write of size 8 at addr ff110000054dc0a8 by task repro/1
[ 22.205134]
[ 22.210770] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.2.0-07732-g9328b3b03bdc-dirty #3 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 22.212576] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 22.213750] Call Trace:
[ 22.215271] <TASK>
[ 22.216242] ? ftrace_stub_direct_tramp+0x10/0x10
[ 22.217774] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70
[ 22.220531] print_report+0x157/0x4b4
[ 22.223202] ? fixup_red_left+0x9/0x30
[ 22.224407] ? complete_report_info+0x83/0x110
[ 22.226679] ? function_graph_enter_regs+0xa76/0xb90
[ 22.228084] kasan_report+0xce/0x100
[ 22.230109] ? function_graph_enter_regs+0xa76/0xb90
[ 22.232860] ? stack_trace_save+0x4/0xd0
[ 22.234156] function_graph_enter_regs+0xa76/0xb90
[ 22.236090] ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
[ 22.237752] ? __pfx_function_graph_enter_regs+0x10/0x10
[ 22.238694] ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x345/0xf80
[ 22.239628] ? stack_trace_save+0x4/0xd0
[ 22.242121] ? stack_trace_save+0x4/0xd0
[ 22.243588] ftrace_graph_func+0xda/0x160
[ 22.245362] ? ftrace_stub_direct_tramp+0x10/0x10
[ 22.246520] 0xffffffffa0000095
[ 22.250528] ? stack_trace_save+0x9/0xd0
[ 22.251757] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit+0x11d/0x5c0
[ 22.253152] stack_trace_save+0x9/0xd0
[ 22.254264] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
[ 22.273631] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 22.276763] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70
[ 22.278296] __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
[ 22.280157] kmem_cache_free+0xbf/0x3b0
[ 22.282963] ? ftrace_stub_direct_tramp+0x10/0x10
[ 22.284001] free_task+0xa2/0x160
[ 22.285699] ? ftrace_stub_direct_tramp+0x10/0x10
[ 22.286752] copy_process+0x2aae/0x7bc0
Initialize the child function graph state immediately after
dup_task_struct(), before the first fallible operation. |
| A flaw was found in EAP's Elytron. An EAP application whose security domain is backed by an Elytron token-realm with oauth2-introspection would allow parameter substitution due to missing URL encoding. |
| An invalid pointer release vulnerability exists in YARA 4.5.8 during deserialization of compiled .yrc rule files. The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of external-variable pointers, which may lead to invalid free in yr_rules_destroy() or wild pointer access in yr_object_create(). An attacker can provide a specially crafted .yrc file that causes memory corruption and application crash. |
| GoCD is a continuous deliver server. Prior to 26.1.0, the internal GoCD UI /jobStatus.json API does not validate that a requested server-assigned job ID belongs to the pipeline and stage named in the request. An authenticated user can guess job IDs and retrieve status for jobs in pipelines the user cannot otherwise view, including job names, state, progress timestamps, assigned agent IP addresses and UUIDs, and associated stages and pipelines. The response does not expose console output, artifacts, commands, variables, or configuration. This issue is fixed in version 26.1.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: Serialize PCM mmap with buffer reallocation to fix page UAF
snd_pcm_hw_params() and snd_pcm_hw_free() guard buffer reallocation
with an mmap_count check performed under the PCM stream lock, but the
lock is released long before the buffer is actually freed:
snd_pcm_sync_stop(), constraint refinement and do_free_pages() all
happen in between. snd_pcm_mmap_data(), on the other hand, takes no
lock at all: it validates against the old buffer's state and
dma_bytes, remaps its pages into the VMA, and only then increments
mmap_count.
A concurrent mmap() can therefore slip in between the check and the
free. remap_pfn_range() installs writable PTEs for the old buffer's
pages without taking page references, and the subsequent
do_free_pages() returns those pages to the page allocator while the
VMA still maps them. This leaves a stale, writable mapping of freed
pages: a page-level use-after-free that can be leveraged for local
privilege escalation.
Make snd_pcm_mmap_data() participate in the buffer-access scheme
introduced for hw_params/hw_free: acquire runtime->buffer_accessing
before validating and remapping, and release it afterwards. Buffer
reallocation already fails with -EBUSY while accessors are active,
and the mmap side now fails with -EBUSY while a reallocation is in
progress, so the validate/remap sequence and the check/free sequence
can no longer interleave.
A reproducer that turns this race into a stale writable mapping of
the freed DMA buffer pages is available on request. |
